The Dahrendorf Forum is a joint initiative by the Hertie School in Berlin and the London School of Economics and Political Science, funded by Stiftung Mercator.

Since its creation in 2010, the Dahrendorf project has grown into a major research and policy engagement network. It has held three successful Dahrendorf Symposia in Berlin in 2011, 2013, and 2016. Over its four research cycles, the project has gained valuable experience of injecting academic ideas into policy debates. It has also become a recognised example of successful transnational cooperation. The project has helped to strengthen the institutional links between the two academic partners, becoming the centrepiece of intellectual collaboration between the Hertie School and the London School of Economics (LSE). Initially a British-German collaboration, the Dahrendorf initiative has grown into a broader European project, drawing together a wide network from many different countries, and now with even greater relevance in the emerging post-Brexit environment.

The Dahrendorf Team generates and disseminates social science research that is both policy relevant and of the highest standard. The researchers concentrate on generating impact with high-level policymakers and practitioners close to the centres of political action and decision-making in Berlin, London, and Brussels.
Ralf Dahrendorf and the European Union 2030: Looking Back, Looking Forward

Edited by Helmut K. Anheier and Iain Begg
Lord Dahrendorf was firmly convinced of the necessity for European cooperation and, at the same time, he was always acutely aware of the fragility of the European project. I have often been impressed, intrigued, and sometimes even puzzled, by his clear-sightedness, by his observations’ relevance to, and their resonance with, Europe today. Undogmatic clear-sightedness does not look for quick applause but gains it in the long run. The present moment is a moment of acute crisis. And while the Covid-19 pandemic, arguably, is the greatest and possibly most challenging crisis the European Union (EU) has ever faced, just in the last decade, the same was said about the Eurozone crisis and what has come to be called the ‘migration crisis’, not to forget Brexit.

The Dahrendorf Forum was initiated in 2010 to change the debate on Europe, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis that morphed into what came to be called the European sovereign debt, or Eurozone crisis. Stiftung Mercator has been proud to support this joint initiative by the Hertie School in Berlin and the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). The initiative was set up to honour Lord Dahrendorf’s intellectual legacy. Three aspects of this outstanding legacy have been of particular relevance to the work of Stiftung Mercator, and to me personally:

The first concerns Dahrendorf as a ‘bridge-builder’, or as an ‘embodied interface’, across and between societal sectors, academic disciplines and national borders. He was a brilliant academic, talented politician, skilled public administrator and eminent public intellectual—moving elegantly between these worlds. In this respect, he has been a model for us as an organisation. We understand our role as a private foundation to encompass being an intermediary between societal sectors, facilitating meaningful dialogue. In particular, the way in which we promote science, and the humanities can be described as ‘Dahrendorfian’. As a foundation with socio-political objectives, Stiftung Mercator does not support research solely for the sake of new scientific knowledge but with the aim of applying it to societal challenges and informing public debate.
The second concerns Dahrendorf as a public debater. His 1996 piece ‘Why Europe matters: a personal view’ is a wonderful example. He makes a genuine effort to explain why, in his view, Britain should remain within the European Union and should play a role in shaping it. At the same time, he outlines deficiencies and takes criticism seriously, without dismissing it as heresy. He has never discharged himself from the burden of argument for his stance. I think we should heed the way Dahrendorf debated Europe then when debating Europe today, acknowledging ambivalence and complexity. Examples might be the limits of European integration through law or economic integration, concerns regarding the democratic legitimacy and accountability of EU institutions, just to name a few.

The third aspect concerns Dahrendorf’s observations and insights on conflict in modern societies. To him, it was clear that modern societies are prone to tension and conflict of all kinds. For Dahrendorf, there was no point in hoping or trying to avoid conflicts but a necessity for these conflicts to be actively managed. Dahrendorf, in the 1990s, astutely described some of the conflicts globalisation would bring and the ‘perverse choices’ governments would face as a consequence of globalisation. As a foundation working on climate change, migration and integration, I think these are among the most fundamental insights when trying to contribute to societal responses to these phenomena. To me, it means that we need to understand that, for example, decarbonisation comes with distributive consequences and that some people have legitimate concerns that they will lose from certain policies. They also have a democratic right to voice these concerns. The same is true for migration and integration. These conflicts need to be bounded democratically. This is especially challenging at a time when the institutions designed to bound conflicts are increasingly contested and the nature of conflict changes. We need to understand the drivers and dynamics of this contestation and the changing nature of conflicts. And then, we need to take them seriously in order to process them productively. In that sense, it seems implausible to assume that the evolution of democratic institutions should already have, or will ever, come to an end.

The Dahrendorf Forum has, over the last ten years, embodied all of the above. As a joint initiative by the Hertie School and the LSE it has brought together researchers and practitioners from across Europe and beyond. It has grown into a major research and policy engagement network and a distinctive example of successful Anglo-British cooperation. In a Dahrendorfian manner, it has applied excellent social science research to a wide range of pressing societal and political problems. The researchers have communicated their findings beyond academia, engaged decision-makers and reached out to the public. Above all, the Dahrendorf Forum has created a space for genuine debate on Europe.

This compendium of essays is a testament to this approach. The collection brings together contributors from different countries and sectors. It launches and, I hope, stimulates a lively debate on the implications of the current crisis for the future of Europe.

I would like to thank everyone who has contributed to the Dahrendorf Forum over the last ten years. Above all, I thank Helmut Anheier and Iain Begg for co-directing this project so competently and passionately, and for editing this volume. Moreover, I thank Damian Chalmers, Mick Cox, Henrik Enderlein, Robert Falkner and Arne Westad who contributed to the project in various roles and at different times at LSE and Hertie. It has been a pleasure and a privilege to work with all of you on this truly collaborative effort. May the friendships and links last long. Finally, I thank Lady Christiane Dahrendorf for her constant and continuous support to the Dahrendorf Forum.
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**Pawel Świeboda**, Director-General of the Human Brain Project; formerly Deputy Head of the European Political Strategy Centre, the European Commission’s in-house think tank
I met Ralf Dahrendorf on only a few occasions, but I was able to tell him that I had come of age as a teenage university student reading his sociology books, and that when I became a Member of Parliament I was also much influenced by his practical thinking about how best to manage our complex economy. Indeed, as I write I can see in my bookcase my well-thumbed and annotated copy of Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society.

And so it has been a great privilege to contribute to the Dahrendorf Forum and see the influence it has had. Three years ago, I gave a talk on the theme ‘A life in politics’, in which I tried to draw some conclusions from years of dealing with crises when in Government. Then, in February 2018, with Bertrand Badré and Paul Polman, I addressed the social and environmental proposals contained in Bertrand’s book ‘Can Finance save the world?’ and asked instead whether the world could save finance? Last year, the Dahrendorf forum published a blog I wrote on the chaos of Brexit.

It is appropriate that the three main themes in these ‘Dahrendorf’ essays are populism, Brexit, and Europe’s role in globalisation. Dahrendorf could not have been expected to anticipate all the consequences of a global health pandemic, but he would have immediately recognised that it sat alongside climate change, inequality, nuclear proliferation, financial instability, and poverty as global problems in need of globally coordinated solutions, the resolution of which are beyond the capacity of any single nation state acting on its own.

Dahrendorf always saw the bigger picture. He became worried about globalisation and would have agreed with Kevin Featherstone that globalisation is not going away, but that we need to manage it better. He would also have deplored what Paweł Świeboda, in his essay, calls the ‘winner takes all’ logic of the neo-liberals that has led to rampant inequalities within almost every country round the world.
And in his lifetime, Dahrendorf had seen too much of populist nationalism not to underplay the threats posed by right wing anti-globalisation movements across Europe and the world. He wrote of the fine line we have to draw between ‘democracy and populism, between campaign debates and demagogy, between discussion and manipulation’. Indeed, Radosław Markowski reminds us how, in complex modern societies, we need to work harder to sustain democratic values.

This concern about the future of democracy was central to Dahrendorf’s bigger project. ‘The task ahead for the early 21st century’, he wrote, ‘is to square the circle between growth, social cohesion and political freedom’. He would have agreed with Kris Best and Mark Hallerberg in their essay that ‘we have to do so in the context of a new global balance of power, one that has shifted away from the post-war western hegemony’. But he would have insisted too, as Danuta Hübner writes, that ‘we cannot opt out of interdependence. It is an illusion that populists have fed us for years. Britain became a test case—we can see now how bitter the food tastes’.

As Sophie Vanhoonacker says, we ‘continue to be best served by an open international system’, and Danuta Hübner and Ferdinando Nelli Feroci urge Europe to become the true champion of multilateralism. Because of the damage being wrought by US-China rivalry, Kris Best and Mark Hallerberg point to the obligation on, and the opportunity for, Europe to lead.

But Europe has to set out a clear vision of what Global Europe means—determined at all times to stand by the democratic values that are at the heart of the Constitution of the European Union. Indeed, Europeans must not lose sight of what gives them greatest credibility and moral force on the world stage: their values and ability to deploy soft power, as stressed in the essays by Wolfgang Seibel and Alexandru Filip. As the latter says, Europe has a role in projecting an enlightened humanism that ‘rejects cynical and pragmatic power play in politics, chauvinism and nationalism, and the belief that the world society (be it politically or economically) functions according to a zero-sum logic’.

Recognising that the EU will be limited in its ability to externalise fundamental ‘European’ values in a more multi-polar international order, the notion according to Ben Martill, of ‘principled pragmatism’ nonetheless sets out a vision of the EU as a responsible international actor, its actions informed ‘by both interests and the protection of its fundamental values’.

In my role as a UN special envoy for global education, I see daily the damage done by nationalist xenophobic and anti-immigrant policies, so we must welcome the calls in the essays by Elizabeth Collett and Ben Martill for Europe to fulfil its moral duty to lead.
Ferdinando Nelli Feroci is right to say that ‘to be global it [Europe] will need to demonstrate an improved capacity to use, in a coordinated manner, all the EU’s policies (from trade to climate, to environment, to energy, to digital, to research and innovation etc.) to strengthen Europe’s external projection. Sophie Vanhoonacker wants to use its economic muscle as a trading bloc to advance its foreign policy objectives.

There are specific recommendations on how nation states should play their part in Global Europe. Drop Nordstream 2, Wolfgang Seibel tells Germany, and in doing so ‘strengthen Germany’s position in any other area of EU politics’.

Michael Cox fears both sides will lose from Brexit, but we should aim to mitigate these losses and find new ways to unite our efforts. For example, it ought to be axiomatic that the UK and the EU do not allow petty restrictions and institutional jealousies to inhibit collective action on security, as discussed in the essay by Monika Sus. ‘I argue that the Union should offer the UK the bespoke partnership’ it sought, she says. While always in favour of our membership of the European Union I recognise that the challenge today is to ensure the UK and the EU27 work together.

Dahrendorf was also as worried about European Union overreach as he was about its underperformance, and he would have been pleased that the balance of power has recently shifted from an appointed commission to the Council of all elected EU leaders. The European Union, he always argued, must be bold in pursuing its historic mission but also be humble, recognising its limitations. While I disagree with Kwasi Kwarteng on his advocacy of Brexit itself, he also draws attention to the tensions that arise between the nation state and regional forms of government like the EU.

‘A Europe which pretends to be a nation writ large, even a superpower, is in fact a monstrous construction rather than an ideal’ Dahrendorf wrote. Instead, he saw the nation state as ‘still the most effective guarantee of our civil rights, welfare and social cohesion’. And this is the challenge all countries will continue to face: to get the right balance between the national autonomies people desire and the international cooperation we desperately need.

Post-Brexit Britain will, I believe, soon discover as will those who favour an independent Scotland, that the ‘us-versus-them’ nationalism they subscribe to—the ‘Britain first’ ‘Scotland first’ ideologies—gets that balance wrong. In the modern world, each nation’s independence is limited by their interdependence, and there are indeed global problems, from climate change and pandemics and nuclear proliferation, to financial instability and the Sustainable Development Goals that cannot be fully addressed without globally coordinated solutions.
Ralf Dahrendorf had several careers—academic, politician, institutional leader—and achieved more distinction in each than most manage in just one. He was born in Germany and took British nationality in 1988 at the age of 59. Having achieved successful careers in both countries he contributed to public life in Germany as well as Britain for decades. Perhaps the best way to summarise his distinguished academic career and its interaction with his political activities is to accord him the label ‘public intellectual’. From his resistance to Nazi tyranny in the 1940s to his public debates with Rudi Dutschke, the 1960s left wing firebrand, and his time as a European Commissioner in the 1970s, he was more than ready to engage with political opponents.

As a prominent non-aligned (cross-bench) member of the House of Lords he took an interest in a wide range of subjects; as the intellectual founder of the University of Konstanz, as Director of the LSE, as Warden of Saint Anthony’s College, and as senior member of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, he encouraged a generation of students and scholars alike.

As explained in a blog written in 2017¹ for the Dahrendorf Forum, well before the acrimony around the UK withdrawal deal reached its zenith, Dahrendorf was ‘not known for evading difficult questions or shying away from controversy’. Nor could he be described as a Euro-zealot: he was instinctively pro-European, but as the blog put it ‘nonetheless frequently expressed his discomfort with developments in Brussels’ and was often sharply critical of the EU institutions. ‘Ever closer union’ is not a concept he would easily have espoused, not least because he gave greater weight to democracy and freedom and saw the nation state, despite all its defects, still as the best guarantor of freedom and democracy.

Yet it is hard to believe that Dahrendorf would have voted ‘leave’ in the 2016 UK referendum. He regarded the UK not just as a natural member of the European Union, but also as a necessary counterweight to the other larger countries, notably France and

¹ https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/ralf-dahrendorf-and-the-European-project
Germany. In all probability, he would have understood the political sentiments behind the Brexit slogan ‘take back control’, but would have deplored the political brinkmanship and opportunism. He would have been aghast at the petty nationalism the Brexit campaign fostered. He believed in political contestation and extolled the virtues of cooperation across European borders, while asserting the continuing importance of the nation state as the guarantor of identity, freedom and democracy.

**Dahrendorf on Europe**

In *After 1989: Morals, Revolution and Civil Society*, Ralf Dahrendorf (1997) raised the possibility of a ‘democratic united Europe’, and noted its ‘magnetic effect’ on would-be member states, yet regretted the European Union’s inability ‘to discharge its evident responsibility very impressively’. He regarded 1989 as a watershed year for Europe. Three decades on, the transformations wrought in Europe have been profound, but so too have been its trials and tribulations, with Covid-19 constituting the greatest yet.

Major advances since 1989 include: the latter stages of the ‘1992’ programme to complete the single market and follow-up initiatives; creating the Euro: implementing the Schengen agreement; and bringing sixteen new members into the European Union. Subsequently, however, the Euro endured several years of crisis, the economies of too many member states have stagnated, previously uncontested norms on the rule of law have come under challenge, and the 2015 refugee crisis exposed deep divisions. Populism and noxious forms of nationalism have resurfaced, and there is Brexit, the first instance of a member state seceding from the EU. The struggle to agree a collective economic response to the pandemic has led to new schisms.

European integration has had a decidedly mixed record and one which, despite all the introspection Europeans have engaged in of late about how to re-boot European integration, betrays the lack of a clear sense of direction. The Juncker Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe put forward five wildly different scenarios, but stopped short of offering a preference. Emmanuel Macron has spoken eloquently of his vision for Europe, not least in his wide-ranging ‘Sorbonne’ speech, but has struggled to enlist the support of his peers.

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Dahrendorf was very much in favour of European integration and collaboration, but, as mentioned above, was no starry-eyed evangelist for ever closer union, and certainly not for a federal Europe. Writing in 1996 on ‘Why Europe Matters’, the first ever publication of the Centre for European Reform (Dahrendorf, 1996), a think tank he was influential in establishing, he said a

‘Europe which pretends to be a nation writ large, even a superpower, is in fact a monstrous construction rather than an ideal’. Instead he saw the nation state as ‘still the most effective guarantee of our civil rights, welfare and social cohesion’.

The challenges of globalisation and the spectre of populism

At the height of the 1990s globalisation spurt, Dahrendorf argued that a growing and globalising world economy would create ‘perverse choices’ for liberal democracies: over time, staying competitive required either adopting measures detrimental to the cohesion of civil society or restricting civil liberties and political participation. The task ahead for the early 21st century, he wrote, ‘is to square the circle between growth, social cohesion and political freedom’.

He was also adamant that Europe needs to be open to the world and was a strong advocate of multilateralism. But he also feared contrary forces and commented that a ‘Europe which closes its gates will soon become stifling and illiberal in its structures and policies’. Yet faced with the increasingly belligerent stances of the US and China, as well as Russia and other middle-ranked powers, Dahrendorf’s position risks becoming untenable. In global governance and international relations new hard realities may have to be confronted.

Populism worried Dahrendorf, both because of his own experience of its ramifications and his dismay about misleading use of the term. In his treatise on ‘Acht Anmerkungen zum Populismus’ (Dahrendorf, 2003), he observes that it ‘is often difficult to draw the line between democracy and populism, between campaign debates and demagogy, between discussion and manipulation’.

He deplores the simplistic solutions put forward by so many populists, yet warns of what happens if mainstream politicians do not take the trouble to engage with electorates:
they need ‘to explain complex issues in a way that is easy to understand’. He notes how populists are more likely to thrive where parliaments are weak and expresses concern about the ‘hollowing-out’ of parliamentary democratic forms. Profusion of decision-making ‘spaces’ exacerbates the problem by leaving institutional gaps, despite a growth in the number of competing parliaments.

The result, as true today as it was when Dahrendorf was writing in 2003, ‘is not just a democratic deficit which we might be able to reverse, but a gap in democracy which we do not yet have the means to fill’. It should preoccupy Europe’s leaders who, at least in relation to economic and monetary union are alert to the need for credible democratic mechanism to render some of the difficult and far-reaching policy interventions of recent years more accountable and legitimate.

Buoyed by the prospect of coming into office without having to face an acute crisis (recall that Covid-19 only surfaced late in 2019…), Ursula von der Leyen, the then incoming Commission President, put forward six priorities in her Political Guidelines for the coming five years. From the ‘green deal’, through ‘a Europe fit for the digital age’ to a ‘stronger Europe in the world’, they suggested a different perspective from dealing with the aftermath of crisis. Yet here we are once again facing an altogether different crisis.

Questions put to authors of the essays

This volume brings together essays written by those involved in the fourth cycle of the Dahrendorf Forum addressing questions around the future of Europe. The Forum itself honours the intellectual legacy of Ralf Dahrendorf but, in keeping with his own Popperian world view, does not seek to lionise him. It is a collaboration between the London School of Economics and the Hertie School, generously funded by the Stiftung Mercator.

The essays which follow take inspiration from a variety of ideas or standpoints Dahrendorf articulated, but do not necessarily align with what he wrote or might have been deemed to believe. Several personal reflections on the man as well as his work, complement the brief portrait sketched in this introduction. The contributors were asked to reflect on six questions, detailed below, though without having to offer responses to all six or to take account of other perspectives. They touch on themes Dahrendorf not only wrote about, but which can also be regarded as central to political debate today in these strange times of Covid-19, resurgent nationalism and uncertainty about how the European ‘project’ evolves.
Specifically, the questions were:

1. In the 1990s, Dahrendorf noted the appeal of Europe as a bastion of democracy, but he was ambivalent about the need for democracy at European level. Do you share his view of the nation state is ‘still the most effective guarantee of our civil rights, welfare and social cohesion’. Do you think his assessment still holds today and do you have suggestions about how to improve matters? How can the balance between the national and the supranational be better organised and managed?

2. Dahrendorf argued that a growing and globalising world economy would create ‘perverse choices’ for liberal democracies. For him, as noted above, the task ahead for the early 21st century, ‘is to square the circle between growth, social cohesion and political freedom’. Do you agree with this statement and how do you view Europe’s prospects in this regard, not least in light of the Covid-19 crisis?

3. More recently, analysts like Dani Rodrik, but also some politicians in Europe and elsewhere, have favoured a de-globalisation of national economies so as to regain national economic sovereignty. How should the EU respond to these challenges, considering also the current debate about the risks of over-reliance on global supply chains, for many of which China is pivotal?

4. Is an enhanced global role for Europe, as proposed by European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, a realistic objective and, if so, in what domains and can it aspire to be a leading power on a par with China and the US? In the context of growing US-China rivalries, apparent US disengagement from global governance and a belligerent Russia, what are realistic geopolitical policy options for the EU?

5. Brexit would have deeply shocked Dahrendorf. The UK has, formally, now left the European Union and negotiations on the future relationship between the UK and the EU27 are struggling. Considering the interests of both sides, what would be the optimal outcome of these negotiations overall or in the area you know best (for example, trade, security, foreign policy, etc)?

6. If you had to make up to three proposals to improve the performance of the EU by 2030, assuming a reasonably rapid recovery from the Covid-19 traumas, what would they be? Conversely, what would be up to three missteps you would wish the EU not to take?
All the authors rose to the challenge and their contributions succeed not only in providing thought-provoking analyses of matters central to the future of Europe, but also in demonstrating the continuing relevance of Dahrendorf’s insights. The essays are presented under three broad headings: ‘Europe in the world’, ‘Brexit’ and ‘Democracy’. However, several of the essays cut across these boundaries.

We are grateful to Gordon Brown for his excellent Foreword and to all the authors for producing such high-quality essays. We also warmly thank all the Dahrendorf Forum team for their contributions to the work of the Forum over the years, and particularly Ted Knudsen and Gesa von Stillfried for their support throughout the process of producing this volume. Indira Endaya and Sarah Coolican did sterling work in turning the raw material into such an elegant publication. None of this would have been possible without the funding and encouragement provided by Stiftung Mercator and we are immensely grateful to Wolfgang Rohe and his colleagues.

References


Europe in the World
The EU’s Geopolitical Moment

Benjamin Martill

Introduction

Ralf Dahrendorf was no stranger to the key issues in European foreign policy and security collaboration. He was the European Economic Community’s (EEC) Commissioner for External Relations and Trade between 1970 and 1972 and a number of his scholarly publications from the period dealt explicitly with questions of European and EEC foreign policy (e.g. Dahrendorf 1973, 1977, 1978), touching on questions of foreign policy identity, transatlantic relations, collaboration between member states and the means of EEC influence—questions that continue to inform discussion of the EU’s role in the world today. Moreover, Dahrendorf’s voluminous subsequent writings invariably took account of Europe’s external context for the policies and priorities pursued on the continent.

Yet Dahrendorf himself may have been surprised at the centrality which questions of foreign, security and defence policies have received at the highest levels of the EU over the past few years. A vast array of security and defence initiatives was promoted by the Juncker Commission and more are promised as part of von der Leyen’s ‘geopolitical Commission’ (Politico 2019). However, a ‘geopolitical Europe’ strikes many as a contradiction in terms, given the EU’s ‘civilian’ identity cultivated over the years. Moreover, the Union has never been a defence actor (though it has developed significant capacities in security over the years) and NATO remains the major strategic actor in Europe.

The view from Europe looks very different in 2020 compared with the post-Cold War decade: the transatlantic relationship is fraying, non-democratic powers are on the rise, the commitment to the liberal international order has never been weaker, and intractable conflicts persist in the EU’s near abroad. The rise of a more dangerous external environment has prompted a number of EU-led proposals, aimed at endowing the EU with ‘autonomous’ security and defence capabilities, cultivating a discourse less averse to conflict and more tuned-in to European interests.
This brief contribution examines the position of Europe in a more ‘fragile’ international order and assesses the main institutional and discursive innovations which have emerged in response. It suggests the EU’s geopolitical moment diagnoses many of the Union’s problems correctly, offers several creative institutional solutions to try to overcome these, and sets out a rhetorical blend of realpolitik and normativity which is both politically savvy and strategically helpful. But it also claims the EU risks letting its expectations (and those of others) race ahead of realities, continues to prioritise forms of EU autonomy over other potentially workable European initiatives, and has notably failed to set out a position on geostrategic dilemmas to come.

The EU’s Geopolitical Moment

There are a number of reasons why attention has turned in recent years to the development of the Union’s security and defence capabilities. External developments were foremost in the minds of policymakers, and in many ways the world the EU inhabits is more dangerous than that of the more immediate post-Cold War era (e.g. Ten Brinke and Martill 2019; Tocci and Alcaro 2014). The crux of European security, the transatlantic relationship, has weakened, given the US’ increased focus on the Asia-Pacific and the current White House incumbent’s apparent dislike of the EU’s policy priorities, as well as its dependence on American largesse in security matters.

The rise of ‘non-Western’ powers, chief among them China, has proven a stark reminder that the dominance of the West over the international political order cannot last forever. Plainly the EU, and the US, must find ways to accommodate would-be major powers. Meanwhile, intractable conflicts have emerged on the Union’s periphery—in the Donbass region, in Syria, in Libya—many of which resemble the Cold War-era ‘proxy wars’. While the Syrian and Libyan crises emerged out of failed democratization efforts, the resurgence of Russia under Vladimir Putin and that country’s entry into the strategic milieu has turned these conflicts into geopolitical contests, as well as precipitating the crisis in the Ukraine.

These external challenges—to put it euphemistically—prompted much soul searching within Europe about the viability of the continent’s existing security and defence arrangements and the ability of the Union to protect its citizens in a more dangerous world. But the Brexit vote of 23rd June 2016 provided much of the impetus needed to get these initiatives off the ground. There are a number of reasons for this.
First, the Brexit vote galvanised the EU into action, offering a critical juncture at which reforms could be instigated. The British decision to leave the EU came as a shock to the EU, stoking fears of collapse and prompting concerted discussion of the Union’s post-Brexit priorities. Second, Brexit risked undermining the credibility of the integration process, creating incentives for policymakers to show not only that integration would continue without the UK, but also that it could deliver for its citizens. Security and defence offered a way to achieve this, since there was much to do in this area, and it matched current priorities.

Third, the absence of the UK removed a stumbling block to further security and defence integration, since the British had traditionally been the most sceptical of all member states towards any efforts to establish a more autonomous EU security and defence policy, which they believed could undermine NATO. Finally, the loss of the UK and its economic and diplomatic clout—even if these were never at the Union’s full disposal—left a number of potential capabilities gaps which would be easier to overcome through coordinated efforts on behalf of remaining members.

Together, these twin pressures—external and internal—stimulated developments in the security and defence field aimed at creating a more ‘strategic’ Europe, better able to respond to threats in its own neighbourhood. These included the release of the EU’s Global Strategy in June 2016 which set out the principles and priorities guiding the EU’s foreign and security policy, and the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in December 2017 which institutionalised closer cooperation in joint defence projects between participating member states (all bar Denmark and Malta). The establishment of the European Defence Fund in the same year, funded by substantial sums from the community budget, was partly an attempt to shore up the European defence-industrial base. These initiatives were supplemented by the establishment of a permanent headquarters for EU military missions—the Military Planning and Conduct Capability—in the summer of 2017 and the inception of a process termed the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD) aimed at identifying shortfalls in capabilities and possibilities for joint procurement (Martill and Sus 2018).

The Union’s geopolitical moment thus consisted of both discursive and institutional changes which sought to promote the goal of ‘strategic autonomy’, the ability for the EU to act independently of the US in the security and defence field in the longer-term. Discursively, policymakers worked to bring strategic questions to the forefront, establish common EU interests and goals, and promote a more ‘activist’ streak within
some quarters of the Union traditionally more sceptical to the idea of military force. Institutionally, the Union’s various initiatives sought to improve the coordination of existing efforts in order to better capitalise on EU members’ significant—but often uncoordinated—defence efforts.

Assessing the EU’s Response

The EU’s focus on geopolitics is timely and is to be welcomed for a number of reasons. First, Europe’s leaders have identified a major EU failing and have correctly diagnosed the difficulties for the EU in the years ahead. This is no mean feat—in the United States, for instance, talk of decline is politically contentious and thus prevents an open discussion about the direction of future policy. There is an encouraging degree of self-awareness in discussions about the EU’s limitations as a geopolitical actor and its need to adapt to the emerging order.

Second, the institutional innovations and policy documents offer creative solutions for the dilemmas surrounding member states’ desire to preserve their sovereignty and autonomy. PESCO, for instance, binds individual member states to specific projects based on an efficient division of labour, making commitments easier to establish (Biscop 2018). The Global Strategy, meanwhile, was prevented from turning into a lowest-common-denominator affair through the shrewd diplomatic efforts of Nathalie Tocci and Federica Mogherini (see Tocci 2017).

Third, the EU’s blend of realpolitik and normative discourses at the heart of both the Global Strategy and the various policy proposals is both politically savvy and strategically appropriate. Recognising that the EU will be limited in its ability to externalise fundamental ‘European’ values in a more plural international order, the notion of ‘principled pragmatism’ nonetheless sets out a vision of the EU as a responsible international actor which is informed by both interests and the protection of its fundamental values. Efforts to engage constructively with the Trump administration and China on the basis of ‘shared values’ illustrate the distinctiveness of this dual moral and geopolitical doctrine.

Yet notable limitations to the EU’s efforts to portray itself as a strategic actor have to be acknowledged. First, in all the talk of the EU as a strategic actor there is a risk the Union lets its expectations (and those of others) get ahead of the reality of cautious change from a low starting-point. The EU is not a major defence actor and strategic autonomy, in any meaningful sense, is a long way off. The challenges in terms of capability development, inter-operability, joint-deployment and the forging of a common ‘strategic
culture’ have long been acknowledged (e.g. Cottey 2020; Howorth 2018). Careless talk of an ‘EU army’ by policymakers, and the promotion of the view that the EU is getting its act together as a defence actor, risks re-opening the ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ diagnosed in the 1990s (Hill 1993). Overblown rhetoric may be politically helpful in the short term, but the longer-term effect will be to erode the EU’s credibility if it cannot deliver on the priorities it sets for itself (Martill and Sus 2019).

Second, the laudable aim of achieving EU strategic autonomy conflicts at times with the forms of European autonomy which may well prove more effective in keeping the continent secure (Biscop 2016). Various forms of security and defence collaboration exist outside the EU framework, including a number of bilateral, mini-lateral and NATO initiatives. The UK’s withdrawal from the EU has increased the significance of a number of these arrangements, which can be more effective because they are not tied to the EU’s institutional architecture and membership. Where EU and European initiatives are complementary there is much to gain, but duplication and overlap is easy to foresee. The EU’s promotion of its institutional autonomy over and above close security arrangements with the post-Brexit UK (Whitman 2020) may be understandable, but also highlights the tension between EU and European initiatives.

Third, it is not clear the EU’s strategic concept adequately comprehends the (difficult) choices the Union will be faced with in the coming decades. While the Global Strategy offers a good overview of the challenges to come, it is less clear on the choices that need to be made. For instance, it is not clear whether the EU’s role will be as an independent ‘pole’ in a multipolar order pursuing a flexible policy of alliances or whether the Union will (or want to) remain an adjunct of the ‘West’ (and the US) to which it will remain firmly aligned (Biscop 2019). It is also unclear whether the Union views itself as a truly global actor in terms of military and diplomatic reach and other foreign policy goals, or whether it will continue to be defined by a more limited, regional purview (Ten Brinke and Martill 2019). While the EU champions the multilateral order, it is not clear whether it should become the champion of a reformed and more plural international order, or whether it should rather seek to defend the more liberal aspects of the current set-up. These big strategic questions do not have easy answers, but they will increase in importance in the years ahead, and the EU will need to have at least some idea of what its role might be.
Conclusions

The years ahead will prove challenging for the EU as it seeks to navigate a more insecure external environment. As it charts this course, there are two pitfalls which should be avoided at all costs. First, EU policymakers must avoid the temptation to overplay the transformative nature of the EU’s turn to strategy, since the Union’s credibility ultimately depends on its ability to live up to the goals it (and others) has set for itself. Second, the pursuit by EU institutions of strategic autonomy should not come at the expense of meaningful initiatives aimed at galvanizing a broader European strategic autonomy for the continent as a whole. Ideally, this would entail collaboration with major non-EU partners, including the UK.

Whether or not Dahrendorf would have expected the tumultuous international developments of recent years, or the EU’s tentative move into the fields of geopolitics and strategy, there is no doubt he would have advocated careful and cautious assessment as the best means of mapping out the options for Europe. He would, surely have insisted the EU cannot shy away from the important strategic choices emerging in the years ahead, including questions about the kind of international order the EU wishes to support, how it will position itself in relation to democratic and non-democratic actors alike, and how it views its role in a more diverse (and dangerous) global order.
References


Resisting the Siren Songs of De-Globalisation: Europe’s Hour?

Danuta Hübner

The measure of a thinker is whether his thought remains salient in the discourse and provoking in contexts that are no longer his own. Ralf Dahrendorf’s views on Europe and the world remain an important point of reference more than a decade after his death. This is a proof that he remains an indispensable thinker for our time. Ralf Dahrendorf has combined two personas, which normally should be mutually exclusive, but in him were perfectly complementary. On one hand he was a consummate insider as a European Commissioner, on the other, as a scholar, he was a bit of a contrarian in relation to structures that he worked in.

As a former European Commissioner and a scholar myself, I greatly appreciate the fact that these seemingly contradictory impulses may coexist in one human being. This combination can actually be very refreshing and productive when thinking about politics and doing politics. It gives the ability of a ‘prismal’ thinking, when you can see events, trends simultaneously, from various points of view, and also accept changes as an unavoidable part of a long wave of history and relativity as a ruling principle of human history.

Dahrendorf was, of course, a Popperian and thus, in all political engagement, he accepted that any idea can be falsifiable. This insight applies to political ideas. Every political assessment of particular institutions, structures, etc., always belongs to the era when it arose and it has to be modified along the curve of time. And it is in this spirit, that I understand Ralf Dahrendorf’s words written in 1996, when he expressed his conviction that the ‘nation state is still the most effective guarantee of our civil rights, welfare and social cohesion’. He wrote it at the tail-end of the long ‘age of prosperity’ that the transatlantic world had enjoyed since the post-war rebuilding. Since then
globalisation, populism, authoritarian tendencies, economic downturns and a series of crises, social changes and other forces, to which we can now add the pandemic, have shuffled the deck globally.

Nation states also went through many political shocks. But the most important one was probably an epistemological shock. Democratic leaders understood the limits of their power. The nation states stopped being omnipotent even on their own territories, where their power was encircled and often overpowered by economic actors of a global reach, that were richer and stronger than many national entities. Subsequently, the nation states were also weakened by the loss of control over information flows and means of communication, as well as by ceasing to be the main distribution channel for social punishments or rewards to other actors.

Since the 90s, nation states have become more susceptible to temptations of separatism (either territorial or cultural) or separation of societies into different niches, with separate codes, values, sensitivities, cultural patterns, etc. Those niches have access to different information sources, different figures of authority. Of course, various nations go through these processes differently. But it is rather obvious to me that the nation state will never return to what I could call its ‘vintage modern’ model, in force between the 1960s and the 1990s.

Right now we’re undergoing a reassessment, often painful, of what a nation state is and what it should be in the future. It is enough to see the recent ‘monuments’ war’, the overthrowing of the monuments commemorating persons accused of white supremacy, that took place in the wake of George Floyd’s murder, to appreciate the fact that there is no return to the past. Many social groups that feel excluded from the official discourse now claim their rightful place in the national consciousness of their societies. It can cut both ways, as a means of moral reconciliation, but also as a possible source of political dissention.

A new nation state would probably be more of a moderator, reconciler or facilitator of various internal tensions, and perhaps a pacifier of emerging contradictions, than a unified field of authority for all groups inside and an obvious reference for the outside world as well. When this occurs, it will be a Kuhnian shift to quite another paradigm of functioning of societies and of political power, and this is why the traditional political elites do not take lightly to thinking about their own demise. They of course would do everything to decelerate the process, probably in the spirit of Prince Salina’s famous dictum: ‘everything needs to change, so everything can stay the same.’
This is when Dahrendorf’s insight comes in handy. He was prescient when he wrote that a growing and globalising world economy would create ‘perverse choices’ for liberal democracies: over time, staying competitive (would have) require(d) either adopting measures detrimental to the cohesion of civil society or restricting civil liberties and political participation. The task ahead for the early 21st century, he wrote, ‘is to square the circle between growth, social cohesion and political freedom’.

And our time is exactly the moment when we try to square this circle, with various degrees of success. The problem is compounded by the fact, that sometimes we have to make do not even with a square, with clear contours, but with a shapeless blob consisting of manipulated public opinion, irresponsible leaders of populist, if not fascist, persuasion and a general dissatisfaction with the state of the world among the people.

In these uncertain times, integration projects, like the European Union, are the only way to ‘ride the tiger’, so to speak, to make growth, social cohesion and political freedom work together in a virtuous circle, and not cancel each other.

To me, European integration is the only viable project for Europe and for its long-term survival. It is my firm conviction that if we thoughtlessly allow this multigenerational enterprise to fail, there will be a decomposition of our continent into worryingly fragile democracies, existing alongside some populist fiefdoms. In this context, I regard all the calls for de-globalisation and for asserting national sovereignty as slightly detached from reality. If we de-globalise, the effect will be not a return to strong national economies of the ‘vintage modern’ model, as described above, but a dispersion of the world into local economies, always at the mercy of a some sort of ‘Overlord’.

In the pandemic crisis, we saw it first-hand, when our national economies were not only overpowered by the act of God, but also were utterly dependent on one single provider of necessary medical equipment, that is China. China has anyway been readying itself for that role of Global Overlord for some decades now. And now it thinks that it is its moment to rise and show its true colours. There are also other candidates that would like to fulfil this role, at least sub-regionally.

Thus, we have to understand that de-globalisation would mean not just reversing globalisation, but also risking subjugation to a power ill-suited to lead the world responsibly on a democratic basis. De-globalisation means the end of transatlantic leadership, and that would also mean a threat to human rights, decline in accepted political standards and reverting to an unprincipled free-for-all type of world regime. Europe in this configuration would lose its role as standard setter and human right champion, as well as promoter of responsible policies on issues like climate.
We have to rethink globalisation, especially its effect on people on the ground, but we cannot reject it. We can already see how thin the line is between protection and protectionism. It would be irresponsible to bow to destructive populism.

Europe must retain its leading edge, both for the good of the world and its own interest. We have to remain leaders, sometimes at a high price, in areas crucial for the future: in climate, in responsible use of data and digitalization, and for keeping the world together and not apart when it comes to reacting to challenges before us.

If I had to point to a one thing that somehow is a connecting tissue for all those challenges, it is multilateralism. We cannot do anything in the world if we go our particular, and often peculiar, Sonderwegs. We need to propose the best solutions to a world that is jittery and in a protracted state of unbalance. The European Union, with a new leadership and with the goal of becoming a more political entity than ever before, must work toward boldly exercising the leading role in shaping the multilateral alliances throughout the world, for democracy, for defence of global governance, for international responsibility, but also for a better quality of people’s life. We cannot opt out of interdependence. It is an illusion that populists have fed us for years. Britain became a test case—we can see now how bitter the food tastes.

Nevertheless, in a world as complex as ours, we need the UK as a democratic ally and partner on the world scene. I very much hope that we will reach the last stage of Brexit without much recrimination, with broad outlines of cooperation in matters that are vital to both the EU and the UK. We should remain close to each other, for there is a longstanding history and common values that bind us. Of course, as the saying goes ‘the proof of the pudding will be in the eating’. So, let’s see.

In sum, if we want to pursue our plan for the Next Generation Europe, we have to see it as a part of a broader background. It entails recommitting ourselves to a world of mutual obligation between states to behave responsibly, of supporting integration projects world-wide that offer incentives for such behaviour, and of an extensive multilateral network that would enforce the standards if some actors behave irresponsibly anyway.

Europe is a mature political actor on a world scene that radically demands moral reorientation and political rearrangement. In a context where contentious actors sometimes get the best, most visible roles, despite their destructive behaviour, the European Union cannot just sit on a pedestal and look on in disbelief.

It is now the hour of Europe.
Dahrendorf’s Quandary in the Post-Traumatic Europe

Paweł Świeboda

We are in a Dahrendorfian moment in the European Union where many of today’s dilemmas go directly to the heart of the issues he cared about deeply. Delivering growth, social cohesion and political freedom—all at the same time—has become the real issue of the time, as he had anticipated. Tensions between the three domains are abundantly clear given the difficult trade-offs they imply. Yet something has changed.

Dahrendorf’s quandary was anchored in a specific period in post-Second World War history, driven by the seemingly unstoppable and unamendable forces of globalisation and technological progress. The fall of the Iron Curtain, in particular, conferred unparalleled legitimacy on this orientation, both given the defeat of the rival proposition and the lack of a viable alternative. While the future seemed one-directional for a number of years, Dahrendorf’s quandary pointed to some inherent tensions within the post-Cold War paradigm and hence offered unique foresight.

Dahrendorf did not live to see the rise of populism, growing Chinese assertiveness, cascading effects of climate change, or the global pandemic. Attempting to look at these phenomena through Dahrendorf’s prism, one lesson we are learning with a vengeance is that nothing can ever be taken for granted. Everything is a function of human effort, delicate choices and good will to create a commonly shared rulebook. In this context, Dahrendorf’s quandary teaches us to make choices which are more holistic, which span the economic, social and political domains all at the same time, and which ask bigger questions about the direction of travel of the European Union.
Dahrendorf’s quandary in 2020: democracy

One can intuitively sense that Dahrendorf would consider today’s situation to be not only an immense challenge but also a moment of particular opportunity. We can recalibrate progress which has been skewed to the advantage of some. We can trim the ‘winner takes all’ logic of current developments in the technology markets. And we can also address some of the most pressing shortcomings of globalisation to mitigate the ‘everyone for themselves’ logic which has prevailed in recent years. The challenge is to pursue these goals simultaneously, implying not being satisfied by higher growth, if it is not accompanied by rising social cohesion, or not being lured by the promise of technological edge and a better standard of living if it comes at the expense of political freedoms. All of these are a matter of political choice that require resolute action, rather than being resigned to a sense of inevitability in the face of disruption and rapid change.

Many of today’s dilemmas do not lead to obvious answers—when it comes to democracy, yes, the nation state remains the most complete locus of democratic governance, as Dahrendorf himself observed, but it is subject of ever greater pressures and influences from outside. It is not the sole guarantor of civil rights. European courts and institutions have an impressive record in preventing the excesses of the state and standing up for the citizen. They could and should do more to look after respect for Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union which speaks about ‘union values’ in constitutional terms. At the same time, institutions are not operating in a vacuum but in the midst of a political disruption leading to often extreme states of societal polarisation. This makes the situation ever more complex. One thing is certain: the nation state may be unrivalled as a source of democratic legitimacy, but it is not the only actor present in the space of democratic debate.

Democracy at the European-level has grown and matured. In areas of pan-European relevance, such as fighting the abuses of the new technological oligopolies in the digital age, it has played an impressive role in defending the interests of Member States and citizens. At the same time, it has not been given a real opportunity to grow in recent years, as governance reforms have been blocked for fear of disrupting the fragile status quo. Therefore, we do not know the counterfactual, namely what the reality would look like, in particular should we have pan-European constituencies in elections to the European Parliament. We may only know it some day in the future.
Dahrendorf’s quandary in 2020: globalisation

As regards globalisation, Europe has undergone an important transformation in recent years on the back of the realisation that it may have been become too exposed itself. The trade defence mechanism and instruments to address other countries’ illegal subsidies, together with the exquisitely applied armoury of EU competition policy, have aimed to restore that balance. Europe is also, rightly, striving for strategic autonomy, to reduce its excessive dependence on other countries, be it for raw materials or within global supply chains. Although clear already before the Covid-19 crisis, with China providing 98% of the EU’s supply of rare earth elements, or Turkey providing 98% of the EU’s supply of borate, the vulnerability became abundantly obvious with shortages of the Chinese-made protective medical equipment and other products of critical importance.

In the years ahead, Europe will need to find a formula which allows it to look after its own interests while catering for broader, global goals. Someone once said that the German household should receive a Nobel peace prize for contributing to the green transformation world-wide, given the massive fiscal transfers of the Energiewende programme in Germany which supported a phenomenal growth of the renewables industry in recent years. In the meantime, however, almost the entire European solar panel industry was wiped out in the space of a few years by overwhelming Chinese competition. A formula that allows for noble objectives to be realised in a way which contributes to growth and prosperity at home is therefore desperately needed. In many areas, such as in creating an industrial base for battery production, Europe is now moving in this direction.

The challenge of introspection will undoubtedly come to haunt a number of players on the international arena in the aftermath of the Covid-19 crisis, Europe included. However, Europe in particular, remains uniquely positioned to reshape global governance. Not only is multilateralism deeply embedded in its view of the world but it is also a trading superpower with deep international ties. Therefore, a more determined global leadership coming from Europe will be needed when the circumstances become ripe. On trade, technology or climate, global governance remains badly wounded and will require not only a rescue operation but a genuine effort at reconstitution.

The problem often tends to be that the mechanisms of global governance reflect a world which no longer exists, while the emerging reality is seen as not conducive to established and predictable patterns of cooperation. This logic will have to be overcome. It is perfectly possible to think of new global arrangements which would go to the heart
of the concerns of our period. For example, a global algorithmic ombudsman could address the anxieties which prevail around the world about the impenetrability and lack of accountability of Artificial Intelligence. As for the headwinds this and other initiatives could face, it is worth going back to the time when the Bretton Woods institutions were founded. In the post-Second World War context, trust and confidence may have been at an all-time low. Yet, strong vision and determination allowed for doing the impossible. As Paul Volcker, who was once Chairman of the Bretton Woods Committee, recalled “Bretton Woods” is not a particular institution—it is an ideal, a symbol, of the never-ending need for sovereign nations to work together to support open markets in goods, in services, and in finance, all in the interest of a stable, growing and peaceful economy.

From a trilemma to a three-point reinvention agenda

Europe has the inner dynamic to overcome the Dahrendorf quandary, including in the area of global governance, because it is fundamentally a transformative project. This is evident in its objective to become climate-neutral by 2050, an agenda that will entail a massive shift of resources, an enormous technological change, and a significant adaptation of societal habits. If Europe needs to be on guard about something, it is the possible omission of issues of a constitutional nature, such as the value system, or matters which go directly to the heart of citizen concerns, particularly the social dimension. Turning the Dahrendorf quandary into a three-point action plan for the post-Covid-19 period, the following are therefore most pressing.

The first is making issues of good governance and political freedoms a stronger, overarching ambition for the European Union. This is not only the question of the rule of law, fundamental as it is, but also the quality of institutions and responsiveness of the public sector. It is a question of building much broader societal coalitions based on a renewed vision of common interest. Trade-offs will need to be more clearly presented to citizens, with various policy scenarios open for debate. New ways of engagement will need to become more widespread, while civil society organisations should be mandated to fulfil broader public functions in partnership with the state, as already proved effective in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Secondly, Europe needs to invest in genuine European public goods. The logic of the post-Covid situation will push Europe towards spending resources in areas where immediate macroeconomic effect can be strongest and where there are established EU instruments available. But there is a need to develop new strategies and instruments
for higher investment in EU-wide public goods, especially in research and innovation. Although Europe is a strong performer in R&D spending, it has recently lagged behind global competitors. The ease with which funding for research was reduced in the course of the recent negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework, as well as the Recovery Instrument, is worrying. This is particularly the case, given that we are witnessing the phenomenon of weakening research productivity associated with its rising complexity and hence cost. Therefore more investment is needed to achieve the type of excellence Europe needs to remain a global economic powerhouse. For this reason, the European Parliament demanded that the Horizon Europe research programme is allocated 120 billion Euro for the years 2021-2027, rather than the 80.9 billion Euro which the Member States agreed upon in July.

Thirdly, while seeking to address the biggest challenges of our times, the EU needs to play its role in re-calibrating the social contract. There is often a sense of inevitability, or worse, historical determinism in the tacit acceptance of the skewed social reality we observe in many countries around the world today. The assumption tends to be that technology and globalisation generate unstoppable momentum through which some benefit more than others. There are presumably also places which are ahead in the race and others which are ‘left behind’. Europe prides itself on a strong social dimension. Its solidarity mechanisms are indeed, by and large, more elaborate and generous than elsewhere in the world. However, looking at the situation with more granularity leads to a sense of anxiety. In many European countries social mobility seems to have been blocked. It is almost as difficult for a child of poorer parents in Germany to make it to the top as it is for a young American. It is clear that the social elevator needs to be working much better.

Redistribution is part of the answer and European countries practice it with a vengeance. In fact, the main reason why there is less measured inequality in Europe than in the United States in terms of the Gini coefficient is because of redistribution. However, the other side of the coin is about endowment. This means equipping the Europeans with better means to educate themselves, train and improve their skills. One way through which this could be achieved is by means of training vouchers introduced at the European level. Instead of investing on the supply side, by subsidizing training courses which are not always up to the task, it is more efficient to stimulate demand by funding the type of training that people consider helpful and important. Another way is to level the playing field by improving the educational and training offering where it currently lags behind.
Finally, there is scope for introducing a new type of certification which would put more emphasis on actual skills and knowledge, rather than the particular university diploma. A European Excellence Certificate would help to improve opportunities for the talented, yet not necessarily most affluent young people.

Looking forward to 2030, Europe must put in place an appealing and irresistible value proposition that would keep its Member States and citizens engaged. Turning Dahrendorf’s Quandary inside-out, becoming motivated rather than frustrated by its findings, could be a useful guide. By being more deeply aware of the tensions involved in the simultaneous pursuit of economic growth, social cohesion and political freedoms, Europe can be more successful in putting together an agenda that aims at democratic renewal, consolidation of European public goods and a social recalibration which is badly needed. This could subsequently become the basis for a more self-confident and persuasive European global leadership that would aim to provide answers to problems which are of truly universal nature.
Why Europe Continues to Matter

Sophie Vanhoonacker

Introduction

In his seminal essay of 1996 on ‘Why Europe Matters: A Personal View’, Ralf Dahrendorf (1996) formulates ten principles for European renewal. Although several of his recommendations are still relevant today, the current domestic and international context is radically different. The Europe of Dahrendorf was a relatively homogeneous Union of 15 member states, optimistic that its values and successful political model would soon spread to the rest of the world. Today’s EU is much larger and also more diverse, with 19 of its member states sharing a single currency and with a governance structure that has been substantially strengthened under the Lisbon Treaty. But it is also a Union which for the first time has lost a (big) member state and faces unprecedented political and economic challenges. International power is being redistributed, support for liberal democracy and multilateralism is eroding and complex questions such as climate change, digitisation, migration, and more recently the Covid-19 pandemic ask for urgent answers.

The key argument of this contribution is that if the EU wants to subsist and maintain its legitimacy, it will have to convince its citizens that it is indispensable for addressing these challenges, in close interaction with the member states. This means that, next to providing internal stability and prosperity, it will also have to substantially strengthen its role as a security provider. This is not self-evident as it will require a further transfer of sovereignty in areas jealously guarded by national capitals and goes beyond the EU’s traditional role as a market- and normative power.

Starting from the premise that the EU’s international position and role will be a key determinant for its future relevance, this contribution first reflects on how the EU can strengthen its international position and contribute to the security of its citizens. As a second step, it elaborates on how to enhance its role as a provider of prosperity and internal stability. The final section reflects on the EU’s future governance structure.
The EU as a security provider

The European project launched in the 1950s had the political aim of overcoming the age-old rivalry between France and Germany. Thanks to the US security guarantee, the member states of the European Communities (EC) could concentrate on economic integration as the means of achieving the political objectives of peace and stability in Western Europe. The Internal Market (IM) embodied their successful cooperation, impelling ‘Brussels’ to advocate a Kantian international order whereby relations between states are regulated by pre-set rules.

The strong reliance on the US had a heavy price. While the EU’s economic power was substantial, politically it punched below its weight. Faced with an emerging China and a weakening US, this lack of political and military clout is highly problematic. One of the biggest challenges for the EU in the next decade is therefore how to position itself internationally and deal with the security vacuum left by Washington. At the core of the debate is the question of the EU’s strategic autonomy, a question which traditionally has divided the member states between those favouring a strengthening of the European pillar of NATO and those advocating an independent European security role. The issue of a strategically autonomous EU revolves around at least three questions: (1) the strategic positioning of the EU regionally and internationally; (2) its autonomy vis-à-vis other major powers, especially the US; (3) and its material capabilities and instruments.

The current reshuffling of the international cards makes a strategic reflection on the EU geopolitical and geo-economic interests and priorities indispensable. The 2016 EU Global Strategy is a first step in that direction (EUGS 2016). It pleads for a combination of soft and hard power and identifies principled pragmatism, combining idealistic aspirations with the defence of strategic interests, as the guiding principle for EU external action. It sketches a picture whereby the EU prioritises its engagement in its surrounding regions, in combination with an international crisis management role and the active promotion of a rules-based international order. Overall the EUGS stays vague about how it wants to give shape to its approach of principled pragmatism, but as the international context is rapidly deteriorating, more radical choices are now needed.

China, Russia and Turkey are cases in point. Beijing’s continuing disrespect for principles of fair trade and human rights and its rather aggressive manoeuvring through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) require the EU to take a strategic decision on how it wants to reconcile its economic and political interests with its principled approach. In relation to Russia, does the EU want to continue its current levels of dependency on Russian
energy imports if Moscow does not hesitate to illegally annex the Crimean Peninsula and tries to influence EU domestic politics through aggressive information wars? And how should the EU deal with NATO ally Turkey, given it is still an official candidate for full EU membership, fulfils a gate-keeping role vis-à-vis refugees trying to cross the Aegean, but (as we see in the Western Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean) is becoming increasingly assertive in realising its regional ambitions. All of these are difficult questions, especially since the EU member states are not necessarily agreed on how they can best be addressed. Unfortunately, its partners are all too conscious of this division and don’t hesitate to exploit it.

Realising the aim of strategic autonomy inevitably also requires a retuning of the transatlantic relationship. Diverging interests and priorities, as well as doubts about Washington’s continued commitment to Europe’s security, make it imperative for the EU to take on more responsibility for its own security and prepare for interventions where the US and NATO are not involved. The realisation of such autonomy should confront, rather than elide, difficult questions, such as when is the EU willing to use force (Biscop, forthcoming). Independent EU action need not mean the end of NATO, but could lead to a more balanced relationship whereby the EU and the US, as well as the UK, cooperate when there are common interests, but where the EU also has the authority and capacity to go its own way if this is not the case. In today’s turbulent world, a further investment in an EU–NATO dialogue at strategic level, aimed at identifying common interests and actions, will be more necessary than ever (Petrov, Schuette and Vanhoonacker, 2020).

Strategic autonomy also implies that the EU will have to invest in the development of its military capabilities and in a further strengthening of its integrated approach whereby it strategically uses its many external action instruments (ranging from crisis management to trade and diplomacy) to realise its goals. Initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a coordinated annual review of national defence budgets (CARD) and the creation of a European Defence Fund are first, but not yet sufficient steps towards increased interoperability and even a European defence industry. In parallel, the EU will need to further reduce the gaps between the political and operational dimensions of EU external action, and foster the cooperation between traditional foreign policy players and those dealing with internal security (Blockmans and Debuysere, forthcoming; Tocci, forthcoming).

The EU’s investment in its security role should not come at the expense of its role as a trade power. On the contrary, as the world’s largest trading bloc, it should exploit this position to realise its foreign policy objectives. An important priority is the defence of
the open world trading system, currently challenged by rising protectionist tendencies. Even if the Covid-19 crisis leads companies to relocate some of their supply chains closer to home, the regaining of full European economic sovereignty is an illusion and the EU will therefore continue to be best served by an open international system.

In other areas needing global solutions, such as climate change and the governance of new digital technologies, the EU should speak with one voice and try to shape a governance system that meets its needs and those of other third countries who are in disagreement with the US attempts to dismantle the multilateral system (Dworkin and Gowan 2019).

**EU as a provider of prosperity and internal stability**

In parallel with strengthening its external muscle, the EU needs to reinforce its role as provider of prosperity and internal stability. Although the EU has a much stronger legacy in this area than in the field of external action, the challenges are no less daunting. The key priorities identified by the von der Leyen Commission (2019-24) give a good insight into what is at stake (von der Leyen, 2019). Beyond the need discussed earlier to further develop the EU’s external actoriness, the inventory includes the fight against climate change, management of migration, the preparation for a digital society, a more social internal market, as well as a more democratic Union. While the catalogue is spot on and in line with the concerns of European citizens (European Union, 2019), its successful realisation is far from guaranteed.

Contrary to the first decades of European integration, creating continued prosperity is not merely about the development of common standards and regulations of little interest to the European citizens, but about politically highly sensitive matters which affect the sovereignty of the member states and the EU’s future identity. Migration touches upon the defence of our external borders and the EU’s core values. The development of a digital society is not merely about developing or acquiring the latest technology, but raises difficult ethical questions, for instance about how artificial intelligence will be used in the area of health. The growing economic divergence in the Eurozone, threatening the long-term viability of the Euro, triggers a debate about taboo issues such as sovereign debt restructuring and a further harmonisation of economic policies.

The political nature of these issues is challenging in several respects. The pace of EU decision-making is, first, notoriously slow. This may be fine when dealing with the adoption of regulations and directives underpinning the internal market, but is problematic when dealing with urgent political matters such as migration and the Covid-19 pandemic.
where citizens expect quick answers. The same citizens, however, do not always realise that speedier decision-making may come at the price of less transparency and input legitimacy. Secondly, for many of the issues at stake, there are intractable dividing lines amongst the member states. Making a green energy shift is more difficult and costly for heavily coal dependent countries in Central Europe than for those with more innovative and energy-friendly economies. Countries without an EU external border feel less urgency to revise the obsolete asylum system than those facing massive refugee flows at their doorstep. The backsliding of democratic practices in some member states shows that a more democratic Union is not necessarily a priority for all.

Thirdly, the topics on the agenda—much more than at the time of completing the internal market—require solidarity amongst the member states. The fierce debates about the Greek sovereign debt crisis and the allocation of loans and subsidies to address the socio-economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic show that such solidarity among the 27 cannot be taken for granted. It can therefore be expected that when deciding on the EU’s future socio-economic agenda, the debates between the proponents of a neoliberal versus a Keynesian approach will be fierce.

Given the highly political and interlinked nature of the questions to be addressed, it is clear that the technocratic approach of Monnet whereby decisions are taken outside the realm of party politics will not work. Populist parties have understood this very well. Critical about European integration as an elite-driven process, they are resorting to a narrative of bringing back the sovereign nation state of the ‘glorious’ past. The Brexit campaign is a good illustration of how powerful such narrative can be. At times of uncertainty, when decisions about the future direction of the EU need to be taken, a mere development of new policies will not be enough. If the EU wants to be successful in being a key player in the core questions of this time, it will have to come up with a counter-narrative enacting its values and projecting a future which is appealing enough to engage its citizens. In its absence, the vacuum will increasingly be filled by those who consider that solutions for today’s transnational problems can best be addressed by the member states ‘taking back control again’.
Which governance structure?

The plea expressed above for further integration in core policy areas, including security, does not mean that the EU needs to develop into a European federation. We agree with Dahrendorf that ‘the nation state is here to stay’, continuing to be an important source of identity and legitimacy. As can be seen during the successive crises of the past 15 years, including the most recent Covid-19 pandemic, the role of the Heads of State or Government, driven by the Franco-German motor, and preferably in close cooperation with the European Commission, is crucial in providing leadership at the highest level. They have the authority and legitimacy to make the tough political choices required in highly sensitive fields, and are in a position to defend and explain them back home. This need to rely on the European Council in crucial matters is not without risks. It makes successes dependent on who is in the lead in the different member states and, as we have seen in the past couple of years, there are important socio-economic and political fault lines which often make it difficult to speak with one voice. Also, because the democratic order itself is under pressure in some member states, an effective European Council is far from guaranteed.

Conclusion

There has never been a clear blueprint for the European integration process. While this lack of a clear strategic plan makes the EU vulnerable to ‘adhocracy’, it also adds to its versatility. However, being flexible will not be enough. The Union will need political leaders willing to stand up and explain to their citizens the added value of the European project, rather than using it as a scapegoat for what goes wrong. It will also require the EU to deliver in crucial areas like security, unemployment, climate change and security. Europe’s leaders need to formulate strategies and policies that go well beyond Dahrendorf’s ten principles for European renewal, and develop an appealing narrative allowing its citizens to relate to the European project of the future.
References


Even before the health emergency of the Covid-19 outbreak, the crisis of the international multilateral order was a major challenge for the EU. The previous international order had been weakened by the crisis of globalisation, the reluctance of the former hegemonic power to assume its responsibilities, the rise of new global and regional powers, and the growing role of non-state actors. Reflecting the quandary identified a quarter of a century ago by Dahrendorf, the challenge has been accentuated by the surge of nationalism, combined with widespread mistrust towards international/supranational organisations. The old post-war international rules of behaviour and regimes were being contested, while international institutions were systematically delegitimised.

But the impact of Covid-19 could intensify and accelerate these trends, and is likely to modify the pre-Covid-19 model of globalisation. A deep economic recession is expected to affect the planet, even though it will not hit every country and every society with the same intensity. The gaps between rich and poor, among and within countries, will widen. Containing the dramatic economic and social consequences of the pandemic has become a priority of national and international actors. Nationalistic attitudes risk to prevail, as shown by the rising popular support for strong executives and the revival of autocratic regimes. International institutions have not proven especially effective in managing the crisis and have faced increasing criticism, not least from many national governments. The pre-Covid model of globalisation, with its weaknesses and tensions, is being questioned. But so far no new model is being proposed.

Tensions between the US and China, on trade, new technologies and security have deepened and seem set to spill over to other areas, as witnessed by the reciprocal accusations of responsibilities for mishandling the pandemic. This growing strategic
competition between the US and China, fuelled by the electoral campaign in the US and by an increasing Chinese assertiveness, is likely to characterise the world order in the foreseeable future. This will have many repercussions for other global actors, and may complicate efforts to create more effective instruments of global governance.

In a nutshell, the impact of Covid-19 has increased tensions in an already stressed multipolar system. And an evident climate of mistrust among the major players in the world scene is creating new obstacles to international cooperation and to the definition of new and shared rules of the game. These trends are developing in a situation where, realistically, no new hegemonic power is likely to emerge (at least in the short run) from this unprecedented crisis. An unstable, multipolar world is the most likely outcome for the foreseeable future.

Emerging new challenges

New challenges have nevertheless emerged from the present emergency, many of which would require more, and certainly not less, international cooperation. In addition to better provisions for dealing with future pandemics, and cooperation on treatments and vaccines, there is a long list of other global concerns. These include climate change, energy diversification and transition, digitalisation, trade protectionism, massive migration flows, international terrorism, and poverty and inequalities in wealth distribution.

In addition, the erosion of the arms control regime will continue to require a better functioning global governance. A number of regional crises, at present forgotten or neglected because of Covid-19, will reappear in the agendas of governments, regional and international institutions. A renewed emphasis will thus have to be placed on the need to improve the international community’s collective instruments to ensure peace, stability, and a sustainable economic development.

The crisis of multilateralism poses a special challenge for the EU, by far the most advanced project of regional integration, which has grown and developed in a context of a predictable and well-regulated international order. The EU has a strong interest in preserving and, if possible, consolidating a rules-based order within which it can advance its values and interests. Despite the unfavourable international context—a complicated partnership with the United States, a growing competition with China, and a troubled relation with Russia—and its internal weaknesses, the EU has a wide range of instruments to contribute to a re-launch of multilateralism and to the strengthening of a rules-based multilateral order. The unprecedented challenge of the impact of Covid-19 cannot be a justification for the EU to abandon its declared geo-political ambition.
A first, pressing priority for the EU is to implement the far-reaching programme agreed in July 2020 to support economic recovery in the post-Covid phase. Initial measures (suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact, flexibility in the implementation of the rules on State aids, the interventions by the European Central Bank, the SURE scheme to deal with rising unemployment, the European Stability Mechanism’s new credit line, the new European Investment Bank facility etc.) testified to a new political determination by the EU and by its member states. The speed and effectiveness of the EU’s reactions show that the EU has learned the lessons of the economic and financial crisis of 2008/2009. Despite the frictions among member states engendered by some elements of the Next Generation EU package of measures, the EU’s institutions and national governments share the conviction of the necessity of a strong common response. Had they not responded to the risks of a deep economic recession, with its foreseeable consequences on the wellbeing of the continent and on the resilience of the internal market, citizens would not forgive them.

The EU has the potential to regain a leadership role on the international scene and, perhaps counter-intuitively, the pandemic could accelerate this process, because the two major players in the world scene, the US and China, have been considerably weakened by it. The US, under the uncertain and unpredictable leadership of Donald Trump, has coped poorly with the health crisis. Its economy will suffer from renewed lockdowns and social distancing; and its credibility as a reliable partner has been undermined by the evident reluctance to assume the responsibilities of a great power. China’s position is under threat from criticism of how it dealt with the first signs of the pandemic; by the impact of Covid-19 on its economy and on its social stability; and from its aggressive policy towards Hong Kong’s autonomy and its attitudes on fundamental rights and freedoms.

The EU’s window of opportunity

There is, therefore, a clear opportunity for the EU to enhance its political visibility and assume a more active role in dealing with global challenges and regional crises, while maintaining its distinctive characteristic as a soft power. To do so, it will have to fulfil a number of conditions. First, it must show it has the ability to counter the economic recession and to relaunch the economies of its members making effective use of the EU recovery programme. Second, it will have to demonstrate a new and shared political determination to boost the EU dimension, complementing the impact of the individual member states. Third, it will need to develop an improved capacity to use, in a coordinated manner, all the EU’s policies (from trade to climate, to environment, to energy, to digital, to research and innovation etc.) to strengthen Europe’s external projection.
Brexit as a stumbling-block

A possible obstacle to a more prominent EU role in the world scene could stem from the impact of Brexit on the EU’s future. Covid and the economic crisis have set new priorities for the EU. The conclusion of Brexit and the definition of a cooperative relation with the UK remain on the EU’s agenda, but they definitely are not a central issue. Nevertheless it is undeniable that the referendum of June 2016 and the subsequent decision of the UK Government to activate article 50 of The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU with the request to negotiate its exit from the EU, was a dramatic set-back for the EU. And the EU still has to digest the UK’s withdrawal.

Having struggled to achieve an agreement on how the UK should withdraw from the EU, the two sides are now engaged in a more complex negotiation on the definition of the terms and conditions of their future bilateral relations. The issues at stake are relevant. And as a consequence of a firm decision of the British Government there are no models available, among the existing trade agreements between the EU and a third country, that could be utilised to inspire the future bilateral agreement. Despite some divergences on points of principle, and despite a very tight deadline due to the UK’s determination (frankly, difficult to understand) to conclude the negotiation by the end of 2020, an agreement remains possible and is in the interest of the two parties.

Such a deal should be based on an ambitious and wide ranging free trade agreement for goods and non-financial services; on special arrangements for financial services; on a reasonable solution of the historical fishing rights for European fishers in British waters. There also needs to be a certain degree of regulatory convergence for standards on social and environmental protection, for competition and state aids, as means to guarantee a minimum level playing field for businesses. And finally such a comprehensive agreement should be complemented by a satisfactory framework for cooperation on justice and home affairs, on foreign policy, security and on defence.

At the risk of appearing excessively optimistic, I am of the opinion that it is reasonable to assume that a deal will be struck, for the very good reason that both parties have an evident interest in such an agreement. For the UK an agreement will minimise the negative consequences of Brexit on its economy, given the strict interdependence of the British economy with that of the continent. For the EU an agreement should guarantee a collaborative partnership with a European partner which, for several compelling reasons, could contribute to the strengthening of the EU’s international projection.
International Cooperation On Migration: A Multi-Level Endeavour

Elizabeth Collett

From the perspective of the migrant, and as noted by Dahrendorf, the nation state remains the most important entity: it remains the place where rights and entitlements, but also responsibilities, are meted out. While the common immigration and asylum policies of the EU set some baseline parameters for the terms of entry and residence, it is the nation state which retains control over who is granted that entry and residence. And indeed, while acquisition of EU citizenship confers additional rights and privileges, the nation state is the sole entity which can bestow it.

However, the fundamental rights of each individual are protected at the international and European levels, offering citizens and migrants alike, the right of redress for any infringement of their rights. For people on the move, whether migrants or refugees, and particularly asylum seekers, international laws are invaluable: they require states to offer protection to those fleeing persecution, while ensuring that even those without such protections, and without legal residence status, still be accorded basic fundamental rights.

These are supported at EU level. We have seen, in recent years, how quickly these can be eroded when respect for such rights erodes. Thus, for the international community to be an effective guarantor of such rights, it relies upon a quorum of governments upholding them, and to join in robust critique of those who do not. Here, the EU has an opportunity to demonstrate greater leadership, both internally and externally, calling out abuses where they are found. This includes the treatment of migrants and asylum seekers at Europe’s borders. As Commission President von der Leyen stated in her 2020 State of the Union speech: saving lives at sea is not optional.
With respect to social cohesion, the collective evidence suggests that healthy, diverse and inclusive societies can best be promoted at local level. While the nation state can set the tone and offer resources to support community cohesion, it is local connection, trust and engagement which truly makes the difference. Our most global European cities—London, Berlin, Paris, Brussels—thrive when their identity is rooted in diversity. And more practically, cities are often the primary respondents when migrants experience destitution, homelessness or broader socio-economic vulnerability due to insufficiently inclusive national policies.

The false dichotomy(ies) around migration

This is not without tension. One of the greatest challenges to the migration debate, perversely, has been the continual assessment of the ‘economic contribution’ that migrants make to society, as a justification for migration itself. If migrants are seen to be making a net contribution—whether through taxes, philanthropy or wealth creation—then they are good and welcome. If not, they are subject to scepticism, and worse, xenophobia and discrimination.

The Covid-19 pandemic offers a good example of why this dichotomy is false and self-limiting. During the initial months of the pandemic, when communities were locked down, and rising infections were overwhelming hospitals, it became clear that the heroes of the situation were those who are—under normal circumstances—unsung, and frequently dismissed. Behind the doctors and nurses, a significant proportion of whom are foreign-born, were an army of cleaners, porters, shelf stackers, agricultural workers, deliverymen, and other jobs which, while unskilled, became essential.

If countries had limited immigration to those who could unequivocally demonstrate their positive financial contribution, societies would have found life in lockdown far harder. Instead, many governments chartered flights to bring seasonal workers to farms, including in the UK and Germany. Italy and some other countries went further and offered legal status to many of its migrant workers, in recognition of the need to include migrants in all aspects of pandemic response.

Looking forward, a public discussion on the value of migrants, and migration, to society writ large would be deeply welcome, and a discussion that moves beyond purely economic concerns. Some grandmothers, migrating to be with their children, may not ever join the labour market, but may enable a family and community to thrive through unremunerated childcare, and the joy of proximity. A more thoughtful balance between
skills and necessity, and a more holistic understanding of ‘contribution’ would not only offer a more realistic picture of the value of migration, but create more resilient societies, capable of managing fast-paced change, and even crisis.

**Potential for EU global leadership**

From the perspective of the United Nations, Europe has the potential to be a leader not only on migration, but also global mobility writ large. The European Union has spoken a great deal in recent years about global partnership on migration, and in late 2018, the majority of EU Member States adopted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). The fact that not all EU Member States adopted the text has limited the voice of the EU itself on the international stage, and it is notable that no mention of the GCM was made in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, published recently by the European Commission.

The GCM is based on the recognition that no single government can effectively govern migration—fully realizing the potential of migration for societies while protecting the rights, dignity and welfare of migrants and communities—without international cooperation, whether bilaterally, regionally, or globally. It is non-binding, and state-led, but rooted in established obligations and principles, underpinned by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and other internationally agreed frameworks.

The GCM creates a truly comprehensive approach, and common language, for discussing migration and provides tools for implementing rights-based and well managed migration policies. The GCM also offers Europe an opportunity to reframe its longstanding engagement, not always successful, with its neighbouring countries and, most importantly, the African continent.

For several decades, the European Union has engaged in the foreign policy of migration through its own Global Approach. This effort gained intensity in 2015, as European and African states met in Valletta to discuss mutual priorities, and EU Member States established the EU Trust Fund for Africa, a multi-billion Euro fund to address root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa.

But while the financing is deeply welcome, and needed, there is an opportunity to develop a partnership on a more equal footing, in recognition of the ambitions the African Union also has for regional integration, including on migration. The African Continental Free Trade Agreement, and its accompanying Protocol on Free movement of People, and the AU’s 2018 Migration Policy Framework for Africa, demonstrate increasing interest and
ownership of migration issues within the continent, supported by the fact the majority of African nationals migrate within, not out of, Africa. Ensuring this migration is safe, rights-based, and contributes to the broader welfare of both migrants and societies is in the interests of both Europe and Africa.

Conclusion

Covid-19 has also been a leveller across the world. Governments are today grappling with identical issues, including how to health-proof border management, manage visa processes remotely, and ensure the safety of their nationals abroad (and, in some cases, bring them home). However, they are doing so with an internal, rather than external logic, which risks chaos. There are rarely, in the world, moments such as these where common concerns are so universal, and urgent. It is here that multilateralism on migration can find a practical home, and Europe can develop a leadership role alongside the UN, based on the common endeavour of reestablishing predictability and safety in the global system of travel and migration, in a context where post-pandemic economic and social recovery is intrinsically linked to global human mobility. But in a context where, as Dahrendorf notes, ‘the spaces where political decisions are being made have become more diffuse’, the challenge will be finding a means for governments to discuss this urgent issue, and cover its various dimensions, where the benefits of international cooperation intersect with the domestic concerns of the nation state.
Brexit
Ralf Dahrendorf’s remarkable life in Britain began in 1952, when he enrolled at the London School of Economics (LSE) for his second doctorate, joining many other great minds from mainland Europe. Though it was clearly a formational period—it was at the LSE that Dahrendorf drafted some of his most influential books, such as *Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society*—this first sojourn in England was comparatively short-lived. After only a few years he moved to America and then back to Germany, where he established himself as a prominent academic, politician and member of the European Commission.

Dahrendorf returned to Britain in 1974 and remained here for most of the rest of his life, eventually becoming an adoptive citizen. His career during this time reads like a rollcall of distinguished British institutions: he was director of the LSE, warden of St Anthony’s College, Oxford, a fellow of the British Academy, and a Knight of the Realm. In 1993 Dahrendorf joined many other academic politicians as a life peer in the House of Lords, where he sat first as a Liberal Democrat and then as an increasingly independent crossbencher. Dahrendorf’s role as an éminence grise of the British establishment was the culmination of a long and influential career, which provided his academic life with a firm grounding in contemporary politics.

**If Dahrendorf were alive today**

Were Dahrendorf still alive today, it is almost certain that he would have voted Remain in the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership. Like many of his generation, he was attracted to the diplomatic order that the European project seemed to create in the wake of political atrocities. The prospect of constructing peace in Europe for him was simply too great to be ignored, whilst the belief that Britain could make its voice heard in a world of superpowers and trading blocs struck him as quixotic (Dahrendorf, 1996: 5).

Somewhat idealistically, Dahrendorf thought that the European cultural tradition would be crucial in solving contemporary political problems in ‘a spirit of liberty and social
inclusion’. Dahrendorf believed that the effective cooperation of European states would set an example of an international community of law (Dahrendorf, 1996: 5). But perhaps most fundamentally, he disliked the idea that ‘conflict can and should be eliminated’ in favour of ‘homogenous and uniform’ political order (Dahrendorf, 1959: 318). Moreover, the idea of a sovereign nation whose national will can be divined through a people’s vote is diametrically opposed to his vision of a pluralistic society ‘based on recognition and acceptance of social conflict’ (Dahrendorf, 1959: 318).

He was not, however, a European ideologue. He believed in reform. And as a European Commissioner he shared the belief of many liberals in Germany that Britain’s entry into the European Communities was crucial for the project’s success. He hoped that Britain would ‘bring to bear its tradition of democratic accountability on the bureaucratic institutions of Monnet’s Europe’ and ‘provide a welcome antidote to the inward-looking protectionist instincts of some other member-states’ (Dahrendorf, 1996: 2). In other words, he saw in Britain’s entry the potential of an alliance of liberally minded countries that would counter-balance the more chauvinist tendencies within Europe.

Tension between the Nation State and the European Project

Yet Ralf’s cosmopolitan sensibility has always been opposed by nationalists. In his famous address ‘What is a Nation’, Ernest Renan (1882) thought that nineteenth century nation states were only one stage in a progressive history: ‘they have a beginning and they will have an end’ and a ‘European confederation will probably replace them’. This vision has only proved partially correct. While a European confederation has been a key development of the last century, nation states have not died away. In fact, many of the developments that have enabled some citizens to identify as European—globalisation, the spread of mass social media—have paradoxically encouraged a deeper sense of narrowly national community amongst others. In Britain, it was the Euro debate that first showed this crucial tension, the tension that existed between the nation state and the European project.

For many it highlighted that if Britain wanted to retain the hallmarks of a nation state, it would have to accept its role as a peripheral member of an increasingly integrated Europe. This issue went on to become the focal point of arguments between those pushing further European integration and Eurosceptics.

Dahrendorf was one of the few with enough acuity to realise that the debate about British membership of the Euro was quickly turning into a debate against the European...
Union itself. In the early-to-mid 1990s, he recognised that the steady lampooning of European legitimacy was becoming increasingly influential. He noted the frequent complaints of ‘fraud in Brussels, sinister plans by France and Germany, or the lack of accountability in all corners of the European Project’ (Dahrendorf, 1996: 1). But he saw that these early challengers of Brussels bureaucracy thought Britain had a role in the EU, albeit as a reforming Member. It took the rejection of monetary union—the realisation that Britain was on the periphery, as a source of conflict rather than collaboration amongst the Council of Ministers—to turn genial jibes against Brussels bureaucracy into an active political project for British independence.

After the 2008 financial crisis, however, the realisation that functional monetary union required serious restrictions on independent policy has had profound consequences. Previously quiescent nationalist parties—in Hungary, Greece, France and Italy for example—have had a run of electoral successes. They have taken advantage of the perception that increasingly remote supranational elites have betrayed the governments they were supposed to be representing. This rhetoric, which was the key emotional driver behind the referendum result of 2016, is not something that will go away so long as Europe tries to fulfil Renan’s vision as a replacement rather than a complement to nation states.

Following the Euro crisis, dislocations in the Middle East and Africa began to put serious pressure on Mediterranean countries and the principles of the Schengen area. Hungary is an illustrative example. Its national history in some ways could be easily accommodated into a sense of European identity. As a medieval Empire, it saw itself as the last outpost of Christendom and, during more recent conflicts with the Ottoman Empire, portrayed itself as the final outpost of European civilisation. This nationalist history, which provides the background to Viktor Orban’s ideology, flawed though it is, could be easily accommodated within a wider European identity. However, attempts to distribute migrants from North Africa and the Middle East across Europe mean that the EU is increasingly seen as a threat to Hungary’s national identity.

In a speech last year Orban embodied this paradox between Hungarians’ European identity and their growing Euroscepticism. He argued that, because of the EU and European liberals, ‘instead of our united civilization, there will be two civilizations in Europe’, and that Hungary’s role was to embody the true image of ‘Europe as a Christian Civilization’. As long as this vision of the Hungarian nation remains, the EU will be fundamentally unable to co-opt Hungary as a member of its extensive political project. But at the same

1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0HbvKmVSfOw
time it will lack the practical power of previous integrationist projects, like the United States and countless other nation states, to forcibly impose its vision.

Italy is similarly a country whose national history is firmly embedded in a sense of European identity. A consciousness of Roman history and the sense that Italy had once been an apogee of European civilisation, is a constant theme in the writings of Mazzini and other Italian Nationalists. Of course, this vision took on a grotesque form under Mussolini, but a powerful connection between Italian and European culture survived even Il Duce’s twenty-year rule. But, as in Hungary, the political ambitions of the European Union threaten this eliding of national and supranational identity. The expectation of European Union leaders that Italy accepts refugees in the Mediterranean, while key European heads of state refuse to take their allotted share, has helped fuel the rise of La Lega. This perception of the EU as a threatening force has only been encouraged by the continuing requirement that Italy tightly controls its finances as a member of the Euro.

Recent History

There are no signs that this conflict will go away. In July 2020, Poland’s nationalist Law and Justice party had just won the presidential elections, having used regular conflicts with the European Commission to cement the impression that national customs are under threat from liberal internationalists. At the same time, EU members had just agreed to an unprecedented €750 billion ‘Next Generation EU’ recovery package, attached to a new €1 trillion seven-year budget, following intense arguments among member states.

These debates re-exposed tensions between nations willing to promote fiscal conservatism at the expense of national self-determination, the so-called ‘Frugal Four’, and those who are willing to sacrifice economic stability for national freedom. Viktor Orban vetoed any suggestion that receipt of a bailout would be conditional on good governmental behaviour.² And the Spanish Premier, Pedro Sanchez, stressed that there would be no return to the Troika or the spectre of internationalist ‘men in black suits’ running the country.³ In order to overcome the continuing toxic legacy of previous Eurozone bailouts, which came with strict and obtrusive conditions, Pandemic Crisis Support is being provided with hardly any strings attached.⁴ But even with concessions, this bailout has been unable to win the support of other Southern European parties, scarred by previous interventions and still suspicious of any supranational intervention.

² https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/07/18/a-nasty-election-in-poland
³ https://www.elespanol.com/espana/politica/20200516/escabulle-sanchez-no-preguntaria-alega-obviando-espanol/490451392_0.html
⁴ https://www.ft.com/content/2741caf1-5758-4a26-ac88-0cab6cf63500
Conclusion

The tension between national identity and the ambitions of the European Union will remain the single most intractable problem in European politics. There are two starkly competing visions of Europe’s future: a Europe of increasingly assertive states, or a federal Europe which can coordinate and direct politics at a more integrated supranational level. Finding a middle way between these two paths is a considerable challenge.

Here in the United Kingdom, the referendum of 2016 seemed to offer a definitive answer to this central problem. The British people, as we all know, voted by a narrow, but decisive, majority to leave the EU. As a British Government Minister, and as a British citizen, I am deeply interested in how Europe’s future develops. The central question of European politics will also help to define Britain as it seeks to forge its own path in the world. My own view is that the nation state will gradually re-assert itself and Britain will, in the end, be part of a community of strong, independent, European states.

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Ralf Dahrendorf, Britain and the European project

Michael Cox

I have never felt hemmed in... Britain has become like Ancient Rome: whoever wanted to come was made welcome, and soon taken into the fold.¹

Welcome home stranger

Ralf Dahrendorf once confessed that Britain was a country with which ‘he had fallen in love’ even before ‘he had seen it’. One of the reasons why he did so it seems was that his own home city of Hamburg, was, as he called it, the ‘most English city in Germany’ where the locals’ ‘reserved coolness’ was for ‘real’, and where the ‘people’s pin-striped suits’ were perhaps even ‘more pin-striped than those ’ worn in ‘the City of London’ (Dahrendorf, 1982: 10-11). But it was also the idea of Britain that seemed to enthrall him. As he later recalled he ‘was British’ even ‘before he became British’ (Dahrendorf, 1996: 2); in fact, it was through his ‘discovery’ of Britain as he put it that he came to understand the very notion of the ‘West’ (Dahrendorf, 1996: 1). Britain also changed his life for ever after the war. Indeed, having been evacuated with his family out of the Eastern sector of Berlin in 1946 by a British army officer—Noel Annan no less²—he then travelled on two years later to Britain with a number of other Germans to live and study at Wilton Park (in the years immediately after the war a training centre for German prisoners-of-war) where he openly admitted he was ‘educated in English ways’ (Dahrendorf, 2003).

¹ Quote from Dahrendorf (1982: 14)
Nor did the relationship cool thereafter and having completed his doctorate back in Hamburg at the tender age of twenty-two, he undertook post-graduate studies at the LSE—a ‘cramped and rough place’ he later observed—where amongst other things he worked alongside young sociologists like David Lockwood to whom he later dedicated his most important book,\(^3\) began work on his dissertation on ‘unskilled labour in British Industry’, moved from being a classical social democrat to a forward looking liberal as a result of engaging with LSE professor Karl Popper, and not insignificantly perhaps, transferred his football loyalties from Hamburger SV to the North London club of Arsenal!

For the next two decades or so Dahrendorf divided his time between the United States, Canada and Italy, but these were in essence his ‘German years’ as he called them, to be followed rather more unhappily by a stint in Brussels as a Commissioner where, according to Hella Pick, both Dahrendorf and the Commission began to become increasingly ‘tired of each other’.\(^4\) Fortunately for Britain, and for Dahrendorf too one suspects, he was then ‘rescued’, as one writer has put it, by being appointed Director of the LSE—the first sociologist and indeed the first foreigner to lead the School since its foundation in 1895.\(^5\) As has been observed, ‘it was not a straightforward position to fill’ especially given what had gone before when the School had justly or unjustly became famous (or otherwise) for its student lock-ins, demonstrations, and occasional occupations. But Dahrendorf was clearly well equipped to do the job—he had after all gone through the unrest that had swept Germany universities in the 1960s—and not only led the LSE through the next ten years but in the process ‘helped restore stability and optimism’ to an institution that was clearly in need of both.\(^6\)

Nor did he remain aloof from British life more generally, becoming a Fellow of the British Academy in 1977, Warden of St Antony’s College Oxford ten years later, a British citizen a year on from that, and finally a member of the House of Lords in 1993. Along the way he was also asked to deliver the hugely prestigious Reith Lectures, wrote the official history of the LSE, and without fear or favour, became deeply involved in several high level debates about the state of the British nation without provoking the usual storm of protests about foreigners in general (and maybe Germans in particular) ‘interfering’ into Britain’s internal affairs. As Sir Huw Weldon—the Chair of Governors of the LSE

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3 Dahrendorf and Kegan (1959)
5 The idea of ‘rescue’ here is suggested by Colin Crouch in his obituary ‘Ralf Gustav Dahrendorf 1929-2009’. British Academy
6 Quote from Dahrendorf’s obituary in The Telegraph, 18 June 2009.
later observed—by the 1980s, Ralf Dahrendorf had not only become something of an institution in his own right, but had, without really trying, become the most popular German in Britain since Queen Victoria’s husband, Prince Albert!7

**Britain: Decline without Fall**

But what about his views on Britain itself and where did he think it was heading in the last part of the twentieth century?

Dahrendorf had what can only be described as a very special relationship with what he saw as a very special country. Indeed, he was fulsome in his praise of Britain in ways that only someone who had experienced totalitarianism first-hand could be. As he confessed, there had always been, and there remained, a ‘fundamental liberty about life in Britain which was not easily found elsewhere’. Britain could also boast many strengths including a strong sense of continuity and tradition, as well as excellent institutions including the universities, the BBC and the Bank of England all of which remained relatively independent from state interference. There was, moreover, a sense of community in Britain even across the class divide. Indeed, it was this more than anything else which ‘held British society together’ Dahrendorf (1982: 78). He even compared other countries (unfavourably) to Britain. Thus whereas in the United States—not to mention mainland Europe—there was what he called a ‘great rat race’ which dominated people’s lives, in Britain there was a real sense of ‘solidarity’. This however did not prevent the British from having the most vituperative of disagreements in public. But again this was something to be praised not criticised. If anything, Dahrendorf much preferred the ‘rough and tumble’ of political debate in Britain rather than what he viewed as the ‘culture of diplomatic acquiescence and tip-toeing’ that characterised so many discussions in Europe proper (Anheier and Brincker, 2012).

Yet ever the good sociologist, he was not uncritical of Britain and never shied away from pointing out some of its underlying structural problems—the most intractable one of all being its long-term economic decline. He did not mince his words. Whatever the nation’s many strengths, Britain simply had to face up to the profound challenges facing it in the last part of the twentieth century. This did not mean that the nation was on the point of collapse. Nor did it mean this would lead to more intense class conflict, something Britain had been very good at avoiding through most of its history. But the nation was beginning to fall behind, and it was doing so in large part because the system

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7 Quoted in Crouch (2011)
itself was no longer fit for modern purpose. In effect, Britain had reached something of an economic dead-end. Thus, its industries were no longer leading the world. Productivity was low and getting lower. There was a ‘corporate bias’ built into the system. There was too much short-term thinking. Trade unions had probably acquired too much political power. And that great measure of progress—social mobility—was moving in the wrong direction. Britain was hardly on the point of falling apart. Nonetheless, the prospects going forward were not good. Change therefore was not only required: it was absolutely essential if British leaders were to arrest the country’s ‘century long slide’ (Dahrendorf, 1982: 188).

**Dahrendorf and Change**

But in what direction should Britain go? Joining Europe was at least one important part of the solution according to Dahrendorf. However, it was no panacea. More radical change might be required. Dahrendorf was of course no great fan of Mrs Thatcher. She felt the universities had failed Britain. Dahrendorf thought they were the ‘best in Europe’ (Dahrendorf, 1992: 169). She was a Hayekian who believed that the free market was the only answer to Britain’s ills. He was a devotee of Popper and thus advocated more gradual, piecemeal reform. He was also highly critical of what he saw as her persistently negative attitude towards Europe. Indeed, when she was finally ousted from power he wrote that ‘under Thatcher, Britain had lost its impact on Europe, except in terms of slowing things down and obstructing progress’ and that any new leader should accept the reality of Europe, which Thatcher denied’.8

On the other hand, if change was necessary to arrest British decline, then some form of her tough love economics might be necessary. Dahrendorf may have worried that many of Thatcher’s policies would likely change the kind of Britain he so much admired, as of course they did (Dahrendorf, 1988: 191-202). Nonetheless, he was perhaps realist enough (along with many other notable Liberals at the time) to know that some major reforms would be in order to rescue the country from the plight it found itself in by the beginning of the 1980s.9

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9 In a remarkable speech to the House of Lords immediately following Thatcher’s death in 2013, Paddy Ashdown who stood on the ‘left’ of the Liberal Party admitted that her ‘aggressive liberalisation of the markets, stripping down barriers to business and lowering taxation… needed to be done…. at the time’
There was probably too much of the old social democrat in his make up for him to be able to endorse the whole Thatcher agenda. Nevertheless, he later on made the rather telling point that Blair, who had just been elected in 1997, was in a most ‘fortunate position’ economically because all the brutal reforms had already been undertaken by his predecessor!10.

Nor were Dahrendorf’s views on Europe as far apart from Thatcher’s as is commonly assumed.11 Thatcher rarely hesitated to criticise the European ‘project’. Yet even though she frequently attacked Europe in often intemperate language, she was far from being an out-and-out Eurosceptic. As Iain Begg has correctly pointed out, ‘the image of a staunchly Eurosceptic Prime Minister is at odds with her support for the single European market and her assertion, in her 1988 Bruges speech, that the UK’s destiny is to be inside the European Community.’12 Dahrendorf could not have agreed more. But even though he remained a committed European and believed that Britain’s place was in Europe, he had always been critical of the direction in which it had been moving for some time. As he made clear in a telling intervention in 1992, the project ‘as it stood’ had proven to be a disappointment to him; in fact ‘almost everything’ about Europe was ‘wrong’ (see Dahrendorf, 1992: 168). Nor did he become any the less outspoken as time passed. Indeed, there was, he felt, a very real danger of the EU losing touch with both its own citizens as well as with the newly admitted countries of Central and Eastern Europe too and urged it ‘to focus on liberal, not statist principles when building a European demos’ (Anheier and Brincker, 2012: 6-8).

Ironically, therefore, Ralf Dahrendorf and Mrs Thatcher may have had more in common than either would have been prepared to admit. The two together did after all see Britain as being a very exceptional kind of country. They also believed that Britain and Germany had much in common;13 and though they articulated it in rather different terms, both insisted that whatever its faults, a united Europe in whatever shape or form was an essential building block of a stable international order. Finally, the two together welcomed what they saw as the almost inevitable collapse of the East European order.

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10 See his comment in the discussion ‘After the landslide’ Prospect magazine, June 20th, 1997. Available at https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/afterthelandslide
11 Helmut Anheier, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/12/20/ralf-dahrendorf-was-both-pro-Europe-and-pro-britain/
13 Mrs Thatcher may have had her doubts about German unification in 1989, but according to Dahrendorf, she was much ‘impressed by the success of the market economy in Germany’. See Dahrendorf (1982: 143).
in 1989. This may not have represented the ‘end of history’ as Dahrendorf made clear in a blistering attack on Fukuyama.\footnote{For Dahrendorf’s critique of Fukuyama see his remarks in \textit{Reflections on the Revolution in Europe} reproduced in Delong, \url{https://www.bradford-delong.com/2017/06/weekend-reading-ralf-dahrendorf-on-frank-fukuyama-from-reflections-on-the-revolution-in-europe.html}} Still, even if the future did not belong to capitalism in its neo-liberal form (as he made clear) it was evident that a new world and a more ‘open society’ was in the making.

**Where are we now?**

But how did this new world unfold and what did Dahrendorf have to say about it? Dahrendorf clearly welcomed the political space created by what he called ‘the strange death of socialism’ in Eastern Europe (Dahrendorf, 1990). On the other hand, he was quite well aware of the many dangers which lay ahead—one of which he identified as populism—which flowed from the unleashing of a free-for-all global capitalism which in his own telling words ‘built paths to the top for some while digging holes for others’. How prescient that early warning turned out to be. Certainly the young German who arrived to such a warm welcome in Britain in 1948, and who then went on to make such a huge contribution to British life, would surely have been deeply saddened to see the current state of a nation whose people finally took the decision to leave the EU in 2016.

But being Dahrendorf, one senses he would also have been the first to point out in his own no-nonsense way that if European leaders had perhaps been a little less hubristic and not pushed ahead with a ‘project’ which he always felt was leaving the people behind, then the UK might not have taken the critical decision it did. As it is, Britain, sadly, now finds itself in the situation where it is stranded in a world of putative superpowers—of which the EU will remain one—with few options and even fewer chances now of addressing some of the deep-seated challenges he so brilliantly identified in one century and which remain ever present in the new one. But the high price for Britain’s withdrawal from Europe will not just be paid by the UK alone. For as Dahrendorf always reminded people, having Britain in Europe was not just good for Britain but for the EU too. Together both the British and their European neighbours will together be paying a heavy price for having failed to listen to Ralf Dahrendorf.

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There is no doubt that the British decision to leave the European Union in June 2016 came at an unfortunate moment for the EU, already weakened by the repercussions of the migration and refugee crisis, challenged by the growing number of Eurosceptical and populist parties gaining importance across the Union (Sus and Hadeed, 2020), and forced to deal with armed conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood. Tough and highly politicised negotiations on a future relationship are due to be concluded later in 2020.

Although what both sides seek from the future economic relationship has become more clear, in many other areas it remains hard to judge what post-Brexit cooperation will look like. This is especially true of foreign, security and defence policy, a topic given scant attention during the negotiations. The political declaration agreed by both London and Brussels in October 2019 proposed *inter alia* cooperation regarding British participation in CSDP missions as well as regarding sanctions, collaboration of defence industries and consular issues in third countries (for more, see: Institute for Government, 2019). Yet, the political declaration remained rather general and there was a need for more detailed arrangements. However, despite the willingness of the EU to carry on with the talks, the UK has been reluctant to debate future cooperation in this policy area. Thus, the European Commission noted, in a document that specified possible future solutions for foreign, security and defence cooperation, that the ‘United Kingdom does not wish to engage in negotiations on these matters’ (European Commission, 2020, p. 28).
Yet, reflecting the remarks made by policymakers on both side of the channel regarding their aims for future cooperation in the field of security and defence, a clear conflict line appeared. The United Kingdom declared its willingness to remain in a close partnership with the EU in the area of foreign, security and defence and to regulate the arrangement via a special and bespoke agreement: ‘The UK would like to offer a future relationship that is deeper than any current third country partnership and that reflects our shared interests, values and the importance of a strong and prosperous Europe. This future partnership should be unprecedented in its breadth, taking in cooperation on foreign policy, defence and security, and development, and in the degree of engagement that we envisage’ (HM Government, 2017).

The leaders of the European Union, in turn, did not follow up on the idea of a bespoke agreement. Michel Barnier, Europe’s chief Brexit negotiator, has noted that ‘EU leaders seem united in their position that…the UK should lose any benefits it used to have as a member state’ and it would not be given a seat at the decision-making bodies such as Political and Security Committee or Foreign Affairs Council (Barnier, 2017). Instead, the EU leaders proposed to cooperate with London via a regular third-country arrangement called Framework Participation Agreements (FPA).

Brussels is not keen to offer London a special deal since it wants to avoid ‘contagion’ by other EU countries with strong Eurosceptic tendencies (for more, see: Martill and Sus, 2018). FPAs standardise third country participation in security and defence missions by determining questions of personnel, chain of command, financial aspects and agreements regarding the status of personnel and information sharing. An underlying problem is that a reform of the FPA has been long overdue, not least because such agreements cover a growing number of partners whose strategic importance for, and political convergence with, the EU is diverse (countries participating via FPAs include Ukraine, Turkey, Norway, Canada and Georgia). Reform also became necessary due to the development of new instruments, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), that still lack coherent rules for participation of third countries. Yet, the EU member states have not been able to agree on reform of the FPAs for three years.

Most importantly in relation to the UK, countries participating via an FPA are only given access to EU-issued documents once their participation has been accepted by the Political and Security Committee but are not involved in the decision-making process. Needless to say, London does not accept being treated like any other third country or becoming a rule-taker. Thus, there has been a stalemate regarding post-Brexit security and defence cooperation between UK and the EU.
The impasse is quite surprising given the strategic challenges facing both parties. Ursula von der Leyen, prior to being appointed President of the European Commission in November 2019, had stated her aim for the Commission to be a geopolitical one (von der Leyen, 2019). This stance reflected the fact that the EU now operates in a more hostile world, defined by more intense competition between states (the systemic rivalry between US and China as well as the aggressive policy of Russia towards its neighbours are prominent examples), the increased significance of multipolarity, and the declining role of international organizations. Additionally, as Blockmans argued, ‘issues previously belonging to the realm of low politics, such as transport and telecoms (cf. 5G), have come to characterise great power rivalry’ (Blockmans, 2020). The Covid-19 pandemic that hit Europe (and the world) in early 2020 only accelerated all these trends and made the world even more geopolitically tense than before.

Against this backdrop, Nathalie Tocci rightly noticed that ‘in this unstable global environment, the EU is increasingly unable to depend on its most powerful ally even as the multilateral order it has championed threatens to unravel. Sovereignty and autonomy are no longer luxuries. They are necessities’ (Tocci, 2020). Indeed, the strategic autonomy concept, put forward in the European Global Strategy 2016 (EEAS, 2016) became more important than ever.

The ambiguity of this concept led to a debate on how it should really be understood: Nicholas Burns and Douglas Lute have suggested that a preferable concept for the EU might be ‘strategic responsibility’ (Lute and Burns, 2019). Federica Mogherini, at the 2019 Munich Security Conference, coined the expression ‘cooperative autonomy’. Sven Biscop distinguishes between ‘strengthening autonomy’ (in domestic security), a ‘significant degree of autonomy’ (Europe’s ‘connectivity’) and ‘full strategic autonomy’ (in crisis response) (Biscop, 2016). Daniel Fiott differentiates between ‘autonomy as responsibility’, ‘autonomy as hedging’ and ‘autonomy as emancipation’ (Fiott, 2018).

At the same time, any kind of strategic autonomy can be achieved only if it is a European and not an EU-endeavor because UK military and diplomatic power is an essential element of the European security architecture. Against this backdrop, the indispensableness of a close cooperation between the EU and the UK is undeniable. This is also true looking at the geopolitical situation of the United Kingdom, which has no better option than to liaise with the European Union. The idea of Global Britain put forward by Theresa May and supported by Boris Johnson, who has been speaking about UK’s independence, has been heavily criticised as unrealistic by experts (for more, see: Daddow, 2019).
The options for security and defence

In the field of security and defence, there are two dimensions of the post-Brexit cooperation that are especially important. The first is operational and concerns how to benefit from each other’s military and civilian capabilities in order to launch civilian and military operations. The second is strategic and relates to the ambition of the European Union to be an ‘unparalleled platform for cooperation on security and defence’ (De Serrano Haro, 2019). If the EU, following the geopolitical motto of the new Commission, wants to become an important player in security and defence, it can only do so in a close partnership with the United Kingdom, a diplomatic and military heavyweight.

Such an involvement would also strengthen the primacy of multilateral cooperation that is in the EU’s DNA. In today’s multipolar world, with liberal values under threat, being able to integrate like-minded partners and to act jointly is essential for the Union. Moreover, the ability of both the EU and the UK to cooperate closely would constitute an important projection of Europe’s soft power, and would place Europe among other geopolitical players such as NATO and the UN, or the US and China. Only a strong Europe can provide leadership and contribute to the system of global governance.

Therefore, both the European Union and the United Kingdom should have strong incentives to overcome the stalemate regarding their future cooperation as quickly as possible. Despite damaging rhetoric from both sides as they have tried to score political points against each other by fueling the debate, the global trends presented briefly above show that there is no time to waste. Faced with growing geopolitical challenges, the lack of a comprehensive arrangement for post-Brexit cooperation in security and defence is damaging for both London and Brussels. By leaving the EU, the UK is gaining independence to pursue its foreign policy according to its interests, a manifestation of which is, for instance, provided by the recent alignment with US, Australia and Canada with regard to China (for more examples, see: Whitman, 2020).

Yet, due to the fact that the UK and the EU are located in the same ‘operational backyards’ (King and Scarlett, 2020) and share both threats and security interests to a great extent, a ‘no deal’ scenario would undermine the possibility for London to multiply its strength by striking a security and defence deal with the EU27. Without an agreement, cooperation would still be possible, but it would be run on an ad-hoc basis and would be time and effort consuming. Moreover, a lack of formal agreement would result in poorly coordinated positions and could lead to a scenario in which London and Brussels pursue competing objectives. This would dramatically weaken the effectiveness of the foreign and security policies of both sides and undermine the idea of European autonomy.
Conclusion

Thus, I argue that the Union should offer the UK the bespoke partnership London originally sought, while respecting the decision-making autonomy of both sides, yet allowing for the possibility of joint-decision-making. Manifestly, such an agreement would go beyond any existing agreements with a third county, but would be justified by the strategic significance of the UK. Such an agreement should also be wide-ranging, covering internal and external dimensions of security. London should resist the shortsighted temptation of rejecting such an offer, since alternative solutions, including bilateral agreements with selected Member States or cooperation via the NATO or G7 frameworks, would not replace an all-encompassing deal on security and defence with the EU (for more on the possible enhancement of the cooperation via NATO, see: Martill and Sus, 2018).

There should be a flexible mechanism to coordinate common positions, to plug the UK into CSDP missions and to enable British participation in the new security instruments such as PESCO projects or the EDF. Against the backdrop of the global challenges presented above and the urgent need for strategic planning, more limited ad-hoc cooperation would not be sufficient. Instead, both sides would be well advised to overcome their mutual resentments and to start to act in the interest of their citizens by providing an effective foreign, security and defence policy.

Although Ralf Dahrendorf’s would have respected (while regretting) Brexit as a sovereign decision made by British citizens to leave the European Union, he would equally have been adamant about the necessity of both parties remaining close and cooperating with each other. The cost of not pursuing a close partnership would be high and would pose a threat to the security of the continent.
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Democracy
A Quandary, But Not a Vision

Kevin Featherstone

What legacy?

Let’s be clear: Ralf Dahrendorf was no visionary for a united Europe. He had strong reservations about the deepening of the European integration process. On 26th November 1979, for example, at the European University Institute, he advocated a Europe à la carte, allowing governments to choose whichever policies they wanted to join. This was not a typical stance for former EU commissioners. He opposed the single currency and just six years before its launch wrote that ‘it will take very nearly a miracle for Europe’s single currency to be issued to its citizens in 2002’ (New Statesman, 28.2.1998). He repeatedly argued that the nation-state was the only context in which representative democracy could work. Indeed, ‘Far from being a successful step in the direction of applying democracy beyond the nation-state, Europe proves that this is all but impossible to achieve’ (Dahrendorf, 2001). In the British political context of his time, as a member of the House of Lords, he allowed himself to be portrayed as a soft Eurosceptic, warmly cited by the Bruges Group of harsher EU critics. His separate enthusiasm for eastern European accession was hardly distinctive and was an agenda shared by all shades of political opinion.

His legacy is stronger in posing a quandary of conflicting constraints between national independence and globalisation. He did not signal a way out of the quandary. And a similar frame has been developed by others—notably, (Rodrik, 2011)—with much greater exploration of the policy implications. But the frame remains relevant to our current discussion here.

Before considering how his quandary might be addressed—and addressing the question of the relevance of the nation state in the future—it is important to recognise the changes that have occurred since Dahrendorf was writing. It would be too generous to suggest that Dahrendorf’s misgivings about EMU were borne out by the later Euro crisis,
but there are elements that connect. He was concerned about the divisions between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’ and he also seriously doubted the benefits for those countries that did join. Today, most economists in Europe would assert the economic gains that have accrued from entry into the ‘Euro’ and with ‘Brexit’ the relationship between the ins and the outs is far less significant.

Lessons from the crisis

The more fundamental issue is the source of the divisions that emerged in the crisis; these were not really foreseen by Dahrendorf (Dyson and Featherstone, 1998). These had several bases—moral hazard, structural disparities amongst them—but perhaps the most distinctive, in terms of support for the European integration, was the ‘ideologicization’ of the project. The single currency regime—in its rules and governance—became ideologically-confined, favouring a set of norms advocated—if not always respected—by its biggest economy, Germany. The Maastricht provisions and the subsequent reforms have constitutionalised many of the principles of ordo-liberalism (Bellamy and Weale, 2015: 259; see also Dyson and Featherstone, 1998). The meaning of ‘Europe’ privileged a set of principles drawn from one policy tradition, trampling over the diversity of pre-existing national traditions. This ideologicization placed Europe as a source of conflict with opposing domestic forces; blame for the crisis was traded and feelings of victimhood fanned.

The Euro crisis exposed the challenges of burden-sharing and these were further exposed in the humanitarian tragedies of migration and asylum-seeking refugees arriving across the Mediterranean and the Aegean, especially in 2015. Many EU states, particularly in central Europe, refused to accept an equitable share of these numbers, while some erected fences and used heavy-handed policing to keep them out. Chancellor Merkel’s enlightened lead was constrained by a domestic push-back, but also by central European governments vetoing EU burden-sharing arrangements. Refugees crossing from Libya died at sea and the refugee camps in Greece are still grossly over-crowded, as I write. As the French philosopher, Bernard-Henri Levy noted in the early summer of 2020, the Moria camp on Lesvos was a ‘monument of inhumanity and shame’ (Kathimerini, 7.7.20). The fires that destroyed the camp a few months later were a revolt by the refugees against their new suffering and a call to the EU for action. Europe had become a prison for those refugees who had arrived and a wall of exclusion against those desperate to enter.

Indeed, a third key and wider development is the rise of the new ‘identity politics’ (Kriesi, 2007). Europe has been ‘othered’ by the new Eurosceptic populists: ‘we’ are the
victims of ‘their’ rules and impositions. This has grown well beyond British Eurosceptics to incorporate Matteo Salvini, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, Andrzej Duda, Viktor Orbán and their allies. Unprecedentedly, the EU Commission has been placed in the position of ensuring a member state (Poland) upholds the rule of law and judicial independence.

The consequence of these developments has been hugely important. They question what ‘Europe’ stands for and they challenge its legitimation and sense of shared interests. Maastricht was a bold, singular initiative—the epitome of the Jean Monnet approach of a technocratic and opaque system of governance, lacking balance and ‘input legitimacy’ (Scharpf, 1999). The failure to establish a proper ‘European Constitution’ compounded the problems of legitimation.

While Dahrendorf could claim that the nation state was the most effective guarantee of ‘the civil rights, welfare and social cohesion’ of its member state citizens’, this is the result of the choices made by various European leaders. ‘Europe’ has been narrowing and exclusionary: how could it have been seen as offering equivalent guarantees to those of its member states? But, it’s potential to play a much bigger role remains.

The EU’s response to the election of the left-wing populist government of Alexis Tsipras in January 2015 was tothem in terms of Dahrendorf’s quandary of how to obtain the economic benefits of integration (and globalisation) while adapting provision for social cohesion and political rights. The EU Commission Vice President, Jyrki Katainen, declared ‘We don’t change policies because of elections’ (28.1.15). It was a conundrum created by the narrowness of the Eurozone’s policies and unaccountable structures. But, for the purposes of legitimation, an answer has to be found to it.

Looking for answers

Ideas of how to tackle these problems of legitimation came in President Macron’s speech at the Sorbonne in September 2017, which was visionary. Macron returned us to the original ideas of ‘economic governance’ put forward by Pierre Beregovoy in 1988, prior to the Maastricht negotiations. This was a conception that was more balanced and inclusive than that offered by more recent EU leaders who have re-defined and emasculated the term. It is much more than the strategy of discipline that inspired Eurozone reform at the start of the Euro crisis: of automatic fines, closer monitoring, and stronger rules, etc. Indeed, the idea of simply having a rules-based approach to fiscal policy across the Eurozone now seems increasingly obsolete—if we consider the recent cases of France and Italy, not to mention Greece. Flexibility and inclusion should
mark a new Eurozone governance, thereby broadening the domestic range of support and the input legitimacy of the process.

More than ever, the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic returned the Eurozone to the existential questions implicit in Dahrendorf’s quandary. The proposal by Merkel and Macron for a new ‘EU Recovery Fund’ further advanced by Ursula von der Leyen, culminated in the €750 billion ‘Next Generation EU’ package agreed after a marathon European Council meeting in mid-July 2020. But the lukewarm support of several richer member states and doubts about whether it represents a permanent shift in approach leaves the EU at a crossroads once again. It takes up Macron’s idea of a ‘real’ Eurozone budget, but leaves unresolved many of the challenges of risk-sharing that would need to be met for the EU to make a much more effective response to the challenges of showing solidarity and sharing the burden.

The Recovery Fund is, nevertheless, important in signifying a breakout from previous narrow dogmas. The philosophy is more Keynesian than Ordo-liberal in macroeconomic terms, but also embraces a newer, greener and more ‘social’ economic model. It ought to be paralleled by a European unemployment insurance scheme (e.g. Dullien, 2013), as recently recognised by Ursula von den Leyen, to be part of the socio-economic mission of the EU. Again, this would be a buttress against Eurosceptic attacks. The proper implementation of the Recovery Fund will be a defining moment in the EU’s economic governance and the sense of solidarity.

But the EU must also address the issues of institutional process that arise from a larger redistributive role—issues that arose in the debt bailouts and where the EU failed to meet legitimate concerns about the inclusivity and accountability of decision-making. The legacy of the Greek bailouts is to create widespread anxieties about funding conditionality. It became a reputational issue for Italian leaders. There ought to be a way, though, of combining much larger EU transfers with an assessment of how well member states comply with reform agendas agreed collectively at the EU-level and uphold basic EU principles in their democratic and judicial spheres. This is an idea floated in Schäuble’s ‘non-paper’ (Schäuble, 2017). It does not need a ‘Troika’ to monitor domestic compliance and it is a reasonable squaring of the interests of both donor and recipient publics.
The EU in an uncertain world

Externally, the EU has a special responsibility to uphold a multilateral economic order in the face of those who wish to resolve the Dahrendorf quandary by attempting to rein back globalisation. The outcome of the US Presidential election this autumn may prove pivotal in this effort. A strategy of ‘America First’ or ‘China First’ is not one to be emulated by the EU. The EU, too, has to rethink its global economic engagement in the aftermath of Brexit. The UK has been a champion of the EU’s openness to the rest of the world economy. The EU27 should not, in their own economic interests, shift in the opposite direction. Indeed, the EU needs to flank its international economic strategy with an ability to develop an effective global strategy, linking economics, politics and security. It has failed to do so thus far, but the EU has clout to deploy and it needs to select its priorities and give itself the decision-making ability to act in accordance with them. This is a strategy recognised by President von der Leyen.

The EU cannot, of course, sustain multilateralism if Washington and Beijing are intent on different strategies. This is not Europe’s century: international leadership is likely to be disputed between the US and China. At best, as a third and weaker player, the EU can only stall or ameliorate its actions. The EU has, itself, a delicate balance to maintain—avoiding inflaming bloc-to-bloc conflicts, while asserting its own global vision. It cannot be simply reactive to US sanctions on other states, caught in the restrictions placed on international companies as with Washington’s trade measures against Iran. The EU must select its own priorities and deploy its resources. It has more potential for wider impact via its own standards-setting regimes, especially in the area of new technologies (Abels et al, 2020). Its ‘sharp power’ needs to be deployed in a strategically sensitive manner.

Closer to home, the EU has greater weight. The EU must refine the architecture of its relations with its own near-neighbours. These neighbours feel ‘governance by externalisation’ (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 799) in a process in which the EU looms as hegemonic and impositional. The external domestic effects are an anathema to the democratic norms of the EU itself, as neighbouring states must trade voice and democracy for access to the EU market (Featherstone, 2017). An immediate task is for the EU to manage ‘Brexit’. It has to handle the populist improvisation of London to steer relations along a path that leaves open alternative options for closer integration in the future. A future UK government is unlikely to settle for the constraints felt by Norway. Ideally, the Brexit case and that of the EU’s other near-neighbours would be placed
within a strategy akin to the Bruegel think-tank’s 2016 proposal for a new ‘Continental Partnership’ maximizing economic flows beneath an over-arching architecture (Pisani-Ferry, et al, 2016).

It is clear that the current juncture forces some choices on the EU and that there exists the opportunity to go further. The degree of political will is, again, crucial to how well the EU is able to respond. The EU has already outstripped the caution or reticence of Dahrendorf, but it has certainly not resolved his quandary. It must act on several fronts. Even political will cannot compensate for a lack of capacity. Rather than Troikas and punishment beatings, the EU should greatly expand its support for capacity-building in the disparate public institutions of its member states (building on the Commission’s recent Taskforce). This softer approach can be tied to the funding flow and to the maintenance of basic democratic norms. Money alone, though, may not make such domestic intervention acceptable: it must also stem from a more inclusive, accommodating ideological paradigm driving its macro-policies.

A greater sense of shared purpose within, can also help externally. And, ‘Brexit’ may contribute in this regard by its creation of an ‘EU27’ with a clear and consistent mandate for difficult negotiations. The EU has moved well beyond Dahrendorf’s policy preferences, but this remains a time to reflect harder on his quandary. Optimality—for European citizens as a whole or even in their national parts—cannot come from a strategy of ‘less Europe’ or a more insular Europe. The EU role is to manage the effects of globalisation, not to deny or defeat them, and to distribute the benefits justly within. Who wins from de-globalisation? Not ‘Europe’, only perhaps some of its divided parts as they descend into a politics of recrimination.
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Escaping From the Non-Compliance Trap: Germany’s Response to State-sponsored Murder and the Nord Stream 2 Issue

Wolfgang Seibel

For Dahrendorf, the essence of democracy and freedom were more important than the promise of an ever-closer union in Europe,’ Helmut Anheier wrote in a 2017 editorial for the Dahrendorf Forum. Indeed, Ralf Dahrendorf was a realist. He knew that the robustness of supranational arrangements hinges on the commitment of their member states, and cannot be taken for granted. He also deplored the idea that democratic values might be over-ridden for presumed gains in European integration. On the contrary, both might suffer: sacrificing democratic values and undermining integration.

Dahrendorf was not just a sceptical realist as far as the reality of European integration was concerned, he was also especially sensitive regarding the legacy of Germany’s authoritarian past. This was the crucial message of his trail-blazing book Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland (Dahrendorf, 1967). His scepticism notwithstanding, Dahrendorf would have subscribed to the notion of the mutual reinforcement of democracy and freedom and robust multilateralism, especially as far as the role of Germany is concerned.

There can be no reasonable doubt about the commitment of all German Federal Governments, so far, to multilateralism and, thus, the cause of European integration under the auspices of what today is the European Union. However, commitment is a matter of values and motives, while what matters in practice is compliance. Whether or not member states of a multilateral arrangement do what they are officially committed to is an open question. Countless episodes illustrate how the conflicting rationale of commitment and compliance shaped the history of the EU and its institutional predecessors. Dahrendorf’s scepticism reflected those experiences.
This essay examines the tensions between Germany’s strong commitment to the EU and its deals with Russia on securing privileged access to natural gas supplies. It speculates on whether recent incidents in which the Russian state has ridden roughshod over international norms will induce Germany’s leadership to comply better with commitments to EU rules.

**Nord Stream 2—a paradigmatic case**

The on-going German debate on whether or not to suspend the completion of the second gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea, known as Nord Stream 2, is a paradigmatic case. It is about German lack of compliance with EU regulations, in spite of official commitment. The framework of the EU energy market is the Third Energy Package of 2009 and, as far as the supply of natural is concerned, the Gas Directive. The Gas Directive stipulates the separation of gas production and sale operations via transmission networks. This is known as the ‘unbundling’ requirement. It was designed to strengthen the competitiveness of renewable energy suppliers who typically have no transmission network at their disposal. However, one year after the Georgian war of 2008, it was also meant to reduce EU dependence on Russian natural gas. Nord Stream 2 is incompatible with the Gas Directive, thus with EU law, since the owner of Nord Stream Corporation, Russia’s state-owned gas giant Gazprom, is also the world’s largest gas producer.

Strictly, German companies in the gas business should never have signed the contracts for Nord Stream 2. They include Wintershall AG and its parent company BASF, as well as Uniper, since March 2020 part of the Finnish trust Fortum though. At the very least, the German Federal Government should have made it crystal-clear to these companies that Nord Stream 2 is incompatible with EU energy policy and that Germany for the sake of the credibility of its commitment to the single European market and its institutions should abide by the Third Energy Package.

In fact, the German Federal Government did just the opposite. A former Chancellor and Social Democrat, Gerhard Schröder, was recruited by Gazprom in a smart move to get access to domestic elite networks and to neutralise potential opposition from the German political Left. Schröder’s influence became especially effective when, from 2013 on, fellow Social Democrats were at the helm of the Federal Ministry for the Economy which at that time was also responsible for energy policy. What emerged was an influential alliance of unlikely partners, namely the conservative wing of the Christian Democrats with its traditional business connections and the very Social Democrats who otherwise never hesitate to criticise business lobbying.
Instead of promoting EU rules designed to strengthen the competitiveness of renewable energy and to reduce the dependence on Russian gas supply, Berlin supported the Nord Stream 2 project against stiffening opposition. In domestic public discourse, opposition to the pipeline project was primarily associated with the threat of US sanctions culminating in the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act (PEESA) of December 2019. It remained largely unaddressed, however, that Nord Stream 2 was, from the very outset, fiercely criticised within the European Union itself.

In November 2015, ten EU member states wrote an Open Letter to the EU Commission in protest against Nord Stream 2 and asked to put the project on the agenda of the EU summit. In response, the German Federal Government came up with two bizarre arguments. One was that Nord Stream was a private business affair in which the Federal Government had no intention to interfere. A second argument was that the Gas Directive was allegedly not applicable to the pipeline because the trajectory ran through international waters—*nota bene*, the Baltic sea surrounded by EU member states. This should have made it even more pressing to demonstrate political commitment to the implementation of the Third Energy package rather than exploit loopholes of the Gas Directive.

In practice, Germany blocked any initiative to put the issue on the agenda of the EU Council. It did not change its stance when, in November 2018, some 100 members of the EU Parliament sent another Open Letter in protest against Nord Stream 2, this time to Chancellor Merkel herself. It read, *inter alia*, ‘We ask you, Madam Chancellor, that your government reconsiders and changes its policy on Nord Stream 2. Stop blocking the work on the Gas Directive. Support the course set by the European Commission and the European Parliament. Let Russia’s President know that Germany will stand by its EU partners and by Ukraine. Choose the European way, not the “Germany first” way.’ Again, this should have been clear enough. It was to no avail though.

For the German government, it probably came as an unpleasant surprise when French President Emmanuel Macron, in February 2019, took the initiative to amend the Gas Directive so that the last loophole for Nord Stream 2 to circumvent the Directive was closed. Since April 2019, no pipeline can be licensed under EU law when the ‘unbundling’ of gas production and gas transmission is not guaranteed as soon as one end is located in one of the member states. This is the case for Nord Stream 2: its terminal is in Lubmin, near the city of Greifswald in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. In May 2020, the relevant regulatory agency, the *Bundesnetzagentur*, decided that the amended Gas Directive applies to Nord Stream 2 also retroactively.
Russia beyond the pale?

That was the state of affairs when it emerged that the Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with Novichok, the same agent used in the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal in the UK in 2018. Merkel, in remarkably strong language, not only pronounced the attack on Navalny an unacceptable crime but also demanded an explanation from the Russian government.

Merkel’s public stance differed from the low-key reaction of the German government when, earlier in 2020, Federal prosecutors had determined that Russian intelligence agents had staged a cyberattack on the Bundestag in 2015 and that the murder of a Georgian man gunned down in public in Berlin in August 2019 was a hit ordered by the Russian government. The resolve of the Federal Government was underlined the same day by a joint press conference at which Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (SPD) and Minister of Defence, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (CDU) expressed similar sentiments. On 6 September, Maas expressed his hope that ‘that the Russians will not force us to change our position on Nord Stream 2’. The next day, Merkel’s spokesman, Steffen Seibert, confirmed that the chancellor ‘shared the opinion of the Foreign Minister’. It was the first time ever that abandoning Nord Stream 2 was officially considered by key figures of the Federal Government and the Chancellor herself. The intended message to the Russian government was clear and precise: enough is enough.

Yet cacophony characterises the reaction in Chancellor Merkel’s own party, the Christian Democrats (CDU). The chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, Norbert Röttgen, a candidate for the CDU presidency, and one of his rivals, Friedrich Merz, suggested a stop or moratorium to suspend the completion of the pipeline. By contrast, the Prime Minister of the state of North-Rhine Westphalia, Norbert Laschet, another candidate for the party presidency, warned against ‘one-sided steps’ referring to unilateral measures against Nord Stream 2. Rather, a ‘European answer’ should be given. The current president of the Christian Democrats, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, said ‘Nord Stream 2 is not my heartfelt concern’ but did not explicitly join Röttgen or Merz in their plea for a stop or moratorium of the project. A remarkable statement came from the Christian Democratic Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, Peter Altmeier, who stated that according to the experience in his entire political life, sanctions had served no purpose. His statement prompted Röttgen’s sarcastic reminder that the Minister was, after all, a member of Merkel’s cabinet who had supported every single EU sanction against Russia since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Foreign Minister Maas of the SPD found himself in an even more awkward situation. Virtually nobody within his own party supported his statement that Russia’s non-compliance with the investigation into the origins of the attempted murder of Alex Navalny could change the German position on Nord Stream 2. On the contrary, prominent members of the party leadership, such as the Prime Minister of the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Manuela Schwesig, fiercely rejected the notion of a moratorium, let alone stop, of the pending works to complete the pipeline. The chairman of the SPD Bundestag group, Rolf Mützenich, practiced what is known as ‘whataboutery’. He said that, after all, Germany had no choice but to purchase fossil energy sources from countries with authoritarian regimes, for instance oil from Saudi Arabia—an allusion to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 at the hands of presumed Saudi intelligence agents. Mützenich said, there would be no reason to handle the case of Russia and the attempted murder of Navalny differently.

**Conclusion**

What is indicative about the German Nord Stream 2 debate after the attempted murder of Alexei Navalny is the absence of the EU dimension in terms of regulation and institutional requirements, let alone the question of compliance. Mobilizing political energy and forming explicit and implicit alliances in favor of abandoning Nord Stream 2 for the sake of Germany’s credibility within the EU is therefore an uphill battle. The fact that Germany fails to comply with the Third Energy Package and, thus, with its own principles of multilateralism and ‘deepening’ the EU single market, is virtually not addressed in political discourse. The fact that Nord Stream 2 has always put a strain on the cohesion of the European Union in the realm of a common energy policy, and especially on Germany’s relationship with Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, is only reluctantly acknowledged. Finally, quite remarkably for a country that takes pride in its commitment to the fight against climate change, the fact that gas pipelines are emitters of one of the worst climate gases, methane, is not mentioned either.

Whether or not the Merkel Government will manage to escape from the non-compliance trap remains uncertain. Now that Germany holds the presidency of the EU Council, Berlin must not miss the opportunity of productive issue linkage. When the attempted murder of Navalny with an internationally banned nerve agent is defined as a state sponsored crime, it needs a resolute response. Abandoning Nord Stream 2 would be precisely that kind of response. At the same time, it would represent a better-late-than-never act of compliance with the principles of the single European energy market
in the form of the Third Energy Package and the Gas Directive. It would thus contribute to the mutual reinforcement of democratic values and robust multilateralism. After all, the return to compliance with EU commitments in a crucial field like energy supply is likely to strengthen Germany’s position in any other area of EU politics and policy where compliance is of the essence—and vice versa. Obvious examples are the rule of law and a commitment to human rights as the basis of migration policy. And, finally, suspending the completion of a second gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea would be a sign of credible commitment to the goals of the United Nations’ Paris agreement to combat climate change and the European Climate Change Programme.

In a nutshell, it is a potential win-win situation in the arduous struggle for the mutual reinforcement of democracy and robust multilateralism in Ralf Dahrendorf’s sense. The only losers are those who invested their hopes and their money in a pipeline project based on infringement of EU rules. The alternative is an ‘all-lose’ scenario: to deepen the rift within the EU over Nord Stream 2, to encourage Russia to continue with aggression and state-sponsored crime and to weaken Germany’s standing as a credible lead nation in what is supposed to be an ever-closer union in Europe.

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Enlightened Humanism – a New Faith for the 21st Century or Europe’s Manifest Destiny?

Alexandru Filip

Ralf Dahrendorf drew attention to the perils of declining social cohesion in Europe and elsewhere in what is now known as the ‘Dahrendorf Quandary’ (Dahrendorf, 1996). The Quandary—an impossibility theorem—exposes the difficulties in maintaining social cohesion in a world that seeks to advance democracy at the same time as economic globalisation, capital fluidity, the breakdown of political economic barriers and the trans-nationalization of policy making. The Quandary has much in common with the better known ‘Globalisation Trilemma’ of Dani Rodrik (2011).

Social Cohesion is complex and compound. Its thinning and decline stems in part from weakening social ties (such as class ties and class identity) and the erosion of social capital, as well as social exclusion. In the North American context, we might associate it with Robert Putnam’s metaphor of ‘bowling alone’ (Putnam, 2000). It also reflects a combination of political polarization, and increased support for ‘disloyal’ or ‘anti-systemic’ populist opposition parties (in conjunction with falling trust in established politics and the so called ‘Volksparteien’).

Rodrik, is inclined to believe the trilemma can be resolved by states opting to maintain the democratic and local/national elements (sovereignty) and, in effect, roll back globalisation. By contrast Dahrendorf feared states may pursue different courses of action, renouncing either liberal democratic principles (as has happened in certain contexts already) or by abandoning efforts to maintain social cohesion.

It is not only the thinning of class ties and rising social exclusion that express falling social cohesion. Organised religion and religious organizations are among the constituent elements of civil society - declining religious ties and involvement with religious organizations can also be read as part of the mosaic of falling cohesion. Such declining
involvement can be read as part of a wider trend of secularization in Europe spanning the past century. The next section discusses the waning influence of religion in Europe, then the case for humanism as a new paradigm to underpin European values is presented. The essay concludes by exploring how these ideas offer a way of resolving Dahrendorf’s concerns about social cohesion.

**The decline of religion in Europe**

The importance of religion in Europe and the lives of Europeans (especially in the Western part of the continent) has been trending downwards. In fact, there is a significant number of countries around the world where religiosity is decreasing as Ronald Inglehart (2020) shows (especially so in more developed countries), where the causes of this shift are discussed. The number of people identifying themselves as religious, attending church service, or associating themselves with organised religion has been declining, Western Europe has become increasingly secular as the role of religious authority in the design of policy and laws has decreased over the course of the 20th century (as have the ideas of national churches or official state religion). In a society that is increasingly secular, social and political direction is ever less the territory of the metaphysical.

This correlates with critiques from abroad that Western Europe (or the West) has lost its soul, moral compass, or other such slogans. These reproaches can also originate much closer to home, being expressed by (highly) conservative politicians in central and eastern Europe all the while enjoying security provided by the safety blanket of ‘Pax Europeana’. Such political actors (most often of the populist flavor) claim to represent and defend traditional European values, and their catchwords regularly include defense of the family, nation, and the church. Such stances also correlate with attacks on the freedoms of minorities (of various types) and the liberal push towards a diverse society.

Confusing lack of religiosity with nihilism or cynicism, these (arguably, intellectually insincere) claims somehow suggest that without organised religion a society will be rudderless. It is not always clear if such Euroscepticism is founded upon fear of West European secularism and laicism, or whether the latter is just an added excuse to oppose pan-European action. However, the fact is that these actors are quick to take up the defense of religious institutions and act as if their communities or polities are the last bastions of a church under siege. Further afield, autocrats or quasi-authoritarian rules legitimise their regimes by appealing to religious tradition, and portray liberal Europe as a Gomorrah without ethical standards, that has lost its morality. The (intellectually insincere) allegation is Europe has lost touch with its religious roots.
The rise of enlightened humanism

If we are indeed seeing the swan song of religion as a pilot of European society, perhaps an alternative ‘faith’ can replace it as the one to characterise the ‘European soul’. In a society of weakening social ties and fluctuating social capital, humanism could be something like a paradigm (the term is used here as a substitute for ‘ideology’) on which to build a new sense of togetherness. If people no longer share a sense of togetherness based on class or religious ties, perhaps these can be replaced by a belief (even if it exposes itself to accusations of idealism) that we can make a difference.

It is fashionable to claim that Christianity ‘rests on two legs’: Judaic monotheism and Greek rationalism (or philosophy). It is in similar sources that another paradigm found its origin over the ages: Enlightened Humanism. Humanism is a philosophical school of thought built around the idea that human beings have intrinsic value and agency. Immanuel Kant’s principle of humanity, or categorical imperative reads as follows ‘Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end’ (Kant, 1785).

In other words, the value of a human being comes not from their instrumental utility to fulfilling somebody else’s goal. They have a value in and of themselves by the mere act of being human, with dreams, goals, and aspirations. They are not property, and not to be treated as pawns or tools for the achievement of some geopolitical or economic goal (the ultimate expression of the latter idea being manifested in slavery). Humans are not a statistic, nor are they numbers to be used in the planning and alteration of ethnic geography. What if we could promote Enlightened Humanism as the new guiding principle on the basis of which to judge political action? What if we could promote it as a … religion for the 21st century, if you will.

Enlightened Humanism has also been called a ‘religion of humanity’ (a phrase associated with American founding father, Thomas Paine)—it is easy for modern audiences (especially those in Europe) to scoff at American politics in the present day as being overly besieged by confrontation, polarization, inequality, and racism but we should not forget or disregard the good brought about by the founding fathers from across the ocean in era when Europe was still in the grip of feudalism or monarchic autocracy. For a very long time, American political ideals were ahead of their time in terms of conceiving people not just as subjects, but also agents.

It must be noted that such approaches or strands of thought as those that characterise enlightened humanism are not only the ‘property’ of European culture. Similar paradigms and world views have been expressed over time across various geographical and
cultural coordinates, going as far back as ancient India and China. It just happens that the presently most well-known flavor is the one that has spread in the ‘old continent’.

With its diverse roots in Renaissance Humanism, the American and French Revolutions, and the Kantian Tradition, enlightened humanism is a philosophical school of thought associated with the idealism of the enlightenment project. It rejects the notion expressed by ‘Homo homini lupus’ (‘Man is wolf to man’). It believes—in conjunction with the enlightenment project—that history progresses (even if not linearly) towards a better state of the world in the future, that there is such a thing as the ‘good society’ that all people can agree and identify with, and that we can reach a state of affairs where humans would—aided by progress—reach a state of enlightenment and absence of want and poverty. Dutch philosopher Erasmus of Rotterdam is often associated with the promotion of humanist tradition in (northern) Renaissance Europe, and seen as a father to the school of thought. Ralf Dahrendorf¹ used the term Societas Erasmiana in homage to the scholar to describe a society and scholarly tradition founded at the intersection of liberal and humanist thought.

Enlightened Humanism rejects cynical and pragmatic powerplay in politics, chauvinism and nationalism, and the belief that world society (be it politically or economically) functions according to a zero-sum logic. It thus stands in direct contradiction to various world leaders (in both Eurasia and the Americas) who believe that something can only be gained at someone else’s expense. It believes in cooperation, common goals, and the pursuit of mutual security and affluence, objectivity, and consensus arrived at through deliberative action. If that sounds eerily familiar to the principles underlying the structure of the European Union, that is because they are largely the same. The European Union is many things to many people. But among them is a common space for the advancement of respect for human rights, democracy, property rights, the rule of law, and political action aimed at enabling people to be as autonomous and sovereign as possible in their pursuit of happiness. The Charter of Human Rights of the European Union and the European Convention of Human Rights can be seen as products of the humanist tradition.

Enlightened humanism also rejects cultural relativism. It rejects the notion that some people are better off living under dictatorships or oppression, or that not everybody truly desires the freedom and liberty to enhance their lives. It rejects the notion that things such as democracy or human rights are culturally and geographically bounded—and thus should not apply everywhere.

¹ Norbert Schreiber: ‘An Interview with Ralf Dahrendorf’
http://history.thiscenturysreview.com/ralfdahrendorf.html
Enlightened Humanism also means that policy design and decisions should be judged on the degree to which they benefit human beings and help them – it thus implies that a political programme based on it should advance those initiatives that extend an arm to those less fortunate, or whose lives are in danger. Examples would include helping refugees whose lives are in danger, as well as providing support to those in other societies who find themselves in less fortunate circumstances.

Enlightened Humanism rejects the assumptions of Realpolitik, but need not mean weakness or ‘turning the other cheek’. The EU should not, and perhaps must not, abandon the idea of trying to export said humanism for the sake of comfort and safety at home. Fortress Europa is—in the long term—a losing proposition. Only by expanding the geographical spread of respect for human rights, civil liberties, liberal democracy, and the rule of law, can Europe hope to secure of safe and prosperous future for itself and others. The world is smaller than ever (we affectionately refer to it as the ‘global village’) and modern-day problems (such as pollution, environmental degradation, humanitarian crises) do NOT respect national boundaries (or continental ones for that matter).

Europe and other like-minded progressive, secular societies have not only the possibility, but perhaps also the responsibility, to be the flag-bearers of Humanism throughout the World. This also means willingness to take a stand for what is right (in other words, ‘growing a spine’) and not shy away when faced with the prospect of losing market access for its products, or having gas or oil faucets turned off. In this regard, diversification and politically economic contingency measures should not be abandoned.

According to Inglehart (2020), religion may have been the most effective way to maintain social order and cohesion in agrarian and subsistence style societies, but modernization has changed that equation. As traditionalism and religiosity declines, new, equally strong moral norms can emerge to fill the void, and empirical evidence shows that in highly secure and secular countries, people are giving increasing priority to self-expression, free choice and free speech, and emphasis on human rights, equality and tolerance.

Today’s Europe is perfectly placed and primed for promoting Enlightened Humanism (as a new philosophical underpinning of culture and society) at home and abroad—if there ever was a time and place, a society or collection of societies that were up to the task, then it is the present-day European Union.

There are undeniably many rough edges that need polishing. Nobody claims that European politics and society are perfect. Europe is—just like many other places— afflicted by corruption, inequality, chauvinism and bigotry. But in an argumentation
similar to that about democracy (it is said that it is the least bad type of political system), it is currently the best blueprint we have to bring about the good society. And yes, it is still work in progress.

Concluding comments

This is the point at which this essay also comes full circle. One remedy against declining feelings of ‘togetherness’ can be an increased understanding of what binds us in our humanity. Membership or activism in religious organizations might be supplemented, complemented or even replaced by humanitarian awareness and involvement. The ties that bind together need not be based on concerns about the metaphysical, but on an understanding and appreciation of humanity instead.

Finding a new anchor for social cohesion in the form of Enlightened Humanism could provide a novel, perhaps indirect, but effective way to resolve Dahrendorf’s Quandary in Europe and elsewhere. It can offer a new basis for reconciling democracy and social cohesion, replacing that formerly provided by religion. And maybe, because Humanism is a ‘universalist’ outlook and philosophy, less tied to the local, and immediate ‘in-group’, it would offer a third leg of the quandary—a form of cohesion and togetherness—that is more suitable to go hand in hand with globalisation.

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On Complexity and Simplism

Radosław Markowski

Ralf Dahrendorf has contributed to social sciences in many key ways and made a number of foundational proposals, so that picking a single one is quite a challenge. Among his numerous fundamental observations and—in a way—ontological assumptions about socio-political phenomena, one finds the following short observation: ‘Populism is simple, democracy is complex; ultimately, this may be the most important difference between these two forms of relating to the people. More specifically, populism relies on conscious efforts to simplify problems’ (Dahrendorf 2003). This short quote is echoed in many similar remarks, of which one is my favorite. When asked in a TV interview what kind of advice he would like to convey to younger people around the world, he replied as follows:

‘Live with complexities! Don’t try to simplify the world into one which is homogeneous...with simple beliefs and convictions because that is the world of war and destruction. The world is complicated and we have to appreciate it is complicated... and while it is—he continued—very unpopular these days in view of fundamentalism, protectionism and desire for homogeneity, I think the great task ahead which the moral minority has, is to spread the message of complexity: the world is not simple nor should it be simple, it is rich because it is complicated.’

I posit that, by 2030, the EU will have to address this general issue very seriously, failing which it—and the world at large—will experience dire consequences in democratic developments. In what follows, I concentrate on a narrow, particular issue with broad corollaries.

My attention was drawn to this interview two years after I started work on the concept known, despite the complexity of simple ideas, as simplism (Markowski 2019). There is an uneasy relationship between different phenomena and notions related to populism and simplism. Ralf Dahrendorf would certainly express a distaste for the current misuse of the term populism and would, I hope, welcome attempts at its contextual clarification.
The notion of populism is vague, fuzzy and contaminated with many a- or anti-liberal constructs. Almost anything that challenges liberal democracies can be called populism. As a result, it has allegedly acquired an extensive travelling capacity, spanning political cultures across the world.

Among the phenomena tightly associated with populism one finds—as clearly stated by Ralf Dahrendorf—the issue of crude simplifications of reality. They manifest themselves in different forms. One has to distinguish, first, between simplicism and simplism, the former being a positive tool for making things comprehensible; simplifying in this instance aims at clarity and intelligibility. The second notion indicates an act of oversimplification leading to misrepresentation—to a false simplicity (for details see Markowski 2019). This issue was certainly at the crux of Dahrendorf’s concerns. It is visible in the above quote on populism, but even more so in his contributions to conflict theory. His idea on the role of conflict in industrialised societies is a fantastic example how to present complex, complicated relationships with clarity and intelligible simplicism (Dahrendorf 1959). It serves as an intricate theoretical framework for the different relationships and how these can be regulated. He proposed a multi-factor concept: the conflicts are supra-individual, they can be hierarchical or between groups with similar power. His theory is a dynamic one, phases are identified (emergence, awareness and organization), their essence is captured in the notions of ‘intensity’ and ‘violence’.

His theory was a dynamic construct, its initial version from the 1950s having been updated on several occasions to interpret new conflicts (i.e. such as the one in Northern Ireland) almost until his death. Dahrendorf identifies and discusses three ways of dealing with conflict—its suppression, its solution and its settlement. He sees a principled productivity of conflicts, providing they are settled fairly. All these complicated aspects of conflicts and their developments are presented lucidly in his theory.

What follows—and more generally my contribution to test the relationship between populism and simplicism—is less ambitious even though it follows the Dahrendorffian spirit and dictum concerning the necessity of simplicism in conveying complex ideas and phenomena.

In the political domain we are concerned with—what we call—the ‘linkage’ between elites and masses in the key process of representation and the quality of democracy. However, the linkage is not enough in itself because political content needs to be clearly communicated through such a linkage, not least by transmitting facts: ‘No facts—no democracy’.
Like scientists, people long for simple explanations in the spirit of William of Occam and Wittgenstein (see Russell 1945). Political scientists try to meet this demand through ‘heuristic shortcuts’, ‘policy cues’ or ‘rational ignorance’ (Bartels 2008; Lau & Redlawsk 2006; Downs 1957). All these simplifications improve the quality of the mass-elite linkage. However, a phenomenon of deliberate misinformation is often visible and seems less conducive to sustaining democracy (Kuklinski et al 2000; Tworzecki, Markowski 2014).

Political parties, when ‘socializing’ the electorate to their ideas and programs, unfortunately too often manipulate and misinform citizens. Empirical evidence shows that people not only tend to hold inaccurate factual beliefs, but do so confidently. The problem then, at least with respect to attitudes about public policy, is not that people simply lack information, but that they firmly hold the wrong information—and use it to form ‘preferences’ (Kuklinski et al 2000: 732). If this is the case, then the alleged Condorcetian miracle of ‘invisible hand of aggregation’ (Althaus 2003) is unlikely to occur as it is based on the assumption of randomness of the false beliefs and subsequent choices made. Deliberately misinformed voters however are likely to make systematically biased choices. Regrettably, political science has been preoccupied for too long mainly with the distinction between ‘informed’ or ‘uninformed’ citizens, neglecting the misinformed ones.

Populist mobilization in its appreciation of the ordinary people and their presumed inability to grasp complicated phenomena gives precedence to common sense at the expense of meritocratic expertise (Hawkins 2010: 7; Cramer 2016: 123-130). Ordinary people hold it by virtue of their closeness to, and familiarity with, daily routines, everyday problems, and practical knowledge. Moreover, many populists openly reject recognised scientific achievements, question methodology and fundamental academic values, and belittle established generalizations based on scientific proof. They create new types of ‘knowledge’ and offer different ‘truths’, by inventing ‘facts’. An alternative knowledge production is in the making, and is not just an unexpected side-effect. It contests the epistemic pillars of the dominant scientific culture and advances alternative expert and academic authorities.

Sociologists of knowledge claim that most of the knowledge we use comes from the ‘like-minded people’ surrounding us (van Dijk 2014; Althaus 2003) or/and is acquired from epistemic authorities (Giddens 1991), which leads us through the complex multifaceted body of knowledge, in principle available to everybody. Yet because of its richness and diversity of findings (or interpretations), it is easily manipulated by new populists. Besides, a serious body of research posits that mistrusting verified knowledge in one field boosts beliefs in fake-news and alternative truths in other domains.
Political psychology research stresses that people believe facts that confirm their previously socially constructed views. Moreover, new information that falsifies such views is typically rejected because of peer group constraints (Nyhan and Reifer 2010; Lau & Redlawsk 2006). In short, alternative knowledge is a social phenomenon; ultimately the community decides what becomes strongly held opinion. The crux of the problem is not trivial (technical) misinformation. The widespread popularity and effective usage of conspiracy theories by populists is one of their more successful ploys. Some authors claim it is the ‘populist theory of power’ (Fenster 2008).

**Simplism: where does it come from?**

One way to go about complicated notions in social sciences is to juxtapose their ‘negatives’—the strictly opposite phenomena. Scholars typically consider pluralism and elitism to be the antithesis of populism. My contention is that we have to add meritocracy, of which the ‘negative’ is **simplism**.

Numerous authors assert that populists seek to simplify the public debate and political messages to ‘validate’ their difference vis a vis elites, because the latter unnecessarily complicate things, use incomprehensible jargon etc. (Canovan 1999; Mudde 2004; Oliver & Rahn 2016). Recent political developments, from Brexit via Trump and Orban in Hungary, to PiS in Polish illustrate how populists radically simplify political debate. They attempt to use black-and-white clarity and limited vocabulary, refute scientific achievements, despise causal relationships, trivialise complicated policy decisions etc.

The theoretical foundations of **simplism** are to be found mainly in the theory of cognitive complexity (Tetlock 1983; 1998). The pivotal role of cognitive complexity in political life has been demonstrated by ample research; scholars have observed significantly lower levels of complexity among politicians of minority parties than of majority parties. Complexity has also been related to competitive versus accommodationist political strategies in international disputes, such as the American-Soviet arms control talks or Arab-Israeli speeches at international forums. Moreover, the complexity has been considered an individual trait that accompanies adherence to specific ideologies. In particular, ideologies such as fascism (authoritarian personality theory) and left-wing and right-wing extremism were hypothesised to be sustained by a simplistic cognitive style of information processing.

Another thread of research concentrates on the details of populists’ language, as used in party manifestoes or public speeches (Belanger & Meguid 2008). Scholars focus as well on the mechanisms by which voters ‘consume’ these messages (cf. Fernandez-
Vasquez 2014), on the language used in this type of communication (Bischof & Senninger 2017), and even its’ tone and sentiment (Young & Soroka 2012). The simplicity of the language used by parties depends not only on the attributes of target voters, it also has to do with media preferences, some of which favor short, attractive ‘catchy’ phrases and metaphors, rather than complicated sentences, replete with professional jargon (Takens et al 2013). Bischof & Senninger (2017) conclude with two general observations: (a) populist parties employ significantly less complex language in their party manifestos, and (b) individuals are more able to correctly place parties in the ideological space if parties use less complex campaign messages.

My modest contribution to the debate presented above is to distinguish between general simplism (pertaining to life in general) and political simplism (depicting the political domain alone).

By general simplism, the overall idea and related narrative I put forward is that the world is much simpler than the dominant expert/academic complicated storyline supposes (for operationalization and details, see Markowski 2019, Annex)\(^1\). It assumes there is usually one simple truth and straightforward explanation, so there is no need for complex deliberations and time-consuming evaluations of alternatives. Nor is it necessary to assume elites should be labelled ‘corrupt’; for populists, most educated, upper strata people are equally dodgy and untrustworthy.

Political simplism is a ‘linkage tool’, a specific narrative assuming that the political domain is deliberately complicated by political elites, parliamentarians and the like, and that action is needed to improve the linkage with the masses via creation of a much simpler, comprehensible and ‘for the people’ explanation of the political realm\(^2\).

As such it falls short of being an ideology, rather it is a communication style that appeals to ordinary people, whose reasoning is un-contaminated with the complexities of formal knowledge of those who possess superior skills in grasping the essence of public policy. It is a two-way feedback loop: populists propose a crude ‘explanation’ of the problems and offer unrefined policy ‘solutions’; these are met with uncritical acclaim by social strata unwilling to pay attention to deeper concerns, complex means of achieving policy goals, and considering deliberation on alternatives as superfluous and a sheer waste of time.

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\(^1\) An example of the operationalization and only one item wording of the general simplism: ‘Academics and experts of different specialties obscure things which are fairly straightforward’.

\(^2\) An example of the operationalization and only one item wording of the political simplism: ‘Solving the problems our country faces is pretty easy; it is just necessary to give power to those who want to accomplish it.’
Some empirical results

To illustrate the relationship between simplism and populism as well as the related phenomena (authoritarianism, nationalism, conspiracy theory and the like) findings from research undertaken in Poland is instructive. Three general results emerge, suggesting directions for further research.

First, simplism seems to be ‘centrally located’ in the universe of populist-related phenomena, such as conspiracy theory usage, authoritarianism, nationalism, rejection of pluralism etc. Simplism is statistically more significantly associated with these populist-related phenomena than populism itself. Moreover, in a multivariate analysis, with core populism as a dependent variable, the strongest direct effect is associated simplism, only followed by conspiracy theory usage, nationalism and rejection of pluralism.

Second, and more importantly, the concept of simplism is a good explanatory factor of the vote choice when parties are split between—broadly—‘populist’ and mainstream ones. Simplism is a stronger explanatory factor than core-populism indicators or any of the several other associated phenomena. This is a striking result of paramount importance.

Third, the relationship between simplism and other analyzed phenomena is as expected, though their interaction effects call for further scrutiny. They include: perception of conflicts in the Polish society; the level of political knowledge and educational attainment; and positive and negative party identification.

Conclusion

An open question remains: what is the ontological status of simplism? Should it be a constitutive element of populism or is it an ontologically different—yet related—phenomenon? Irrespective of how we answer these questions, the main point remains: this third decade of the 21st century is going to face an acute problem from a cluster of interrelated phenomena, deriving from post-truth culture. To be sure, so far simplism ought to be treated as a method of communication between elites and masses, as a political linkage tool based on the assumption that the surrounding world, politics and economy are simple. This is an assumption Ralf Dahrendorf would have rejected with great eloquence and sought to counter.

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3 For details of the hypotheses tested and the first empirical findings see Markowski (2019), where details of operationalization and ‘wording’ are presented as well.
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Lord Dahrendorf’s Challenges to Europe
KRIS BEST AND MARK HALLERBERG

Ralf Dahrendorf anticipated some of the key challenges that face Europeans today. Globalisation—defined in economic terms as a proportionately high flow of capital and goods—led him to question whether such flows would affect the very functioning of liberal democracies in Europe. His concern was that too few people would benefit from globalisation, and many would in turn come to question democracy. As he wrote in 1997, ‘The greatest danger to democracy today is that large numbers of people conclude: if the constitution of liberty does not increase our prosperity, then we do not need more, do not want it.’ (Dahrendorf, 1997: 132).

One way his concern could manifest itself is through support for authoritarian populist parties. Indeed, while there remain gaps in our understanding about the rise of populist movements that question key tenets of liberalism, there is at least a correlation between the ‘losers’ from economic change (due both to ‘globalisation’ and to technological development) and areas where populist parties do well in relatively prosperous countries, such as France and Germany. Evidence from Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth (2020) shows that populist parties do best in Europe and in the United States in regions that have experienced long-term economic decline.¹

The level of government here is important, as Ralf Dahrendorf focused on liberal democracy at the nation-state level, and not necessarily at the level of the European Union. Yet even in the 1990s, when Ralf Dahrendorf was writing, the European Union played a critical role in the maintenance of a liberal economic order. Economic competition and the ‘four freedoms’ of the common market of capital, goods, services, and especially labour are at the very core of what the European Union stands for and defends. The European

¹ At the same time, others insist that a cultural backlash, rather than an economic one, largely explains the rise of populist parties – see Inglehart and Norris (2017).
Union played a critical role at the international level as well as in the spread of liberal economic norms, and negotiations between the United States and the European Union set the agenda for successive GATT agreements as far back as the Kennedy round in the 1960s (Sbragia, 2010). So while Ralf Dahrendorf did not insist on more liberal democracy led from Brussels, the European Union has historically been one of the guarantors of the international liberal order, together with the United States.

**Today’s Changed Context**

Much of what Ralf Dahrendorf observed in the late 1990s and early 2000s regarding Europe and Western liberal democracies was prescient, as has become increasingly clear today. Nevertheless, the world has changed in three key ways compared to Lord Dahrendorf’s time and forces us to view his thinking in a new light. First, there has been a markedly ‘European’ policy response to a series of crises; second, there is the growing salience of climate change; and finally, the global balance of power has shifted away from the post-war setting.

Ralf Dahrendorf wrote his reflections on Europe before it had experienced three continent-wide crises: the Euro crisis, the refugee crisis, and now the Covid-19 pandemic. These crises have resulted in a highly contentious policy response at the European level. They included restrictions on what policies governments should adopt in ‘programme’ member states (Euro crisis), quotas for the hosting of refugees (refugee crisis), and a Recovery Plan for Europe that will, for the first time, involve the EU level borrowing to finance policy interventions (Covid-19). Yet a recurring concern in populations is that much of the decision-making that led to this action was behind closed doors or hidden behind the ‘technocracy.’

One does not need to be a Brexiteer to have concerns about the seeming activism of the European Union and the questionable democratic roots of such action. In a sharp turnaround from Dahrendorf’s post-1989 characterisation of the ‘magnetic effect’ of Europe for the then-would-be member states, national politicians in those countries (among others) often exploit this perceived lack of democracy at the European level as a scapegoat for unpopular policies, claiming that these were forced upon them by ‘Brussels.’ Slovakian governments complained about packages for other member states, Hungarian and Polish government oppose refugee quotas, and—while not formally part of the ‘Frugal Four’—the three Baltic member states have participated in the new ‘Hanseatic League’ that called for greater use of the European Stability Mechanism.
(ESM) as the main instrument to address the type of economic shock that hit Europe as a result of Covid-19.

Ralf Dahrendorf was an early critic of the democratic legitimacy of major policy action at the EU level, referring to himself not as a Eurosceptic, but as a ‘sceptical European’ (Dahrendorf, 1997: 165). He argued that any democratic deficit at the EU level should be solved with more national parliamentary involvement. But he did not foresee the multiple crises that would grip the continent in the 2010s and require policy action at the European level.

He has been proven correct with respect to his central observation that liberal democracies would face the fundamental challenge of ‘squar[ing] the circle between growth, social cohesion and political freedom’, and that they would have to make ‘perverse choices’ in the context of globalisation. We see this in the current political manifestations of the ‘losers’ or ‘left behind’ of globalisation in populist movements throughout the developed world. However, the original challenge posed by Ralf Dahrendorf now comes with a twist that he perhaps did not foresee at the time of writing. Namely, within the last decade, climate change has emerged as a much more urgent global priority. The policy conversation has since shifted from ‘growth’ to ‘sustainable growth’.

For liberal democracies, this compounds the problem of what to do with the ‘losers’ or the ‘left behind’. Climate change adds a new dimension to the already-existing challenges of globalisation. Policymakers are now faced with additional ‘perverse choices’ in the short term (winding down certain industries, adopting stricter regulations, etc., which may have significant negative effects for certain regions and segments of the labour market) in order to pursue long-term sustainability goals. This risks creating an additional pool of ‘climate losers’—firms and individuals in unsustainable industries, or in regions that depend on unsustainable industries, who will suffer economically from a shift towards sustainability. Once again, an activist European Union in the form of ‘the Green Deal’ is a crucial player, reinforcing the need for a functioning democracy at the EU level and not merely at the nation-state level.

Finally, since Dahrendorf’s day, new global rivalries have emerged, accompanied by a new global economic order. The rise of China means that there is a new major power on the international economic front; additionally, other players, such as Brazil and India, play an increasingly influential role as well.² Under the Trump administration, the United States has turned away from the role it once shared with Europe in supporting the rules-

² For a fascinating perspective that integrates a wide set of actors in the study of trade negotiations, including least developed, middle income, and developed economies—see Narlikar (2020).
based liberal economic order, a development which has lasting consequences for the global order (Salazar-Morales and Hallerberg, 2020). Even if Joe Biden is set to become President in January, the growing ‘Great Powers’ rivalry between the US and China will not simply disappear.

This new state of affairs leaves Europe facing a series of difficult choices. Europe’s openness to trade, and to competition more generally, has historically been a source of economic strength. This openness is also a core value that is deeply engrained in the European project. However, it is increasingly not reciprocated. Europe now finds itself caught in the middle of the US-China rivalry, trying to preserve a liberal economic order that neither side seems interested in respecting. The United States has become more overt in ‘weaponising’ its economic clout and financial system, such as through the use of secondary sanctions (Drezner, Farrell and Newman, 2021). China makes strategic use of investment and development funds and has built state-supported megacorporations. On the competition front, European companies are losing ground to US and Chinese corporate giants, especially but not exclusively in the digital and IT realms. These are not ‘merely’ competition or trade issues, as a long-term decline in global competitiveness and economic sovereignty has tangible effects on European labour markets, on our standard of living, and on social cohesion.

**What can Europe do at this point?**

Increasing its global role is a realistic objective, but Europe must consider where and how it focuses its efforts as a global power. Indeed, this was one of the outcomes of the Dahrendorf Forum scenario exercise (Abels et al, 2020). Realistically, it may be too late to catch up to the US and China with respect to homegrown digital/ttech giants, as these benefit from huge economies of scale, network effects, and digital ecosystems that have already been achieved, making entry into certain digital industries difficult. The ‘European champions’ idea is politically popular, but it is unclear whether these European champions would succeed (Best, 2019). There is also a real danger that ‘European champions’ is short-hand for the return of mere ‘national’ champions, with all of their associated inefficiencies. Nevertheless, assuming that consumers suffer when there is little competition for a Chinese or American product, any European champion that increases competition would be a net positive not just for European producers but for European consumers too.
In the context of increasing global competition and the decline of the liberal rules-based economic order, the Single Market is potentially Europe’s greatest advantage, and the EU must learn to wield it more strategically. The Single Market is a ‘prize’ of nearly 450 million relatively high-income consumers, which US, Chinese and Russian firms are all eager to reach. Hence Europe’s growing recognition as a ‘regulatory superpower’ (see Bradford, 2020). The attraction of the European market and the power held by those who determine the rules of access should not be underestimated.

Europe is a trading superpower. The new generation of EU free trade agreements include broad agreements on economic and social protections (e.g. on collective bargaining, human rights, etc.) and environmental/climate protections (European Commission, 2015). To the extent that these FTAs encourage real change in partner countries (e.g. through required legislative or regulatory changes), they are another tool that the EU can use to wield the power of its Single Market more effectively.

Other steps should be taken to strengthen the EU’s economic sovereignty and its position vis-à-vis other global actors. Limited European champions as discussed above could provide more private sector European economic actors who could compete on the international stage. Further deepening of the Single Market (e.g. through the completion of the Capital Markets Union) would make the internal market more efficient. And while the Euro is already a key international currency, its global importance remains a distant second to the US Dollar; measures to bolster the international role of the Euro would be an important first step to reduce European—and global—dependence on the Dollar (see Best, 2019).

A more economically successful and sovereign European Union, which is more likely with the steps outlined above, would be in a stronger position to help member states protect their citizens from the pernicious effects of globalisation. This, in turn, could help buttress struggling liberal democracies at the nation-state level, thus addressing one of Ralf Dahrendorf’s key concerns.
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Can Circles be Squared? 
Quandaries and Contestation 
Shaping the Future of Europe

Helmut K. Anheier, Iain Begg and Edward Knudsen

Ralf Dahrendorf was not a European federalist. He was pro-European, convinced that the future of the continent—including its stability and prosperity—is ultimately guaranteed by strong democratic societies. Neither a form of a common market nor a unified political system could adequately provide what is best accomplished through robust democracy at the level of the nation state. In addition to his work on the future of the EU, in his seminal essay entitled ‘Economic Opportunity, Civil Society and Political Liberty’ Dahrendorf (1995) argued that the tensions between the social, the economic and the political have become stronger in the context of globalisation and changing geopolitics, resulting in greater challenges for member states and the EU itself.

Dahrendorf’s implicit espousal of a Europe of strong societies organised as nation states under the umbrella of European Union implies recurring tensions between the Union and member states. It also implies that nation states will have to balance the demands put on them through continued globalisation and the pressures put on their societies and political systems. Indeed, the task ahead for the early 21st century, he wrote, ‘is to square the circle between growth, social cohesion and political freedom’ (Dahrendorf, 1995: 4)—a challenge that became known as the Dahrendorf Quandary.

Twenty-five years after Dahrendorf published this essay, how would he conceive of the present moment, characterised by a pandemic, major recession, Brexit, and worsening transatlantic and United States-China relations? Undoubtedly, the many tensions and conflicts would not surprise him, nor would the upsurge in populism
he examined concisely in his ‘Acht Anmerkungen zum Populismus’ (eight observations on populism) (Dahrendorf, 2003). For Dahrendorf, conflicts are necessary for progress and can be productive if managed well, as he argued in his sociology of conflict. Upon looking at the current state of affairs in Europe, Dahrendorf may have been inclined to revisit some of the premises of his 1995 essay. In a section defending the ‘first world,’ he praises Western societies for providing prosperity, upward mobility, strong communities, respect for the rule of law, and democracy. However, with rising inequality, declining social mobility, and democratic backsliding, he would probably have wondered how we got here, and would certainly have searched for ways to resolve these problems.

Against this background, we wondered how he would view Europe at present, and what his expectations might be for the future. This let us to ask the six questions we presented in the Introduction to this Compendium. Let’s briefly review the answers and reflections the authors provided, grouping the essays under the three general headings of Europe, Brexit and Democracy, even though there is some overlap between them. In a second step, we will assess what follows from them.

Europe in the World

The future of Europe’s role in the world deeply concerned Dahrendorf. In 1995, he predicted that ‘regional blocs of some sort may well be where the world is headed.’ In today’s world of competing spheres of influence led by the US and China (with Europe somewhere in the middle, but still closer to the former than the latter despite recent schisms), his observation has proven prescient. Indeed, Europe is on a quest for ‘strategic autonomy’ to free itself from dependence on the US security guarantee and protect itself from economic coercion. It is now over a year since European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen pledged to lead a ‘geopolitical Commission’. This affords an opportunity to appraise progress towards this goal, and to explore what could be done to accelerate it.

Ben Martill examines EU foreign policy in the present fragile international environment. While external challenges—Trump, Brexit, the rise of China—have alarmed the EU, they have provided a necessary impetus to act more strategically. He applauds the ‘dual moral and geopolitical doctrine’ the EU employs as strategically sound. However, both internal challenges (defense coordination) and external ones (continued reliance on the US security umbrella) undermine the pursuit of ‘strategic sovereignty.’ The EU needs to think strategically, balance interests, and partner selectively with a variety of external actors.
Danuta Hübner questions Dahrendorf’s belief that the nation-state is the most effective democratic unit. She argues that Europe is the only plausible path and that de-globalisation won’t accomplish what its proponents wish for. Similar to Featherstone’s argument below, she advocates for more European integration, and for making the EU a fitter and more effective vehicle for democracy.

Pawel Świeboda looks at the current global crises in the context of the Quandary. He argues against determinism or any sense of inevitability and suggests that squaring the circle is a matter of political choice first and foremost. For him, the tensions inherent in the Quandary are by no means unstoppable forces. He addresses two aspects of it: democracy and economic globalisation and concludes that the EU can overcome the Quandary if it reemphasises democracy, invests more in public goods, and recalibrates the social contract.

Sophie Vanhoonacker begins by emphasizing that the EU of today is radically different from when Dahrendorf’s seminal essay on Europe was written (Dahrendorf, 1996). Like Hübner, she argues for ‘more Europe’ to strengthen EU’s position abroad and build security at home. She surveys the history of the EU and how it became dependent on the US for security, and puts forward the proposition that the rise of authoritarianism and the partial withdrawal of the US makes the pursuit of ‘strategic autonomy’ more critical. For her, defence integration and trade promotion should go hand in hand.

Ferdinando Nelli Feroci asks what the future of multilateralism and globalisation will look like after Covid-19. He surveys recent developments, including the failings of international coordination during the pandemic and rising US-China tensions, but points out that in spite of the challenges to the current system, no coherent alternative has been proposed. Nelli Feroci argues that the world needs more, not less, multilateralism to combat climate change, arms proliferation, inequality and more. The EU should use the occasion to jump-start multilateral efforts. The economic response to Covid-19 showed some hope here and the EU should not miss its ‘window of opportunity.’ He concludes by presenting Brexit as a ‘stumbling block,’ but is optimistic that a productive UK-EU partnership is still possible.

Elizabeth Collett looks at the relationship between migrants and the nation-state, pointing out that the final decisions over rights and responsibilities are still taken at the national level. However, the nation-state does not have sole authority: many legal protections exist on the international and European level. While these are at risk of being eroded, they are crucial for protecting rights. On a sub-national level, cities are vital. They thrive on diversity and handle many of the social responsibilities of integrating
migrants. In migration discourse, it is important not to focus exclusively on the ‘economic contribution’ that migrants make—there are many other ways in which they enrich society. Europe must recognise this and lead at the global level on migration—both for migrants to Europe and those that move within the global south. As the pandemic acts as a great global leveler, the time is right for the EU to take more responsibility to ensure the well-being of migrants worldwide.

What can we glean from this wide range of perspectives on the future of Europe? First, there seems to be a near consensus that more Europe is needed, despite Dahrendorf’s reservations. Global problems require international cooperation and, thus, more multilateralism, as many authors have pointed out and as Gordon Brown stated so clearly in his Foreword to this volume. One problem that concerned Dahrendorf was the relationship between domestic welfare and international engagement. Many of the essays discuss this dilemma with reference to the Quandary, but perhaps even more attention should be paid to rising inequality and declining mobility, including how that may hinder nations’ ability to act effectively on the world stage. The authors also concur with Dahrendorf in stressing the primacy of values in international affairs. Dahrendorf pointed to ‘European values’ as a core component of an emerging EU bloc. As geopolitical competition engenders the temptation to sacrifice values for the sake of power, this insistence on a shared moral and ethical mission is more important than ever.

**Brexit**

A committed European and avid Anglophile, Dahrendorf would have been deeply disappointed by the UK’s decision to leave the EU. Still, he had an even deeper enthusiasm for democracy and would almost surely have insisted the result be accepted. In the essays collected under this heading, Dahrendorf’s views on the UK’s relationship with Europe are re-evaluated, and the tricky question of how the British-European relationship can be most productive in the future is discussed.

Kwasi Kwarteng, who supported ‘leave’ and remains pro-Brexit, discusses how Dahrendorf would have felt about Brexit (almost certainly opposed) and the UK’s role in the European project. Dahrendorf was in favor of the UK joining the then European Community, arguing it would imbue the EU with a more liberal bent. For Kwarteng, the EU has not lived up to Dahrendorf’s hope of a more liberal Europe and this has led to tension between national identity and sovereignty, on one side, and EU solidarity on the other. Brexit is just one expression of a more fundamental conflict. In other words, Kwarteng proposes to address the Quandary by emphasizing the nation state.
Michael Cox looks at the changing role of the UK and its relationship with Europe through the lens of Dahrendorf’s personal experiences. Dahrendorf found the openness of Britain appealing in the post-WWII era. Dahrendorf was drawn to Britain’s prestigious institutions, traditions, and debate culture. However, Britain was experiencing economic stagnation, and Dahrendorf thought that joining Europe and imposing some sort of economic liberalization was key to overcoming the country’s weaknesses. While no Thatcherite, he shared some of her views, but also had the wit to recognise sooner than most that neoliberal policies created many tensions capable of undermining the social cohesion of British society. Cox echoes Kwarteng’s view that, despite some reservations, Dahrendorf always believed the UK and Europe were stronger together and would have been deeply disappointed by Brexit.

Monika Sus looks specifically at the prospects for security cooperation between the UK and the EU in the aftermath of Brexit. She laments that not enough attention has been paid to defence, pointing out that while the UK has asked for an ‘unprecedented’ defence partnership, the EU has rebuffed it. The EU position stems from the assertion, often repeated by its negotiators, that the UK cannot maintain the privileges it enjoyed as a member state and should instead be treated like other third countries. This stalemate comes at a time when rising geopolitical tensions—and the increasing need for European autonomy—make a strong partnership crucial. In this context, Sus argues, the EU should abandon its opposition to a ‘bespoke’ deal on defence. While some degree of autonomy for both sides is unavoidable there should also be joint decision-making where appropriate. In the current challenging international climate, it is vital the defence cooperation between the EU and its strategic heavyweight British neighbour remain close.

Clearly, the UK and EU differ on many issues, including the proper relationship between state and market and the desirability of closer European integration. The lengthy and often acrimonious negotiations on, initially, the withdrawal agreement, then on the future relationship have been not been an edifying spectacle, but the essays demonstrate the scope for win-win outcomes. Both Dahrendorf and the contributors to this volume would, rather than dwelling on the problems, want to find solutions.
Democracy

Dahrendorf’s thoughts on democracy and the tensions among globalisation, democracy, and social cohesion continue to resonate. He would have been dismayed by the upsurge in populism, but intrigued as a social scientist by the phenomenon and challenged as a politician to counter it. Despite the gloom induced by Covid-19, there is scope for ‘squaring the circle.’ The essays offer a range of proposals on how Europe can respond.

Kevin Featherstone, focusing on the Quandary, argues that globalisation can’t be undone or reversed. Instead, there needs to be a much more pro-active approach to managing its tensions and contradictions. He calls for moving away from neoliberal and ‘ordoliberal’ models and adopting a more Keynesian framework at the European level. Like Dahrendorf, he advocates combining aspects of state and market to allow for both security and prosperity.

Wolfgang Seibel looks at a specific case in which national sovereignty, EU laws and US interests collide: Nord Stream 2. The case illustrates the tensions between international solidarity and national goals: how can Germany reconcile compliance with EU laws, its presumed national interest, and the likelihood of US sanctions? He argues that the Navalny poisoning gives Germany a window of opportunity to withdraw from the project, comply with EU law and help address climate change.

Alexandru Filip uses the Quandary as a basis for looking at the diverse explanations for the decline of social cohesion, especially the role of values. For example, has declining religiosity undermined a sense of purpose among Europeans? How can we replace this loss of faith with a new ‘enlightened humanism,’ which would ‘reject cynical and pragmatic powerplay in politics, chauvinism and nationalism, and the belief that the world society functions according to a zero-sum logic’? He argues that the EU and member states should embrace humanist values and act upon them domestically, within Europe but also internationally.

Radosław Markowski focuses on Dahrendorf’s desire for the world to appreciate complexity—contrasting it with ‘simplism.’ He relates this to Dahrendorf’s work on conflict and the three ways of handling it—suppression, solution, and settlement. Dahrendorf believed that conflict could be productive, provided it was settled fairly. Acknowledging complexity was key to this. However, the information landscape is easily manipulated by simplistic misinformation. Markowski concludes by predicting that simplism—and the related political phenomenon of populism—will be a core feature of the 21st century. He calls for us to reject the use of simplism as a political linkage tool, much as Dahrendorf would have liked us to.
Kris Best and Mark Hallerberg discuss the link between populism and economic globalisation. They recall the EU’s role in fostering economic liberalization and democracy in the post-WWII era, but also mention Dahrendorf’s preference for politics at the level of the nation-state. However, the joint European response to the Covid-19 pandemic has shown that EU-level initiatives are more relevant than during Dahrendorf’s time. Successive European crises—Eurozone, migration, and coronavirus—have required European solutions. However, many of these have been resolved in technocratic, not democratic, ways. This has made Brussels an easy scapegoat in national politics across Europe. Moreover, economic stagnation, geopolitical rivalry, and the threat of climate change have challenged Europe. To address these issues, they suggest using industrial policy to create ‘European champions,’ leveraging the regulatory influence of the Single Market, and internationalizing the Euro to boost the EU’s global clout.

Dahrendorf was quick to realise that democracy was messy and full of contradictions. Yet he did not shy away from the conflict inherent in a pluralistic society. In fact, he thought it was an important source of progress if managed properly. The contributions in this section touch on a wide range of tensions and conflicts in Western democracies. What they have in common is that they view dialogue, compromise, and innovative policies as a way to resolve disputes in the future,

What it all means

While common themes run through many of the pieces, we could not expect a common answer from such a diverse group of authors. They disagree on several issues: the role of the EU as a kind of sovereign actor in certain policy fields but not others, the case for and against Brexit and its likely aftermath, and the trajectory for democracy. While it is difficult to distil consensus across the various positions taken and arguments made, a cautious summary would identify nonetheless common threads:

- The Quandary can be interpreted as call for pro-active policies to manage inherent tensions. It should not be seen as a source of despair, and countries are not helpless in dealing with it
- While some aspects of globalisation may lose momentum, or even reverse, others will expand over time. Therefore, it is critical to see that globalisation can change in character, from the 1990s push driven by financial markets to the forces unleashed by artificial intelligence and information technologies today
Identities and values are much ‘stickier’ than changes in the economy and may take generations to adapt. Managing these aspects of society and their implications for social cohesion may well be the most daunting task when dealing with the Quandary.

While the question of how democratic the EU as an institution ultimately ought to aspire to be remains unsettled, there is some agreement that the EU can serve as a guarantor of democracy within member states, and perhaps beyond.

There is also agreement that the EU should be more assertive EU internationally, and use its soft as well as sharp power more often and more effectively, especially when combined with a strategic overall security approach.

Opinions differ with respect to the desirability and consequences of Brexit, yet it is clear that the UK and EU should strive for a close partnership in the future. Many shared interests—such as economic growth and common defence—exist between the two, and constructive relations on the most important issues should not be sacrificed over smaller-scale disputes.

The Covid-19 pandemic has revealed many of the limits of multilateral and national governance, yet also gives us an opportunity to renew them. By revealing the flaws in existing structures, it is possible to build resilience and a capacity to adapt in the future.

These considerations lead to a set of new issues. Many of these questions will define the future of Europe and the world:

- First, is there a tension between the EU’s global ambitions and balancing the Quandary? Put another way, does the need to ‘do’ geopolitics create further ‘perverse choices,’ even if that is better than the alternative (being under the yoke of the US or China)?
- What is the best way for the EU to spread its influence and gain autonomy while projecting ‘European values’? The migration crisis is often presented as a challenge to European unity. But does the harsh treatment of migrants, or just accepting more of them, present a greater long-term challenge to EU credibility?
- Is the answer truly ‘more Europe’? Dahrendorf’s words on the importance of the nation-state are often referenced in the contributions, but tend to be over-looked due to recent changes in the geopolitical landscape. What decisions are best made supranationally, and where should the nation-state reign supreme?
The need to rethink globalisation and the social contract is frequently discussed. But what concretely can be done? What are the key policy proposals, and how do we overcome the entrenched interests that may block progress?

What is the legacy of Brexit so far? Was it truly as critical a moment for Europe as it first seemed? Does the event—both the UK leaving and relative EU unity in negotiations—demonstrate European strength or weakness?

Has the worst of the right-wing populist threat been overcome? Even if the electoral surge has subsided, has populist rhetoric morphed into other mainstream parties, policies, and political discourse?

Concluding Comments

Dahrendorf was an impressively prescient thinker. In his writings on Europe, social conflict, inequality, and geopolitics, he anticipated many of the developments we are living through today. Whether it is the increased tensions between democracy and globalisation, the emergence of rival political blocs, or the disruptive role of technology in the workplace, Dahrendorf’s writings from decades ago can have a distinctly ‘I told you so’ aura when read today. As the authors have identified, many of his solutions—promoting social mobility, encouraging a balance between sovereignty and multilateralism, and promoting values internationally—are still applicable today.

Yet changing times also call for new solutions. The Covid-19 pandemic is the most immediate example, as the many governance failings across the rich world have resulted in unnecessary death and economic disruption. The salience of climate change has also intensified since Dahrendorf’s time. It remains unclear whether governments and societies can summon the necessary political will and coordination to stave off catastrophe. Faced with these monumental challenges and the inability of existing political structures to handle them—would Dahrendorf have accepted erosion of democracy to facilitate solutions? The answer is almost certainly not. He was confident that ‘freedom and confidence go well together’ but that ‘when such confidence begins to crumble, freedom soon turns into a more primordial condition, the war of all against all’.

To maintain that confidence while preserving freedom is the task that now faces us all. It is one which Europe has a responsibility to fulfil and should develop the means to lead. To do so, old shibboleths about the threats to the nation state from an over-bearing European Union have to be discarded and opportunities for working together exploited.
References


