The Foreign Policy of the Radical Right: Targeting the EU’s Multilateralism

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Abstract

From 2018 and into 2019 Radical Right (RR) parties were in government in Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Poland. This development provides an opportunity to examine whether RR parties in government have a distinct approach to foreign policy. The four RR governments did not engage much with foreign policy, but the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) was the one instance in which the RR succeeded in affecting the EU’s position. Arising from this case, the paper firstly examines whether this opposition to the GCM was due to a systematic hostility to multilateralism. Secondly it examines whether the RR had a role in shaping the EU’s position on the GCM. The paper concludes that the RR’s antagonism to multilateralism focuses on its opposition to further EU integration in foreign policy. The RR governments, particularly in Hungary and Austria, succeeded in their campaign to diminish the actorness of the EU in the GCM negotiations and in undermining the credibility of the whole negotiations process.

Keywords

EU actorness, foreign policy, migration, multilateralism, Radical Right,
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1. Introduction

General support for RR parties in Europe has been on the rise, with some actually entering government, either as the majority party or in coalition with ‘mainstream’ rivals. This evolution from being insurgents to holding power prompts questions about how the ideologies espoused by RR parties will translate (Mudde 2014) into the formulation and implementation of policies.

While scholars have traced the rise of the RR, there has been little opportunity to explore the extent to which the influence of the RR has altered policy and whether it has had repercussions for EU positions (Albertazzi and Müller 2013; Akkermann 2012; Minkenberg 2001). This is particularly the case for foreign policies, generally accorded less attention than domestic policies (Liang 2007; Mudde 2014).

In terms of definitions, this paper adopts Mudde’s (2014), which places the RR among far-right parties but not on the extreme right. The RR is generally much closer to mainstream centre-right parties in Europe and does not overtly oppose the state or the international order (ibid.). The two RR parties in government today are Fidesz in Hungary (continuously in power since 2010) and PiS in Poland (in power since 2015). There was a brief spell from summer 2018 to spring 2019 when the RR was also in coalition in Austria and Italy. A defining characteristic of all four has been their antagonism to immigration from outside the EU. The aim of this paper is to explore whether RR parties have a distinct approach to foreign policy and how they pursue this when in power. The four RR governments in the EU from 2018 to 2019 showed little activity on foreign policy, but the GCM was the one case in which the RR succeeded in affecting the EU’s position. The GCM (to give it its full title, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration) was a landmark agreement intended to address all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner. It was prepared under the auspices of the UN and negotiated from 2017 to 2018 (United Nations 2018a).

In examining this case, two research questions are investigated. The first is whether this opposition to the GCM was due to a systematic hostility to multilateralism as promoted by the EU’s Global Strategy and pursuit of policies consistent with this hostility when in power. Ideological disdain for multilateralism has been identified in populist parties on all sides of the political spectrum, including the RR (Spiegleier et al. 2017). However, the ideological opposition to multilateralism could go beyond mere populism, hence the paper also explores the diplomatic approach of RR parties.

Second, the paper investigates the role of the RR in shaping the EU’s position on the GCM. Specifically, it tests the dual hypothesis that this mattered for the RR because the GCM constituted an expansion of multilateral governance in a new policy area and affected migration, a policy area central to the RR’s ideology and political messaging.

These questions are explored in two linked empirical exercises which seek to identify common ground in the four countries selected because RR parties were in office at a crucial time. Although the FPÖ in Austria and the Lega Nord (LN) in Italy are no longer in government they are still likely to remain a
significant political presence with opportunities to return to government. I argue that, in the case of the GCM, the RR was able to challenge the multilateralism of the EU in a new way. Due to their ideology of seeking to renationalise foreign policy as much as possible, they targeted the EU’s actorness at the UN (a priority for the EU for the last decade), thereby undermining its credibility as a broker for member states at the multilateral level. RR parties led the opposition to the Compact and were able to induce five more EU member states to join them. The RR parties in majority governments in Hungary and Poland were able to oppose the GCM, while the RR parties as junior members of coalitions in Austria and Italy could only convince their coalition partners to abstain from the vote. Rather than being more accommodating on migration when in government, Austria’s FPÖ was influenced significantly by political groups much further to the right. Moreover, the RR is likely to intervene in decisions around other multilateral processes, as exemplified by how they drew in other right-wing and populist governments – such as those in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Slovakia – to water down the EU position on the GCM.

The first empirical exercise focuses on the most recent election manifestos of the RR. Through a qualitative analysis of party documents and speeches, the paper analyses the discourse of the RR in regard to multilateralism and migration, and the challenge it represents to the current mainstream discourse on EU multilateralism. The analysis focuses on the manifestos prior to the election of these parties to power in the period examined in this paper. By adopting this focus the paper provides an analysis of similarities and divergences between the four parties on multilateralism and migration in particular.

In the second analysis, their stance in relation to the adoption by the UN of the GCM in 2018 is considered, again drawing primarily on government statements and media reports on the negotiations. Interviews with negotiators from the UN, EU, and a member state with a RR government provided additional insights into the negotiations process. These interviewees were all directly involved in the negotiations and the interviews focused on exploring the perceived process, the role of the EU, and how the political and diplomatic actions by the RR were interpreted. Triangulated with media reports and UN documents on the negotiations, this allows for tracing the negotiation process from different perspectives. Focusing on the interviewees’ perception of the process also facilitated an exploration of the extent to which the GCM negotiations were indeed an anomaly when compared with other multilateral processes.

The next section looks at multilateralism and the challenges it faces from the RR, examining whether the presence of RR parties in EU governments could lead to new political tension around the issue of multilateralism within the EU. The particular case of the GCM is then analysed. A concluding section highlights the key findings of this paper, discusses how the RR may affect the position of the EU at the UN, and possible consequences for the commitment to global governance in the EU’s Global Strategy.
2. The Radical Right

Since the end of the cold war, political parties in Europe have developed far beyond the traditional dichotomy of right versus left. With the more recent populist turn in Europe, political definitions have become even more challenging. The majority of new parties that have entered government are right of centre but with different shades of right-wing ideology. The literature has discussed the differentiation in right-wing parties and highlighted the difficulty in classifying parties into homogenous categories. The new mainstream far-right family of political parties, the so-called RR, has emerged as one of the most successful of these populist groupings and gained significant attention in the literature. Mudde has defined the RR as “nativist, authoritarian, and populist” (Mudde 2014). Halikiopoulou, Mock, and Vasilopoulou (2013) place them in the wider far-right family but do not consider them to belong to the extreme right. Mudde also highlights that the ‘right’ aspect of the RR is not the traditionally associated hostility to modernity derived from a distinct political philosophy (Mudde 2007, 25). They have rather been described as proposing an alternative modernity (ibid.). The traditional right-wing socio-economic belief in the self-regulating power of the market does not fit either. The RR’s ideology does not have an economic focus, and in the broadest sense they support a “chauvinist welfare state and protectionist policies” (ibid, 25). The RR description follows Norberto Bobbio’s description of their attitude towards inequality: unlike the left, the right considers inequalities between people to be natural and outside the purview of the state (Mudde 2007, 26). The most established RR parties are the Rassemblement National (formerly Front National, FN) in France, Fidesz in Hungary, the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), and the Italian LN (Mudde 2007). They are strong challengers to the traditional centre-right parties in Europe but do not have a completely coherent profile.

Unlike the extreme right, the RR does not support fascism; they accept the democratic order and do not wish to overthrow it. They also avoid an explicit discourse promoting exclusion based on race or ethnic origin. Instead, they employ a more ‘populist’ approach. They claim to represent the will of the people versus an elite which they argue has betrayed established values and national traditions. Extreme right parties, in contrast, align publicly with fascism, engage in undeniable racist discourse, and seek to challenge the democratic order (Halikiopoulou et al. 2013; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2018; Mudde 2010). With the increasing number of parties emerging and achieving electoral success on the right of centre, the neat classification of political parties within the RR category is also difficult because parties change their policies and new parties emerge. For example, in Germany Die Republikaner were originally part of the RR (Mudde 2007) but have since moved further right. Instead, the newer Alternative für Deutschland is now the main RR party in the country (Mudde 2017).
There are currently a variety of right-wing and populist parties in European governments, such as populist right parties (ANEL in Greece), extreme right parties (United Patriots in Bulgaria), as well as populist parties between right and left (ANO 2011 in the Czech Republic, Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy, and the Estonia Central Party) that may be close but do not quite fit Mudde’s definition of the RR as nativist, authoritarian, and populist (2014). Additionally, there are RR parties with some influence; the Danish People’s Party, for example, supports the government without being part of it.

This paper focuses on the four RR parties recently in government as they represent potential for a political force in Europe that is right of centre. These parties are the FPÖ in Austria (until spring 2019), Fidesz in Hungary, the LN in Italy (until August 2019), and PiS (Law and Justice) in Poland. In Hungary and Poland, the RR formed majority governments. In Austria and Italy, they were junior partners in coalition governments with the centre-right Österreichische Volkspartei in Austria and the populist Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy.

Not all of these four parties would fit consistently and neatly into the RR definition offered by Mudde. While the FPÖ would fit his definition, the LN has been considered too inconsistent on authoritarianism, and Fidesz was labelled as liberal-conservative in the past (Segert 2005). Also, PiS was considered originally as a classical post-communist national conservative party rather than part of the RR (Mudde 2007). However, they have made public commitments to work together on domestic and European policies. Viktor Orbán has called for the RR to unite around anti-migration policies (The Guardian, 10 January 2019). LN’s Matteo Salvini and FPÖ’s Hans Christian Strache echoed these commitments by claiming that with Orbán the RR would ‘rule Europe’ after the 2019 European elections (Kurier, 14 September 2018). Salvini has also called for an Italo-Polish axis with PiS to counteract the German-French axis (Politico Europe, 19 April 2019). Despite these declarations, divisions remain over areas such as foreign policy towards Russia (The Guardian, 17 May 2019). To add to the confusion, the parties sit in different groups in the European Parliament (while issuing joint declarations). While PiS are members of the Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe, the LN and the FPÖ are part of the Europe of Nations and Freedom group, while Orban's Fidesz was until recently a member of the European Peoples Party (BBC News, 20 March 2019) but did not join Salvini’s new initiative for a nationalist group in the European Parliament (The Daily Telegraph, 30 May 2019). A stable definition and classification of these parties is inherently difficult and made all the more so as parties have adapted their approaches and increased their Euroscepticism, their use of populist methods, and their self-identification.

This paper, therefore, acknowledges the difficulty in defining these parties as coherent or homogenous groups. Nonetheless, the RR has established itself as an alternative to the centre right and extreme right in Europe. They are also the only coherently aligned populist parties to emerge from recent elections.
Table 1: Radical Right parties in EU member states’ governments in 2018/2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU member state</th>
<th>Government coalition parties</th>
<th>In government</th>
<th>RR party in senior or junior position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>ÖVP, FPÖ</td>
<td>2018–2019¹</td>
<td>FPÖ, junior partner with centre-right ÖVP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Fidesz, KDNP</td>
<td>Since 2010</td>
<td>Fidesz, senior partner with KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>LN, M5S</td>
<td>2018–2019²</td>
<td>Lega Nord, junior partner with populist Movimento 5 Stelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Law and Justice Party</td>
<td>Since 2015</td>
<td>Majority government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1. The Radical Right in government

The recent period of four prominent RR parties actually in government represents an opportunity to examine in greater detail how RR parties act when they have several counterparts with which to work at European level and whether they are as radical once they are in power. RR policies in government have been debated in the literature over the last 20 years but with limited case studies. Minkenberg (2001) and Weisskircher (2019) have pointed out that it is not clear to what extent RR parties continue to pursue their radical agendas once in government. Some argue that they do follow through and do not fall back into mainstream positions (Albertazzi and Müller 2013; Akkerman et al. 2016). Others have argued that, when participating in government coalitions, RR parties tend to align with broader right-wing parties. In the period of this study from 1996–2012, RR parties were nearly always the junior partners in coalitions (Akkermann 2012, 512). This weakening of their policy positions also included mixed records on migration policy, a key aspect of RR ideology (Albertazzi and Macdonell 2005).

Despite expectations that the RR would pursue new approaches towards Russia and the US, positions have been mainly declaratory and actual policies have shifted little in this regard

¹ The coalition government fell apart after a campaign financing scandal involving the FPÖ in May 2019, triggering new elections in the autumn after which the ÖVP will be forming a new government
² The LN withdrew its support for the coalition in August 2019, and since then the Movimento 5 Stelle has been in coalition with the centre-left Partito Democratico (PD).
This difficulty extends into their foreign policy. Despite expectations that the RR would pursue new approaches towards Russia and the US, positions have been mainly declaratory and actual policies have shifted little in this regard (Die Presse, 31 December 2018; Politico Europe, 13 September 2018; Reuters, 8 March 2019; Banai 2015, 245; Politico Europe, 19 April 2019; Politico Europe, 1 August 2018; Politico Europe, 22 September 2017; The Guardian, 25 October 2019).

The UN-led negotiations for the GCM in 2018 were an exceptional case where RR governments, under the leadership of Hungary and Austria, publicly and successfully undermined a common EU position (Politio Europe, 3 January 2019; Gowan and Dworkin 2019, 9). A final text of the non-legally binding international agreement had been approved in the summer with support from all EU members, except for Hungary. By December, none of the four member states with RR parties in government supported the process, and they were joined in their opposition by five more members – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Slovakia used the same arguments as those developed by the RR, while Romania abstained on different grounds (House of Commons 2019). Due to the short duration of the coinciding RR governments, the GCM represents the only case of a discrete and co-ordinated foreign policy position taken by the RR with clear policy outcomes and effects on EU foreign policy. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the attempts by the RR to disrupt multilateral processes have been lamented by officials and some commentators (Gowan and Dworkin 2019, 2). Climate Change appears to be one issue where the RR has shown ambiguous opposition. Poland hosted the UN Climate Change conference in December 2018 to put the Paris Agreement into practice. However, Poland has been advocating for countries to continue to have the right to use coal (Independent, 8 December 2019). More recently it has, along with Hungary, opposed the EU’s climate goals (Deutsche Welle, 26 June 2019). However, this does not represent a systemic or targeted opposition to multilateralism as a whole but has a primary focus on EU policies. The case of RR action against the GCM is exceptional as it is publicly documented and had discernible policy consequences.

3. The ideological origins of the Radical Right’s opposition to the Global Compact for Migration

This section will further explore the ideology of the RR in regard to its foreign policy. It will do so by focusing on the two aspects which were central to the GCM: multilateralism and migration.

3.1. Promise of a sovereign foreign policy

As outlined by Mudde (2014), RR parties do not go so far as to want to overthrow the international order, as an extreme right party might, but they do seek to challenge aspects of it. While RR parties may not completely reject all multilateral organisations or levels, (de Spiegeleiere et al. 2017, 75) they do emphasise the need for national sovereignty. The “dissatisfaction or disillusionment with multilateral
institutions” drives support for populist parties everywhere on the political spectrum, not just the RR. Their criticism can be placed in the wider populist critique blaming multilateral institutions for the inability to develop certain policies (de Spiegeleiere et al. 2017, 51). Colgan and Keohane (2017) point out that “multilateral overreach” is what populists generally lament, i.e. the increasing delegation of sovereignty to higher multilateral levels. The position of the RR on multilateralism marries the populist criticism of multilateralism with its nativist and authoritarian arguments. Following this logic, as I will show below, multilateralism is not just the removal of sovereignty; its influence is also considered to be ‘foreign’ and ‘tainting’ national identity and pride.

Among the RR governments discussed here, opposition to multilateralism was closely tied to their Euroscepticism. They oppose multilateralism on two levels. Firstly, multilateralism as a foreign policy tool beyond bilateral relations between two nation-states (Keohane 1990) and also the concept of a broader multilateral policymaking frameworks (Ruggie 1992). In Hungary, Fidesz did not issue an official election manifesto before the re-election of Orbán in 2018. Instead, it promised to continue ‘as before’, referring back to its government policy from 2010–2014 (Reuters, 11 January 2018). The previous manifesto gave very little attention to foreign affairs and hardly any indication of the party’s outlook on the international scene. While it focused mainly on domestic policy, its statements on foreign affairs were primarily concerned with international trade: Hungary should use its benefits as an EU member state to expand relations with Russia and China as well as Eastern Europe. This expansion towards the east was at that point not presented as a rejection of the EU (Fidesz 2010, 46). However, while in power, Orbán has made his opposition to multilateralism a cornerstone of his campaign and wider approach to foreign policy and the EU. Orbán has increasingly positioned himself as the face of an alternative Europe, one that rejects liberalism and the politics of the large EU member states (embodied, in his opinion, by Angela Merkel), and instead proposing an illiberal Europe (Dempsey 2016). Since coming to power, Orbán has called multilateralism an ‘unnatural’ way of addressing international affairs (de Spiegeleiere et al. 2017, 18). In a key speech in 2017, he announced the end of the age of multilateralism due to the election of Donald Trump as president of the US, and he interpreted Trump’s ‘America first’ policy as an encouragement for all states to put their national interest first (Orbán 2017, 3). Instead, this would now be an age of bilateralism (4). Here he meant bilateralism in regard to the relationship between two nation-states, not the EU’s bilateralism with third countries which is implied particularly in the EU’s trade policy (Sgabria 2010). The only area in which Orbán does accept multilateralism as relevant is that of European defence integration outside of NATO (4). This significant shift is also reflected in the fact that Fidesz was not initially considered a RR party but it has radicalised significantly once in power (Mudde 2014).

Poland’s PiS election manifesto in 2014 framed its opposition to multilateralism in explicit Eurosceptic language, accusing European integration of undermining ‘Polishness’. PiS wants Poland to use
multilateralism “freely as a tool” for its own interest (150), the definition of a utilitarian approach to multilateralism (159). The manifesto framed its critique of the EU in a context of the need for re-establishing Polish sovereignty and pride internationally, acting bilaterally rather than being represented by the EU at international level. European integration is considered to have undermined this in the past, and PiS promised to stifle further transfer of competences by implementing domestic oversight (151). International organisations, the UN in particular, are not particularly referred to in the context of strengthening multilateralism but rather in terms of establishing Poland’s role as a nation state on the international stage, to be considered an equal to other UN members (59). Strikingly, the Euro-sceptic Visegrad countries (Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic) are considered the natural multilateral home of Poland, while the EU-phile Weimar triangle partners (Germany and France) are not mentioned (Balcer et al. 3). The PiS manifesto thus opposes multilateralism as put forward by the EU in its Global Strategy. Nation-states should remain the key constitutional unit of the international system, and Polish interest is threatened by further integration. While still strongly nationalist and nativist in its foreign policy outlook, the PiS approach is however more balanced than that of other RR parties, especially when compared to Hungary. For example, some international organisations are portrayed positively, with NATO considered necessary and the UN relevant. But they are viewed in the context of power politics in which Poland needs to defend itself.

In its election manifesto, the FPÖ set out a clear sovereignist and nativist worldview filled with references to international agreements as a threat to national sovereignty (FPÖ 2017, 4, 31, 33). The FPÖ promised to establish Austria again as an “autonomous and self-sufficient state” (ibid., 4). Even in the context of national defence, no reference was made to international organisations or multilateral agreements. Instead, the party promised greater military expenditure (12). Foreign influence through international organisations was deplored, with the sovereignist argument of lamenting the increasing globalisation of policy areas heavily pushed. The EU was accused of “stealing sovereignty from citizens” and “breaking the law” by allowing “mass immigration” (50). The FPÖ does not present an exception for a positive connotation of multilateralism. Instead, it wants to promote ‘neutral’ politics towards Russia (52). This is in line with the FPÖ’s previous long-standing opposition to globalisation, US leadership (Liang 2007, 3), and trade agreements such as TTP or Chinese imports to the EU. Multilateralism promoted by the EU is considered as politicised and untrustworthy (FPÖ, 52).

In Italy, LN’s manifesto made defence of the national interest and Italian sovereignty vit-à-vit the EU and international organisations a primary concern. The Lega vowed to seek a return to a ‘pre-Maastricht’ Union (LN 2018, 9), which implies renationalisation of foreign policy and less European integration and representation by the EU of member states in international fora. The manifesto argued that parts of European integration have been ‘unconstitutional’ (9). “Retaining national sovereignty” is defined as the primary ‘national interest’ for its foreign policy (22). International organisations, the UN, and the World Trade Organisation were also named as specific threats to national sovereignty (ibid., 20). The LN is the
only RR party to set out a foreign policy on stopping migration flows into Europe. Here it acknowledges the possible role of EU member states in finding solutions for increased border security and refers to the G7 decision on asylum; however this does focus on reinstating state sovereignty. Thus the Lega promotes ad hoc collaboration with like-minded states in a loose approach to multilateralism, while institutions in general are portrayed negatively.

For the RR parties discussed here, criticism of multilateralism is closely tied to Euroscepticism. In their reading, European integration on foreign policy represents a loss of sovereignty and they suggest a reversal of European integration overall, including renationalisation of foreign policy and prioritisation of bilateral relations between single member states. There is a sense that multilateralism undermines the state’s ability to represent itself at the international level. In the case of Fidesz or PiS, a more nationally driven foreign policy through bilateralism or stronger national representation in international organisations is supposed to replace it. In the cases of Austria and Italy, there is little suggestion as to whether there is a positive engagement with these institutions. A more outright rejection of the institutions and the influence of the US is apparent, before the Trump administration, in particular. There are therefore different degrees to which multilateralism – and the future role of the state in the multilateral system – are rejected. Furthermore there is a clearer expression of nativism, with cultural references made especially in the cases of Poland and Austria, implying that foreign influences are held to undermine the national culture.

In populist fashion, the national interest is represented in a simplified and zero-sum manner: one country’s gain is another one’s loss. The multilateral policy is considered to be pursued by global elites ignoring or undermining the national interest. The RR parties’ focus on sovereignty in their international outlook fits closely with the core aspects of the RR’s ideology described by Mudde (2014). The suspicion felt towards anything foreign, the aspiration for hierarchical or ‘strong’ leadership and discipline make for an uncomfortable relationship with multilateralism. Such interpretations are in contrast with the plans for global governance of the EU, but they also reflect a change for the national foreign policy of these four states.

The position of the LN in Italy towards multilateralism represents perhaps the most striking change from the national foreign policy consensus. Among the member states discussed here, Italy’s foreign policy was the most comfortably grounded in the institutions designed for Euro-Atlantic security during the cold war. After a period of reorientation at the end of the cold war, during which the country attempted to regain its international standing (Andreotti 2008, 173), in the early 2000s Italy’s political elite split broadly into two camps: an internationalist, centre-left grouping, committed to increasing Italy's visibility in international affairs through greater support to international organisations; and the so-called neo-nationalists on the right led by Silvio Berlusconi, who sought to focus Italian foreign affairs on...
economic interests and a limited number of areas but remained pro-European (Cladi and Webber 2011, 208-210; Andreatta 2008, 179).

For Hungary, Orbán's foreign policy represents a significant change from the post-cold war outlook. Hungary was in prime position for Euro-Atlantic integration among the former members of the Warsaw Pact (Banai 2015, 228). While a strong Atlanticist, it saw the importance of European defence integration and supported it from early on (Törö 2013, 42). Orbán’s Eurosceptic foreign policy approach since 2010 follows the overall approach towards Europe and the backslide on the rule of law, which resulted in the first open confrontation between the Hungarian government and the European Union (Banai 2015, 238).

Austria's approach to multilateralism and EU foreign policy was influenced by its cold war neutrality. It was a latecomer to the EU despite being on the Western side of the Iron Curtain, joining only in 1994 (Devine 2011). However, Austrian foreign policy elites claim to have a pragmatic approach, motivated primarily by economic interests (Mueller and Maurer 2016, 6). The approach towards multilateralism changed with the FPÖ turning Austria’s earlier ambivalence towards the EU into Euroscepticism and injecting uncertainty towards multilateral processes within the UN, despite the fact that this forum was previously a cornerstone of its neutrality.

Finally, Poland may have the longest tradition of scepticism towards European multilateralism, perhaps due to a historical sense of neglect by its European allies during the second world war. While committed to European integration after the end of the cold war, Warsaw looked primarily to Washington for assurances on security questions (Chappell 2010, 229). This also affected its attitude towards other multilateral fora that are less dominated by the US and are influenced by Russia, particularly the UN (ibid., 240). However, in recent years the domestic political outlook has changed significantly under the PiS government, affecting foreign policy and problematising more and more the approach to multilateralism (Balcer et al. 2016). This included foreign policy turning more Europessimistic (Balcer et al. 2016, 8), and a new focus on national sovereignty (ibid., 3). Despite this change, PiS remains true to its North Atlantic commitment, and thus the current position on multilateralism is not such a drastic departure from the mainstream as in the other cases discussed here. But the transatlantic relationship appears to be the only one PiS is committed to – it is turning away far more drastically from its European partners.

The RR’s challenge to multilateralism is thus a departure from the traditional foreign policies of these member states. In light of the current drive towards greater multilateralism by the EU in the Global Strategy, the RR’s opposition makes conflict highly probably, not only at EU level, but also domestically, particularly in the cases where the RR is the junior party in the coalition governments in Austria and Italy. As mentioned above, the GCM is, however, the only case where activism from the RR on a foreign policy issue was visible and had specific outcomes. Despite this ideological challenge to multilateralism, the RR
has not effectively opposed it in many cases. Thus below I will highlight how the position of the RR on migration provides a further indication of why the RR was so active on the GCM.

3.2. The Radical Right on migration

To varying degrees, the RR has expressed its opposition to multilateralism, although this has not resulted in its blanket rejection. The rejection of the GCM has been the main issue over which the RR has mobilised in its foreign policy and targeted a multilateral process. The fact that the GCM focused on a key policy area for the RR was undoubtedly a significant aspect of why the parties mobilised. I will now briefly discuss how the four parties have approached the issue of migration and migration as a foreign policy issue.

The RR’s approach towards migration is characterised by its nativist ideology. Mudde (2014) defines this as a “xenophobic nationalism” which believes in a monocultural state where external influences or the presence of foreigners is considered a threat (ibid., 218). Immigration remains the core issue, and all RR parties subscribe to significantly reducing migration (Lutz 2019; Rydgren 2008; Ivarsflaten 2008). Through this issue, they can mobilise their base and increase electoral success (Mudde 2007). The RR across Europe used the refugee influx during the Syrian civil war to increase its aggressive rhetoric against migrants, exploiting a sense of insecurity in the population due to terrorist attacks by positing a connection between these events (Schain 2018, 9).

For the FPÖ, migration became a leading theme of the election in 2018. It called for a ‘stop’ to ‘all immigration’ and promised to increase deportations. This was framed in the context of ‘defending the homeland’ from foreign intruders, and the party promises to dismantle a multicultural ‘parallel society’ and deny a place for Islam in Austrian society (FPÖ 2017, 1). The party unequivocally condemned multiculturalism as a threat undermining Austrian culture and considered increased migration the reason for higher crime rates and terrorist threats in Austria (Balfour 2016; FPÖ 2017, 9). Once in office, party leader Hans Christian Strache used language usually attributed to neo-Nazi groups, such as ‘population exchange’ (Bevölkerungsaustausch) (The Guardian, 29 April 2019), which implies that political elites intend to use immigration to eliminate so-called ‘native’ European populations; by their ideology this would apply only to white Christians.

The LN called for a series of restrictive measures on migrants, including limiting the social benefits available to them and their ability to gain Italian citizenship or to practise their religion. The LN focused on repatriation and collaboration with third countries as well as restricting disembarkations of asylum seekers and migrants coming through the Mediterranean (LN 2018, 6). Furthermore, once in power as minister of the interior, LN leader Mateo Salvini imposed the closure of Italian ports for NGO vessels
rescuing migrants at sea. In government, the LN targeted asylum seekers and irregular migrants living in Italy by dissolving reception centres and initiating mass deportations. Salvini referred to these initiatives as “cleansing the streets” of migrants and Roma (The Daily Telegraph, 23 January 2019).

At the beginning of the refugee crisis, the Hungarian government framed the influx of people directly as a ‘security crisis’ and responded by imposing border controls and building a physical barrier (The New Yorker, 7 January 2019). Since 2015 Hungary has come under significant scrutiny due to the detention of child refugees, the conditions in detention centres and a controversial transit zone on the border with Serbia (United Nation 2019; BBC News, 21 May 2019). The common EU asylum policy and the redistribution of asylum seekers among member states became a point of contention with the EU, especially its Western member states, and Hungary and Poland. Viktor Orbán considers the EU approach to be “undermining national sovereignty and cultural identity” (Deutsche Welle, 8 January 2018). The situation escalated significantly after Orbán introduced a law criminalising any assistance to asylum seekers, resulting in the European Commission referring Hungary to the European Court of Justice (Financial Times, 25 July 2019). The Polish government prior to PiS already opposed the refugee resettlement attempts by the EU, accepting only very reluctantly asylum seekers who had arrived in other EU member states. The PiS government has continued and strengthened this position (Szczerbiak 2017). However, PiS focused less on migration in its election manifesto (Balfour 2016). In fact, the manifesto focused primarily on the emigration of Poles abroad (PiS 2014), although the party’s anti-immigration rhetoric became aggressive during the campaign, with PiS officials describing migrants and refugees as “carrying diseases” and representing a “threat to national identity”; Muslim immigrants were particularly targeted (Politico 2015).

On migration, the RR parties discussed here used xenophobic language against migrants and minorities, specifically Muslims and Roma, which reflects their nativist ideology. They also focused on restrictive measures for migrants to settle in the country long term (see also Lutz 2019, 536). In all four cases, their position on migration and asylum is married to strong Euroscepticism, and the EU is blamed for the high influx or presence of migrants or for not supporting member states enough. For Italy, this referred to people arriving through the Mediterranean, but in Austria and Hungary it was linked to the opening of the so-called Balkan route. In Hungary and Poland, the EU pressure to redistribute migrants across member states was also criticised. For the RR, the opposition to migration has increasingly been framed not only in a xenophobic light but also from a Eurosceptic perspective, rejecting the common European approach and multilateral co-ordination of this policy area. This hostility towards a multilateral approach to migration by the RR provides an important context for opposition to the GCM.

The RR parties discussed here combined their opposition to the two core aspects of the GCM, multilateralism and migration, with their strong Euroscepticism. Before turning to my case study of the GCM and how the RR mobilised against it, I will first outline the mainstream approach towards these negotiations. This will further highlight the tensions with the worldview of the RR but also the challenges
faced by the EU in trying to achieve a common position on migration in the GCM negotiations.

4. Europe’s multilateralism and tensions on the multilateral governance of migration

The GCM was meant to represent a significant shift in the multilateral governance of migration. In contrast to the state-focused approach defined by the receiving states’ restrictive policies, a rights-based focus was supposed to be established. For the EU this represented a challenging process: On the one hand, it has been committed to multilateralism and seeks to develop its actorness at the UN; on the other, as mainly representing migrant-receiving states, it has been very conservative on migration governance in the past. It is in the context of this tension that one needs to consider the RR’s opposition to the GCM.

Multilateralism is central to the EU’s policymaking, including its foreign policy (Laatikainen 2015, 197). Admittedly, there is no consensus among Europeans on what kind of multilateralism to pursue.3 There is a division among the more Keohane-aligned minimalists (1990) focused on inter-state relationships and international organisations, and the literature inspired by Ruggies’ maximalist approach which considers multilateralism a broader and normative framework (1992; Bouchard et al. 2013; De Lombaerde et al. 2010; Corbetta and Dixon 2004). A more normative pursuit of global governance (Biscop 2004), often followed by institutions, is frequently contrasted by some functionalist member states that consider multilateralism simply a foreign policy tool (Krause 2004).

Although there is no fully coherent understanding among member states of the EU’s multilateralism, EU institutions have kept multilateralism a priority for EU foreign policy. Trying to define this more closely, the first European Security Strategy (ESS), issued by the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, coined the term ‘effective multilateralism’ to be a goal for EU foreign policy (European Union 2003). This led to a body of academic literature trying to understand and measure the effectiveness of EU multilateralism (Bouchard et al. 2013, 285; Lazarou et al. 2013, 4; Hettner and Söderbaum 2006, 229). After the ESS, the Lisbon Treaty was the first European treaty referring explicitly to multilateralism (Drieskens and Van Dievel 2015, 10290).4 With it came significant institutional efforts to strengthen multilateralism and the EU’s role within it. The Global Strategy of 2016 stated that, for global governance in the 21st century, it “will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core” (European Union 2016a, 8). The EU Global Strategy

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3 For a comprehensive discussion of the EU’s approach to multilateralism see Kienzle (2008).
4 Treaty on European Union: Article 10A(1) “multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations”, and Article 10A(2) “an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good governance”.
moves on from the concept of “effective multilateralism” to a fundamentally normative approach that seeks global governance and aims to transcend the current system of multilateralism (Forsch 2017, 5).

This normative approach is also reflected in EU efforts to have united representation at the UN. Coordinating and representing member states at international organisations (IOs) has been an ambition for the EU. While at the World Trade Organisation member states have been represented by the European Community since 1995, the importance of enhancing the EU’s role at UN institutions was prioritised in the Lisbon Treaty (Sbragia 2010). The EU reached a significant breakthrough at the UN in 2011 with ‘Resolution 65/276, Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations’. While the EU had held observer status since 1974, it was now given more modalities on how it can take a more coherent role to represent its member states (Andresen Guimarães 2015, 88-89). Member states, particularly the UK, were keen to clarify that the new role of the delegation would reflect the competencies of the EU vis-à-vis the member states. Thus, the EU delegation (EUDEL) can only speak when representing all of its member states for example. This, therefore, requires unanimous support by all member states. If one member state dissents then the others need to find a different arrangement to represent a collective position (Laatikainen 2015, 202; European Council 2011). But following a period of readjustment after 2011, EUDEL now presents most of the statements at the UN General Assembly on behalf of its member states as opposed to the member states themselves (Laatikainen, 2015, 204).

These developments affected the role of the EU as a foreign policy actor in the multilateral context. As Jupille and Caporaso have argued (1998), the EU seeks authority, autonomy, and recognition as a legitimate actor from others. According to Panke (2014, 1062), the EU still has limited authority, autonomy, and internal cohesion at the UN General Assembly. But, nonetheless, member states do find a common position in the majority of cases (ibid., 1052). A challenge for the EU’s vision of growing its role in multilateral fora by representing all of its member states is that this means becoming both a less flexible and more restrictive negotiations partner. As Smith has highlighted, other UN members may be less likely to engage with an official EU position which is considered rigid and non-negotiable than with the positions of sub-groups of EU member states who reach out for consensus across regions (Smith 2017, 640).

4.1. The European Union and the multilateral governance of migration

This tension has become particularly clear in regard to the creation of a multilateral framework to manage migration. Historically, the EU’s position has been restrictive and narrowly focused on reducing numbers; it has been less collaborative with regions of migrant-sending states. Currently, the multilateral approach to migration is a tapestry of different bilateral and multilateral initiatives and agreements. Betts describes this as a bottom-up, rather than a top-down, development of the multilateral framework (2011, 2). States have been keen to keep control of migration in their own hands, and state-based institutions and organisations exist which deal with specific kinds of migration, such as highly skilled labour, tourism, or
forced migration (de Haas 2007; Betts 2010). Forced migration and the refugee regime are the exception, being the most codified area of migration, especially in comparison to travel and labour migration (Teitelbaum 1984; Loescher 2001; Loescher et al. 2008; Betts 2011). Due to the reluctance of states to sign up to a comprehensive multilateral framework, issues have been addressed by consolidating existing legislation in international law, this being described as a ‘soft law’ rather than a hard law approach (Betts 2011, 16). Betts, therefore, speaks of an ‘embeddedness’ of migration in global governance (ibid., 16).

Efforts for greater co-ordination and collaboration between states started following the increased migrations after the cold war. In the 1990s the UN initiated more comprehensive frameworks, but the tension between sending and receiving states made real progress difficult. A long process, starting in the 1990s, led to the UN Secretary-General report on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants in March 2016 (United Nations 2016), and the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants in September of that year resulted in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrations. This set the way for the negotiation of the 2018 GCM (United Nations 2018).

The EU has had a particular role in the multilateral framework on migration, starting with its own internal approach. Since the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU holds an increasing role in the policymaking on migration (Geddes 2013, 8), but member states still control incoming numbers and are able to opt in and out of aspects of migration policy (ibid., 9). With the Lisbon Treaty, managing migration became an explicit objective for the EU, with various Articles of the Treaty giving the EU powers to develop readmission agreements with third countries (European Union 2007, Article 79(1); 78(2) (g) and 79(30). Similar to the codification on the UN level, the EU’s role is more developed on asylum than other aspects of migration (Geddes 2013, 10-11).

The EU has developed an internal dimension of migration policy and begun to harmonise the external dimensions (Geddes 2003; Koslowski 2004; Lahav 2004). With the establishment of the Schengen Regime in Europe, since the 1990s tensions have crystallised between economic liberalism on the one

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5 The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) of 1994 produced a report on the international institutions governing migration, the so-called ‘Doyle Report’, which in turn led to the Global Commission on International Migration that recommended a Special Representative on Migration and Developments and UN High-Level Dialogue in 2006. The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) was established in 2007 (Betts 2011). The GFMD remains an informal structure which is not set up to develop a new multilateral regime. It is rather supposed to help like-minded states to work together and find agreements on a bilateral basis (ibid., 14). Migration was integrated into the discourse on the Development Goals 2030 (ODI 2018), and this link between migration and development has been crucial in bringing the migration issue on to the main agenda of the UN.
hand – with its need for highly mobile labour – and, on the other, the generally restrictive approach to migration adopted by receiving states (ibid., 206). Europe’s foreign policy on migration has continued to focus on returns and the reduction of overall migration numbers from third countries (Thym 2013, 303; Geddes 2018, 122-123). At the same time, efforts to facilitate legal migration have been vague or had little effect, with members imposing additional conditions (Geddes 2018, 124; Thym 2013, 299).

The EU’s normative commitment to advancing multilateralism and expanding it into global governance in principle therefore contrasts with the political positions in policy issues such as migration where governments and institutions have been conservative and restrictive. This tension would also play out in the negotiations for the GCM due to the EU historically holding a conservative position on migration and accommodating primarily its member states’ interest in reducing the numbers of migrants.

5. The Global Compact for Migration

The process of negotiating the GCM was originally a standard multilateral negotiation process, following on from the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of 2016. The text was finalised in July 2018, approved in December at a conference in Marrakesh and endorsed a week later at the UN General Assembly in New York. The process was serviced by the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on International Migration (SRSG) Louise Arbour and International Organization for Migration and facilitated by the Permanent Representatives to the UN of Mexico and Switzerland. The text set out 23 objectives which focus on improving data and evidence-based policymaking, improving conditions for migrants, and combating abuse of migrants. It is not legally binding but sets out the main areas which require greater inter-governmental attention to manage migration more effectively (United Nations 2018a). In the end nine EU member states (Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) and nine more countries (Algeria, Australia, Chile, Israel, Libya, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland and the US) did not support the GCM. (House of Commons 2019). Europe therefore represented the clear majority of states that did not support the Compact.

5.1. The role of the European Union in the negotiations

As described above, the EUDEL made significant progress in representing its member states at the UN level. However, in the GCM negotiations, the EU’s role was contested from the beginning (Guild and Grant 2017). There are two aspects to this, firstly on the mandate for negotiations, and secondly the co-ordination of an EU position at the UN.

The European Council can task the Commission to negotiate and approve international agreements on behalf of the member states. The Commission delivered a proposal to the Council asking for authorisation to approve the GCM, which would have been a further step towards enhancing the role of
the EU in these negotiations. This was, however, refused by the Council and later withdrawn (Melin 2018; Interview 2019c; Interview 2019d). The Commission expressed its support for the GCM, relying on the European Council Conclusions on Migration from October 2016 and the European Consensus on Development from 2017, which do not give a mandate to negotiate to the Commission (ibid; European Union 2016b).

Hungary presented an alternative statement to that of the EU delegation, distancing itself from the whole GCM process (Guild and Weatherhead 2018; Hungarian Permanent Representation to the United Nations 2018). It appears that this may have represented a breach of the obligation of “sincere cooperation” established in the Lisbon Treaty. This commitment implies a mutual legal obligation for the EU and the member states "to assist each other in carrying out the tasks which flow from the Treaties" (TEU Article 4(3)). The case law on this issue has pointed out that there is not necessarily a need for a formal mandate from the Council for the Commission for this obligation to apply (Melin 2018; European Court of Justice 2010). If there is sufficient evidence that member states are co-ordinating and presenting a common position through EU delegations, member states should not vote against EU positions but only abstain. This, so one Court decision states, is also crucial when considering the expectations of third parties with whom the EU may be negotiating. But the situation of the GCM is more complex because of the lack of a Council decision on whether the early dissenting opinion from Hungary would have been a breach of that obligation, or whether the process for a common position was not established enough at this stage in the negotiations (Melin 2018; Gatti 2018).

Following Hungary’s position, the EUDEL was not able to speak on behalf of member states. As discussed above, it can only do so when representing all 28 member states. After a debate in the Committee of Permanent Representatives in the European Union (COREPER) the Bulgarian EU presidency announced that the EUDEL would still be tasked with co-ordinating the work of the remaining EU member states in the negotiations and would lead on the work except for giving statements. This co-ordination required achieving consensus among the remaining 27 member states on statement texts which would then be read out by the incoming presidency, Austria. For consistency, Austria then remained the main spokesperson when its presidency began in the second half of 2018 until the end of the negotiations in July. This arrangement was agreed with Hungary, which participated in the common EU meetings at the UN but abstained from the discussion except for statements emphasising the country’s disengagement from the process and the lack of EU unanimity (Interview 2019c).

As the negotiations progressed through the first half of 2018, the 27 member states remained supportive. Member states sent several domestic delegations to attend the negotiations or meet with country delegations to be briefed on the process and content of the Compact. Unusually for this kind of multilateral negotiations, delegations were sent not just from foreign offices but also from interior ministries and ministries of employment or economy. Thus the co-ordination and outreach work
internally at EU level was perceived as being significantly more exhaustive than had been common practice for multilateral negotiations in the past (Interview 2019c).

As discussed above, on the matter of multilateral governance of migration, the EU and its member states have mainly pursued restrictive policies reflecting the role of migrant-receiving countries. In these negotiations, the EU continued with this attitude. This was due, firstly, to the internal division within the EU on migration and the significantly more restrictive policy outlook on migration, partly shaped by the RR as described above, and the wider general trend in Europe against migration. Additionally, it was because the US had disengaged from the process and the EU was the main representative of migrant-receiving states. While in other human rights negotiations the US would traditionally be more restrictive and the EU would take on the role of mediator between the US and other regional blocs such as Latin American states or the African nations, in the case of the GCM the EU was perceived in the role of the restraining migrant-receiving states (Interview 2019a; Interview 2019c). This was reflected in its conservative position on returns, restrictions on social benefits, and government policies towards so-called ‘firewalls’ (the practice of separating immigration enforcement activities and public service provision services so that undocumented migrants can access essential medical facilities, schools, and other social service institutions) (Interview 2019a). Even though some member states, most prominently Portugal, advocated for a firewall, based on their national practice, others, particularly Austria, were opposed. Austria also opposed the establishment of a legal right of non-refoulement, usually associated with the protection of asylum seekers and related to undocumented migrants (Interview 2019a).

Eventually, these restrictive positions were accepted by the more liberal EU members and by other, mostly sending, regions with the expectation that the 27 EU member states would accept the text at the Marrakesh Conference in December 2018.

### 5.2. European Union member states withdraw support for the Global Compact for Migration

In the few months between agreeing and approving the text, a social media campaign by right-wing groups as well as a statement by the RR governments undermining the EU began to have an effect, and member states started to withdraw support for the GCM. In the end, nine EU member states would not support the GCM. In addition to the four RR governments, the governments of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia did not support the agreement.
Hungary’s opposition at the beginning of the process was an outright rejection of the GCM based on 12 points which portrayed migration as an exclusively negative phenomenon, the need to punish illegal migration, and a warning that no human right for migration should be established as part of the GCM process (Hungarian Permanent Representation to the United Nations 2018). Hungary was the only member state to oppose the GCM from the start. The Hungarian government actively encouraged Poland and Austria to follow with the rejection of the Compact (Poland In, 19 October 2018). It was only several months after the text was agreed that Austria announced officially, in October, that it no longer supported the Compact (Bundeskanzleramt, 2018). Due to a division in the coalition with the ÖVP on the matter, Austria would abstain rather than vote against (Bundeskanzleramt, 31 October 2018). Poland followed in November, announcing it would vote against (Reuters, 20 November 2018). In Italy, the LN’s opposition to the GCM could not convince its senior coalition partner Movimento 5 Stelle and the government put the decision to Parliament before deciding. Thus, to delay the decision, Italy abstained (UN News, 19 December 2019). The Italian legislature delayed the vote, and in February 2019 a coalition led by the ultra-fascist opposition party Fratelli d’Italia passed a motion urging the government not to sign; government parties abstained from this vote (ANSA November 2018; Repubblica, February 2019).

Table 2. Overview of position on GCM of RR governments in the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU member states</th>
<th>Government parties</th>
<th>Political orientation of government</th>
<th>Political and legislative processes on GCM</th>
<th>Position on GCM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>ÖVP, FPÖ</td>
<td>Centre right and RR</td>
<td>Cabinet decision</td>
<td>Abstained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Fidesz, KDNP</td>
<td>RR and Christian Democrat</td>
<td>Cabinet decision</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>LN, M5S</td>
<td>Populist left and RR</td>
<td>Vote in Parliament, further votes delayed</td>
<td>Abstained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>RR</td>
<td>Cabinet decision</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I will discuss the arguments and diplomatic approach of the RR below, but it is important to note that other member states joined or nearly joined the RR in their opposition to the GCM. Table 3 below provides an overview of the five additional member states that did not support the GCM. Bulgaria’s government, which includes the fascist United Patriots, abstained. So did Slovakia, where the far-right SMS is part of a three-party coalition (Reuters, 20 November 2018; EurAktiv, 26 November 2018). The biggest surprise abstention and an outlier was Romania, where government and president had previously approved the GCM (Romanian government 2018). The Social Democrat-Liberal government coalition
had justified its sudden abstention by stating that it wanted to provide a ‘balanced approach’ in view of the division over the GCM in Europe. Latvia’s government coalition of three (including the National Alliance, which is very close to RR ideology) voted against (France24, 6 December 2018). The Czech Republic also voted against the Compact; however, the coalition government there does not include far-right parties but rather the populist ANO 2011. Its decision has often been justified with presenting a united Visegrad position on the Compact in line with the joint opposition to EU migration policy (Reuters, 14 November 2018).

Table 3. Non-RR governments in the EU abstaining or voting against GCM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU member states</th>
<th>Government parties</th>
<th>Political orientation of government</th>
<th>Political and legislative processes on GCM</th>
<th>Position on GCM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>GERB (ГЕРБ), United Patriots</td>
<td>Centre right and extreme right/fascist</td>
<td>Cabinet decision</td>
<td>Abstained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>ANO 2011, Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>Populist, social democrats</td>
<td>Cabinet decision</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Union of Greens and Farmers, New Unity, National Alliance</td>
<td>Green conservative, centre right, populist right</td>
<td>Vote in Parliament</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Social Democrat Party (ПДС) and Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE)</td>
<td>Social democrat and liberal</td>
<td>Cabinet decision</td>
<td>Abstain (reversing previous decision to support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Direction – Social Democracy (Smer-SD, SNS and Most–Híd Democrats)</td>
<td>Social democrat, far right and Hungarian minority party</td>
<td>Vote in Parliament</td>
<td>Abstained</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, there were significant political consequences in more member states as set out in Table 4 below. In Croatia, Estonia, and Lithuania, far-right or populist right coalition parties forced parliamentary votes on the GCM; however, these ended up going in favour of the Compact (Financial Times, December 2018). In Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands, RR opposition parties forced a debate and parliamentary vote which they lost since the government parties fully supported the GCM (ibid.; Suomen Uutiset 2018; Bundestag 2018). The Belgian prime minister Charles Michel resigned when the Flemish nationalist NVA left the government due to his support for the Compact (BBC News, 19 December 2018).
Table 4. EU Member states supporting the GCM despite political opposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU member states</th>
<th>Government parties</th>
<th>Political orientation of government</th>
<th>Political and legislative processes on GCM</th>
<th>Position on GCM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Reformist Movement (MR), New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), the Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&amp;V), the Open Flemish Liberals, and Democrats (Open Vld)</td>
<td>Liberal, Flemish nationalists/conservative, liberal-conservative, Christian democratic,</td>
<td>Cabinet decision, despite no confidence vote</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Croatian People's Party-Liberal Democrats (HNS)</td>
<td>Centre right and liberal</td>
<td>Vote in Parliament initiated by government party</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Estonia Centre Party, Social Democratic Party, Isamaa</td>
<td>Populist centrist, social democratic, conservative</td>
<td>Vote in Parliament initiated by government party</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Centre Party National Coalition Party Blue Reform</td>
<td>Centre right, conservative</td>
<td>Vote in Parliament initiated by opposition</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>CDU/CSU and SPD</td>
<td>Centre right, social democrats, Polish Minority Party, populist right</td>
<td>Vote in Parliament initiated by opposition</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union, Social Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania, Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance and the Order and Justice</td>
<td>Centre right, social democrats, Polish Minority Party, populist right</td>
<td>Vote in Parliament initiated by government party</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Democrats 66 (D66) and Christian Union (CU)</td>
<td>Conservative liberal, Christian democratic, social liberal,</td>
<td>Vote in Parliament initiated by government party</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3. The arguments against the Global Compact for Migration - snowballing from Austria

Many attributed Austria's change of position to a social media campaign targeting the RR base in the country (Die Presse 2018; Politico 2019; Taggesschau 2018). Media investigations into the campaigns revealed that high profile neo-Nazis such as Martin Sellner, leader of the organisation Die Identitären, issued videos which condemned the GCM. He described it as a globalist and 'deceitful' project creating dangerous mass immigration into Europe, bringing "the death of nation-states". He argued that the GCM was supposed to drive immigration into Europe and was developed by unelected diplomats against the interests of Austrian citizens. Although he acknowledged that it is not legally binding in principle, he argued that politicians would nonetheless translate this into policy (Taggesschau 2018). On YouTube, where he called for a Europe-wide campaign against the GCM, his videos became the most viewed channel for content about the GCM (ibid.). The activism of the RR affected many other member states even though they did support the GCM. The social media campaign by Identitären was taken up by the Europe-wide network Generation Identity – albeit with only limited success – in Germany, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands (Independent Ireland 2018; Hope not Hate 2018).

Beyond the online campaigns, the Identitären influenced the FPÖ's foreign policy position on the GCM. When the Austrian government published its dissent from the Compact in October 2018, the official text reflected the language and arguments of the Identitären. It also included the mistranslation of the English language expression 'regular migration' to 'geplante migration' ('planned migration'). This expression is associated with a right-wing conspiracy theory of 'planned population exchange' (Die Presse, 2 November 2018). The main arguments for not supporting the Compact reflected statements of Die Identitären, including restrictions on deportation and the accusation that the Compact would create a 'human right of migration' (Die Zeit, 31 October 2018; ORF, 2 November 2018). The FPÖ was able to draft the government's position excluding the established foreign policy experts in the Austrian Foreign Office and wider government (Die Presse, 2 November 2018). Not surprisingly, the ministerial declaration and decision came as a surprise to the Austrian officials who had actually worked on the negotiations (Interview 2019c; Interview 2019d).

In the case of Austria, we can see that external pressure groups with far more right-wing and xenophobic ideologies were able to influence the RR FPÖ in their position on the GCM. Their opposition framed the critique of the GCM. Although a junior partner in the coalition, the FPÖ was able to influence this foreign policy issue despite ÖVP disagreement and general disagreement from the wider diplomatic corps. These arguments, originally coined by Die Identitären, were picked up by the remaining dissenting European states and even unsettled those governments who sought to support the GCM.

The most common arguments by those member states who voted against or abstained followed the logic of the Austrian announcement in October. The emphasis lay on the concern that the GCM could create
new legal obligations for states regarding migration, ultimately leading to a human right for migration, and the suggestion that the GCM would undermine national sovereignty, particularly concerning border controls and access to social benefits (Kormany 2018; Deutsche Welle, 14 November 2018; Sofia Globe, 2 December 2018; United Nations December 2018).

The claim that the Compact would create a human right for migration became a central one. However, political supporters of the Compact and legal commentators have pointed out that this would be a misrepresentation of what the Compact was aiming to achieve (Peters 2018; Bufalini 2018; DfiD 2018; German Representation at the United Nations 2018). The Compact is not legally binding, as explicitly stated in paragraphs 7 and 15, and thus there cannot be a direct effect on migration policies of individual states. Furthermore, the GCM, due to EU pressure, focuses on facilitating returns and encourages countries of origin to readmit migrants (Peters 2018; Bufalini 2018). The consensus from the legal perspective is that no new legal rights are being created but rather existing ones are being consolidated and reiterated (Allinson et al. 2019). This is in line with the soft law approach on multilateral governance of migration, as discussed above. Although much of the language in the debates on the GCM focused on the 'human rights of migrants', this referred to the need to uphold their basic human rights, not that there should be a separate set of rights protecting them (European Parliament 2018).

The mistrust and opposition to multilateralism originated in the RR’s sovereignist position; however, the justification given by governments exaggerated the process of multilateralism and the policies that would result from the GCM. Mistrust in international institutions and the implication that the interests of others were given priority over local populations are all part of the RR’s argument against both multilateralism and immigration.

5.4. The diplomatic approach of the Radical Right

Reviewing these events, it emerges that beyond the social media campaign and political arguments made against the GCM, the RR also took specific action in undermining the multilateral process and targeted the EU’s role.

Firstly, Hungary’s refusal to engage in the process weakened the role of the EUDEL significantly because it was no longer able to speak on behalf of all of the member states. This was the first case where a member state refused outright to participate in a multilateral process. Because this took all member states by surprise and no other process was in place, a compromise was found and the EU continued to do all of the co-ordination behind the scenes. It was nonetheless a watershed moment which enabled other member states to drop out of the process later on. It has also weakened trust in the EUDEL from
member states, which now paid closer attention to multilateral negotiations and the position promoted by EUDEL (Interview 2019d). This affects all three aspects of the EU’s actorness at the UN, namely the authority, autonomy, and recognition which it has been keen to develop (Jupille and Caporaso 1998).

Secondly, Austria’s retraction of support after having been the main speaker for the EU 27 member states during the negotiations (and while it was holding the EU presidency) also aimed at the EU’s actorness but also undermined the multilateral process as a whole. By refusing any responsibility for the negotiations or the agreed text, the multilateral process was represented as untrustworthy and against the national interest of ordinary Austrians.

Finally, a significant consequence of the campaign questioning the legitimacy of the Compact was the late consultation with national parliaments (Karier, 7 April 2019). Several member states referred the decision to their national parliaments which, from a legal perspective, was unnecessary considering the ‘soft law’ character of the agreement (Peters 2018). However, RR parties did so, both in government and in opposition, claiming that they were allowing for democratic oversight on the multilateral process which had been previously denied. This, of course, implied that the whole process was undemocratic, lacking transparency and accountability. It raised new questions among the general public and made governments less secure in their support of the GCM. In a minority of cases (Slovakia and Latvia), this was a successful strategy to get member states to drop their support. But more widely it raised awareness of the GCM and created a narrative that the process of the GCM was in some way controversial or contested.

6. Conclusions

This paper has examined whether the opposition to the GCM by RR parties in government was due to a systematic hostility to multilateralism as promoted by the EU. The analysis of the party positions on multilateralism, based on party manifestos and key speeches by party leaders, indicated a critical and, at times, hostile position towards multilateralism among the four RR parties. While this varied in degree, with Fidesz, the FPÖ, and LN more outspoken and categorical than PiS, they all combined nativism with the typical populist opposition to multilateralism and European integration. With regard to migration – the policy area at the heart of the GCM – these parties were particularly hostile to a multilateral approach and explicitly targeted the common EU approach. The nativist aspect of their attitude towards migration therefore emerged with both xenophobic reference to migrants and minorities as well as to the EU influence on migration policy. Opposition to the GCM was rooted in this inter-EU conflict on migration and the opposition of RR parties to a multilateral approach which, in their view, equated to increasing migration to Europe. The further expansion to a multilateral framework on migration at the UN level contributed directly to this conflict.
The RR, particularly *Fidesz* and the *FPÖ*, targeted not just the multilateral UN process but explicitly aimed to undermine the EU’s role. That they succeeded in doing so is due to the EU’s vulnerability in this policy area. Firstly, the EU’s commitment to global governance set out in the Global Strategy is an ambitious endeavour, difficult to reconcile with the diverse views on multilateralism in the union. Secondly, EU member states have held a conservative if not limiting position on multilateral governance of migration in the past. Hence pushing its member states towards a more progressive GCM represented a significant challenge. This may also explain the success of the RR in mobilising other member states’ governments in their opposition to the Compact.

The literature has pointed out that the record of RR parties implementing their ideology in practice is limited and mixed (Albertazzi and Müller 2013; Akkermann 2012; Minkenberg 2001); despite the rhetoric, even on migration policies, RR parties often move more to the centre right once they are in government. The case discussed here allowed for further exploration of the foreign policy of the RR. Importantly it was a period in which there were two RR parties in majority governments. *Fidesz* and *PiS* had the opportunity to influence government policy to a much larger extent than ever before. With two more RR parties in government in a junior position in other member states, they were provided with an increased opportunity for shaping policy. There are two ways in which the case of the GCM adds to our understanding of the foreign policy of the RR in government. Firstly the majority of RR governments took a clearer stance in opposition to the GCM, voting against it. The junior coalition partners *FPÖ* and *LN*, on the other hand, were unable to convince their coalition partners to vote against it and abstained. Although they were not able to fully influence government policy in this regard the position of the *FPÖ* itself was significantly radicalised by groups much further to the right of the spectrum (some even openly associated with neo-Nazis). This shows that during the period under investigation here, at least in regard to the question of migration policy, the RR in Austria is changing from previous years when it was more moderate. Greater confrontation and a desire to be positioned to the right of centre is therefore a significant strategy on the question of migration.

As of summer 2019, both Austria and Italy no longer have RR parties in power. With two of its Western European members no longer in government, the remainder of the RR bloc is concentrated in Central Europe. Although weaker, it does not necessarily mean that we will see less activism on the multilateral stage by these states. Indeed, the efforts appear to continue with Warsaw and Budapest recently announcing that they will oppose net-zero targets on greenhouse gas emissions (Deutsche Welle, 26 June 2019). As with the case of the GCM, however, we see greater activism from the RR on multilateralism in which the EU is trying to take a lead or develop a common position, committing to specific targets.

What can one deduce from the RR strategy on the GCM for the future of the EU’s ability to implement its commitment to multilateralism? In the case of the GCM, the RR aimed to undermine the EU’s position and to discredit the whole UN process. This was done by exploiting the EU’s vulnerable position at the UN and the opaque domestic processes on the ratification of this non-legally binding
Compact. Misinformation was openly used to target public opinion. Clearer mandates for negotiations and greater peer pressure among member states on multilateral negotiations to uphold ‘sincere co-operation’ is essential. However, the challenge for the Commission to obtain a formal mandate for negotiation from the Council is unlikely to become any easier, particularly on controversial policy issues. Therefore, member states need to be more proactive in supporting an EU position in multilateral fora. For this, member states must work more closely with domestic stakeholders and particularly with their national parliaments. Although parliamentarians had been involved in delegations to the GCM negotiations, the content of these talks was not part of the debate in most parliaments. Instead, the RR succeeded in tabling debates very late in the process, trying to take control of the narrative on the GCM and thereby increasing support for its position. Encouraging early debates and public and political engagement on policy issues which are being discussed at the multilateral level would provide a more stable base for the EUDEL. The EU’s commitment to global governance is not an apolitical goal; it needs greater political engagement, not only to avoid being undermined by strategies such as those pursued by the RR against the GCM, but also to maintain transparency and accountability.
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