

Nuancing the Voter Landscape:
Radical right and radical left constituencies
in Europe

Alexandru Filip
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About the Author

Alexandru Filip is a Dahrendorf Forum Postdoctoral Fellow at the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin. He completed his PhD on Eurosceptic influence over mainstream parties at the Bremen International Graduate School for Social Sciences. He focuses on European politics, integration, and populist political actors. Author email: filip@hertie-school.org



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Nuancing the Voter Landscape: Radical right and radical left constituencies in Europe

Abstract

How do the voters of radical right and radical left parties compare? Building on previous work that explores the differences between radical constituencies, this paper seeks to elaborate upon existing models by accounting for the effects of welfare chauvinism, identity, and culture/new politics (GAL–TAN). While voters who favour egalitarianism and redistribution are typically expected to vote for the far left, in line with past work on the topic, the situation becomes more complicated when more ideational aspects are factored in. Analysing data from the European Social Survey, this paper finds the cultural dimension to be a very strong predictor of radical party choice: voters at the ‘progressive’ pole of the cultural dimensions have a strong likelihood of voting for the radical left, while those at the ‘conservative’ pole register a high probability of voting for the radical right. These results stand even when controlling for attitudes towards immigration. This paper also finds that the effect of this ‘new politics’ dimension amplifies over time, speaking to the growing salience of the vertical cleavage.

Keywords

Welfare chauvinism, immigration, radical parties, European politics, elections

1. Introduction

In a recent working paper from September 2016, Cas Mudde, one of the leading contemporary figures in the study of populism, argued that populism should no longer be treated as an outlier, a pathology, or exception to the rule of traditional mainstream politics which we can “wait out”. Instead, he suggested that such parties are here to stay, and that both policy insiders and academics should begin to treat them more as a normal feature of European and Western politics. Populism has indeed become one of the catchwords of Western politics. Many of the socio-political struggles that have recently befallen Europe and the West are ascribed to populism, in conjunction with the stresses of globalisation and the rise of radical political actors. From trade wars and closing borders inside the EU to crackdowns on judiciaries or Russian election meddling, the use of ‘populism’ has become a common feature of political debate.

The phrase ‘illiberal democracy’ is heard ever more as certain political entrepreneurs present themselves as democrats, but opponents of liberal democracy.

The past decade has seen the rise of various types of populist and radical parties, from the likes of Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, or La France Insoumise, to the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Sweden Democrats, or the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Academic research has begun to take note of the current populist and fringe party ‘ecosystem’, emphasising that it may be misguided to talk about ‘populist’ or ‘radical’ voters in a lump. *But if these voters are varied, how do they differ?* This is one of the main contributions of the paper, as it seeks to explore the differences between radical constituencies in more detail, by building and elaborating upon past work in the field (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2017; Van Elsas et al., 2017; Rooduijn et al., 2017). This study explores the differences between radical constituencies in more detail, arguing that the ecology of so-called populist or radical voters is more nuanced and diverse than we may at first suspect.

Recent social and political developments point to an intermingling of issues at the liberal and conservative poles in Europe and beyond. Political actors all over the Western world, including in North America, seem to be caught in a clash that brings together questions about political correctness, identity and diversity, affirmative action, feminism, globalisation, environmentalism, and many others into a struggle over how strong a mark progressive politics should make on society. Europeans who welcome immigrants and refugees at train stations and march for open borders are opposed by those who seek to prevent social and political change in their communities. The traditional question that so long topped the political agenda (the distributive left versus right issue) seems to be losing ground to these overarching questions of change versus resistance to change.

This paper pays particular attention to tendencies in welfare chauvinism in relation to voting for the radical right and radical left in western Europe. After looking into the possibility of explaining radical party support as a function of exclusive and inclusive identity traits, it addresses the potential for a paradigm shift in western European politics: the change from one dominated by competition between the left and the right to one that pits social-liberal and progressive ideals against more conservative, traditional ones. This paper thus seeks to give the ‘new cleavage’ thesis an updated empirical foundation.

The phrase ‘illiberal democracy’ is heard ever more as certain political entrepreneurs present themselves (with a strong following) as democrats, but opponents of progressive social liberalism or liberal democracy. After exploring the relationship between radical voting and exclusive/inclusive identity traits, the paper shows to what extent the ‘new politics’, or cultural dimension plays a role in explaining the vote for the radical right and radical left. It is found that this cultural factor is the strongest predictor in the analysis, with progressive extremity being the largest predictor of radical left voting and high conservative scores having a profound effect on the probability of voting for the radical right.

2. Values, Welfare Chauvinism, and New Politics

Based on the current state of academic literature, this paper tests three hypotheses in order to show how the voters of radical parties differ, and how voting for such parties is becoming a function of the new, postmaterialist cleavage. Hypothesis 1, the welfare chauvinism hypothesis, states that high scores on the European Social Survey’s ‘altruism’, ‘egalitarianism’, and ‘redistribution preference’ values will actually lead to lower support for radical left parties (and a higher chance of voting for the radical right) for voters who are strongly opposed to immigration. Hypothesis 2, the exclusive attachment/identity hypothesis, states that relative attachment to one’s country and to Europe affects the likelihood of voting for radical right parties, with highly exclusive individuals (high attachment to home nation and low attachment to Europe) being more likely to vote for the radical right and highly inclusive individuals (higher attachment to Europe than to home nation) being more likely to vote for the radical left. Hypothesis 3, the cultural-ideational hypothesis, states that the likelihood of voting for radical right and radical left parties is determined by cultural factors (progressive versus conservative).

In a recent article published in *European Union Politics*, titled “Radical Distinction, Support for Radical Right and Radical Left Parties in Europe”, Rooduijn et al. (2017) conduct one of the most up-to-date and comprehensive examinations of radical party support in Europe, going beyond the well-studied characteristics associated with the radical right, such as (exclusive) nationalism and nativism (Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007). The main argument of their study is that the underlying difference between radical right and radical left voters is the values that underpin the right and left ideologies. The authors argue that radical-party voters reflect said parties’ foundations in their ideological makeup and value structure (2017). Individuals who are egalitarian, altruistic, believe in redistribution, and favour the use of socio-economic policies to reduce income differences will vote

for radical left parties, while individuals who are egoistic, non-egalitarian, and strongly object to income redistribution will vote for radical right parties. The underlying assumption is that, just like other voters, radical party voters are ideological voters (Van der Brug et al., 2000) and that there are distinct, attitudinal differences between radical right and radical left voters (Visser et al., 2014) that reflect the underlying values and perspectives of the right and the left. While previous studies of the radical right (Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007) and radical left (March, 2011) have identified defining characteristics of said parties' discourse, the value-based approach sought to identify more fundamental differences in voter choice.

The idea that a new dimension of political contestation could structure party choice is not new to the academic discourse, with the likes of Inglehart (1990), Franklin (1992), Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002), or Kriesi et al. (2008) having paid tribute to it. While Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) argued that the *new* cleavage would be centred on the clash between pro- and anti-globalisation, this

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contribution argues the new cleavage is more complex, related to diverse issues such as environmental and post-materialist concerns (for example gay rights).

In a highly acclaimed work from over a decade ago entitled “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Mudde (2004) seemed to sense the direction liberal democratic polities were heading. He drew attention to the pitfalls of using the word too liberally. While the concept is thrown around nigh indiscriminately, Mudde's insight points to the fact that there can be more than one

populism. Populism is not monolithic, and neither are the radical political forces that have used it to gain political advantage and disturbed the traditional political balance of power in Europe. Mudde referred to populism as a ‘hollow ideology’, which can be adjusted to suit various political orientations depending on the content of the discourse. There can be right wing and left wing populism, a conservative communitarian one, as well as a progressive type. Perhaps it is best to talk (in the words of Radoslaw Markowski) about populism as having ‘different flavours’.

Roduijn (2017) has argued against the idea of lumping together the constituencies of radical parties, suggesting that they have little in common with each other. Work by Van Elsas et al. (2017) has shown that Eurosceptic voters are driven by different concerns and motivations, related to the types of Eurosceptic parties they support, and Roduijn, Burgoon, Van Elsas, and Van de Werfhorst (2017) have recently noted that the radical party voters can differ from each other at fundamental levels. This paper builds on this recent work by elaborating the (original) model and providing a more nuanced view of the difference between various radical constituencies.

One shortcoming of assuming left and right radical parties adhere to the same cleavages as their mainstream counterparts is the degree to which it fails to address the question of welfare chauvinism. It is entirely possible for individuals to be altruistic and egalitarian deep down, but to believe that such altruism does not extend beyond the immediate in-group (Marx and Naumann,

2018; Schumacher and Van Kersbergen, 2016). This paper thus elaborates on existing models to show a more nuanced picture of how ‘redistributive’ and ‘egalitarian’ values play into the likelihood of voting for radical parties by highlighting the important role of welfare chauvinism. Redistributive and altruistic values can combine to lessen support for radical left parties and in some instances even increase support for radical right parties.

The welfare chauvinism hypothesis states that the distinction between radical voterships is more complex than just the simple (classical) one that lies at the heart of the left–right cleavage (the distributive/redistributive conflict dimension), which describes voters as either egalitarian and sharing or inherently selfish and egoistic. In other words, the hypothesis suggests that ‘soft’, ideational or cultural factors may be at play. Past research comparing individual policy positions and attitudes in the 90s and 2000s found that with time, the main factors that fuel voter apprehension about immigration or European integration change from being hard, economic ones to soft, cultural concerns (Lubbers and Jaspers, 2011).

The subsequent two hypotheses articulate queries about the impact of these ideational, cultural factors. Hypothesis 2 is based on a strand of literature that has focused on the difference between exclusive and inclusive identity traits—for example to what degree an individual can conceive of him or herself as just a German; both a German and a European; or even a German, a European, and a Bavarian—and the relationship between said identity and attitudes towards European integration (Greenfeld, 1999; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Citrin and Sides, 2004; McLaren, 2007; Kriesi, 2009). The hypothesis states that personal identity traits (exclusive or inclusive identity structure of individuals) could explain radical party voting. The idea that voters may push for more equality and redistribution but at the same time seek to exclude others from it relies on the concepts of in-group and out-group exclusion. Taking a cue from this literature, this paper seeks to uncover to what degree such differences between attachment to the immediate in-group of the home country and the larger out-group of ‘Europe’ may affect electoral choices as described in the first stage of the analysis.

The final hypothesis states—in line with the new cleavage thesis—that we are moving beyond left vs right as the hard, economic cleavage over redistribution begins to lose relative importance in the political landscape to one combining confrontations over immigration, minority rights, environmental policy, the role of traditions, and authority. ‘Vertical’ dimensions have been postulated in past work, having been referred to as postmaterialist/materialist by Inglehart (1990), new politics/old politics (Franklin, 1992) or green/traditionalist and left-libertarian/authoritarian by Kitschelt (1995). One better known recent example of the approach is that of Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) who propose in the new cleavage hypothesis that the pro/anti-globalisation dimension is gaining increasing importance in electoral contests. This paper contributes to this academic discourse by going one step beyond the ‘globalisation’ view, arguing (in line with Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, 2002) that the vertical dimension is about more than just globalisation or immigration, reflecting instead a new cultural divide within Western polities. The test for this hypothesis utilizes

the cultural/new politics axis developed by Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002). Their ‘GAL–TAN scale’ ranges from green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN).

It is expected that the effect of this cultural dimension will hold over and above the redistributive values and variables in the study.

3. Methodology and Operationalisation

The Hypotheses are operationalised as follows:

According to hypothesis 1, one expects to find that the effect egalitarian, altruistic, and redistributive attitudes on vote choice for radical parties be moderated by attitudes towards immigration. At a more discrete level, this can be operationalised as follows:

- h1a: Altruistic/egalitarian/pro-redistributive voters are more likely to vote for the radical left if they have favourable opinions of immigration;
- h1b: Altruistic/egalitarian/pro-redistributive voters are less likely to vote for the radical left if they have negative opinions of immigration; and
- h1c: Altruistic/egalitarian/pro-redistributive voters are more likely to vote for the radical right if they have negative opinions of immigration.

According to hypothesis 2, it is expected that the probability of voting for radical right and radical left parties will correlate with the exclusive/inclusive identity traits of individuals. At a more discrete level, this can be operationalised as follows:

- h2a: The probability of voting for the radical right is higher among individuals with exclusive identity traits; and
- h2b: The probability of voting for the radical left is higher among individuals with inclusive identity traits.

According to hypothesis 3, the probability of voting for the radical right and radical left are expected to correlate with respondents’ GAL–TAN scores. More specifically, we expect that:

- h3a: Having a high GAL score leads to a higher probability of voting for the radical left and a lower probability of voting for the radical right; and
- h3b: Having a high TAN score leads to a higher probability of voting for the radical right and a lower probability of voting for the radical left.

To test these hypotheses, three dependent variables are employed, each reflecting a binary response. They are based on the vote choice of European Social Survey (ESS) participants, who were asked whether they had voted during the last national election; if the answer was “yes”, they were then asked which party they had voted for. Using these answers, dichotomous variables were constructed depicting comparisons between types of parties, on the basis of the ‘radical right’, ‘radical left’, and ‘mainstream’ categories. For each of these variables, the respondents were assigned a 1 if they had

voted for such a party at the most recent general election and 0 if they had not. Over 195,000 total observations from 14 EU countries (the EU15 minus Luxemburg) came from the period 2002–2016 (eight ESS waves). The number of observations change due to missing data on the various models, depending on the variables used¹, thus the effective number of observations used lies slightly under 60,000.

All of the data comes from the ESS and is employed using (cluster robust) logistic regression as the estimation technique. Country and year factors are also included in the analysis, to control for temporal effects or geographical variation, while country-year clusters are used to add to the robustness of the analysis. Control variables such as respondent age, gender, urban vs. rural residence, religiosity, and unemployment status, taken directly from corresponding ESS² questions (a complete list of the variables and operationalisation can be found in the Appendix). Rooduijn et al. aggregated a set of questions about immigration to measure attitudes towards immigration in one indicator, i.e. to what degree respondents perceive immigration as a threat. Further variables include personal levels of economic satisfaction, income decile, dummy variables controlling for social class, and political trust.

The first part of the analysis uses the same data as Rooduijn et al., with the caveat that only countries from the EU 15 (minus Luxembourg) are included. The analysis replicated Rooduijn et al.'s work (ESS 1-7) and elaborated on it by exploring the interactions between altruistic traits and attitudes towards immigration. Hypothesis 2 is tested using data only from ESS 8, because the attachment question is limited to that edition of the ESS. Hypothesis 3 is tested using data from ESS 1–8, given the focus on temporal evolution. The designation of radical right and radical left parties is taken from the Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES), and the population of radical right and radical left parties is based on the CHES experts' evaluations of parties³.

Recent social and political developments point to an intermingling of issues at the liberal and conservative poles in Europe and beyond.

This analysis is conducted using only western European countries. There are two main arguments in favour of this approach. First, the 'idiosyncrasy' of eastern European politics, wherein the political party landscape is much more fluid and unstructured, built on personalistic politics, and to some degree less settled than in western Europe (Rovny, 2014 and 2015). Second, until very recently (for example in the debate about the distribution of refugees inside Europe), eastern European states were less subject to the processes that have fuelled the rise of radical right and radical left parties in western Europe.

1 The models where the main DV is the odds of voting for the radical right as opposed to the radical left employ only those respondents that actually voted for the radical right and left, thus reducing the N significantly.

2 The variable measuring attitudes towards immigration (immigrant threat perception) aggregates the responses to three questions: (1) 'Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?'; (2) 'Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?'; and (3) 'Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?'

3 The first analysis uses the same data and operationalisation of radical right and radical left parties as Rooduijn et al. This overlaps very well with the CHES operationalisation.

4. Analysis

4.1 Welfare chauvinism

The concept of ‘welfare chauvinism’ is that it is entirely possible for individuals to be altruistic and egalitarian, but believe that only members of a ‘deserving’ in-group—for example the naturally born citizens of a country—should benefit from altruism, or the more egalitarian distribution of wealth in the country. If we entertain the possibility that this is true, then we can envisage altruistic, egalitarian individuals who vote against the radical left. If altruistic voters decline to vote for radical left parties or present a smaller likelihood of doing so, then said values (altruism, egalitarianism, redistributive preferences) are not the end-all of radical party voting, with chauvinistic traits such as perceived cultural threat mediating whether the former values play a role.

Redistributive and altruistic values can combine to lessen support for radical left parties and in some instances even increase support for radical right parties.

Pandering to such combinations of attitudes is what augmented the success of radical right parties such as the Front National, the Austrian Freedom Party, and the Danish People’s Party at the turn of the 21st century. The parties moved left on economic issues despite their economically right-wing origins that favoured the rollback of European welfare states. Kitchelt and McGann’s winning formula (2005) for radical right parties in the 1990s suggested a combination of anti-immigrant attitudes and anti-welfare-statist policy positions.

In the new millennium, the formula was amended to recognise that highly egalitarian or altruistic voters may opt for the radical right instead of the left if they are sufficiently conservative (culturally), and that right-wing populist parties had started pandering to the working and lower classes, which favoured redistribution (De Lange, 2007). Studies by Oesch (2008), Spies (2013), and Lefkofridi et al. (2014) have attested to right-wing parties’ leftward movement on economics to capture culturally conservative left-wing voters. This strategy became more feasible as the cultural dimension of fears over globalisation and immigration became more salient (Lubbers and Jaspers, 2011).

Each of the three hypotheses presented above includes the interaction term between ‘immigrant threat perception’ and one of the three redistributive values: altruism, egalitarianism, or belief that governments should reduce income differences. For each of the three dependent variables (mainstream vs radical left, mainstream vs radical right, radical right vs radical left), the models are identical, save for the interaction term. This produces nine separate models with nine interaction effects. The complete regression table is too bulky to present here, but can be found in the appendix. The data used in the analysis is exactly the same as that of Rooduijn et al. (2017), with the exception of the central and eastern European observations, which were excluded as described above.

Table 1 (shortened)

VARIABLES	(M 1) Radical Left	(M 2) Radical Left	(M 3) Radical Left	(M 4) Radical Right	(M 5) Radical Right	(M 6) Radical Right
Egalitarianism	0.19*** (0.023)	0.39*** (0.056)	0.19*** (0.023)	-0.25*** (0.036)	-0.32 (0.191)	-0.25*** (0.035)
Altruism	0.20*** (0.055)	0.09* (0.036)	0.09** (0.036)	0.38*** (0.095)	-0.04 (0.035)	-0.04 (0.035)
Government redistribution	0.54*** (0.044)	0.54*** (0.044)	0.52*** (0.080)	0.04 (0.031)	0.04 (0.032)	0.21 (0.113)
Education	0.08*** (0.022)	0.08*** (0.022)	0.08*** (0.022)	-0.14*** (0.031)	-0.14*** (0.031)	-0.14*** (0.030)
Subjective income	-0.24*** (0.039)	-0.24*** (0.039)	-0.24*** (0.039)	-0.13* (0.063)	-0.13* (0.063)	-0.13* (0.062)
Unemployment	0.09 (0.110)	0.09 (0.111)	0.09 (0.109)	0.37 (0.254)	0.38 (0.249)	0.38 (0.249)
Immigrant threat perception	0.04 (0.046)	0.14** (0.054)	-0.11 (0.065)	0.76*** (0.078)	0.42*** (0.108)	0.57*** (0.076)
Religion	-0.20*** (0.021)	-0.20*** (0.021)	-0.20*** (0.021)	-0.06*** (0.012)	-0.06*** (0.012)	-0.06*** (0.012)
Age	-0.00 (0.003)	-0.00 (0.003)	-0.00 (0.003)	-0.03*** (0.003)	-0.03*** (0.003)	-0.03*** (0.003)
Rural v. urban	0.17*** (0.051)	0.17*** (0.051)	0.17*** (0.051)	-0.16 (0.083)	-0.16 (0.083)	-0.15 (0.082)
Gender	-0.08 (0.060)	-0.09 (0.060)	-0.09 (0.061)	-0.44*** (0.091)	-0.43*** (0.090)	-0.43*** (0.090)
Economic satisfaction	0.12*** (0.013)	0.12*** (0.013)	0.12*** (0.013)	0.05** (0.018)	0.05** (0.017)	0.05** (0.018)
Political trust	0.01 (0.013)	0.01 (0.013)	0.01 (0.013)	0.02 (0.016)	0.02 (0.016)	0.02 (0.016)
Preference for strong government	-0.14*** (0.028)	-0.14*** (0.028)	-0.14*** (0.028)	0.13*** (0.036)	0.13*** (0.035)	0.13*** (0.035)
Immigrant threat perception*altruism	-0.02** (0.009)			-0.06*** (0.014)		
Immigrant threat perception*egalitarianism		-0.04*** (0.010)			0.01 (0.025)	
Immigrant threat perception*government redistribution			0.01 (0.016)			-0.03 (0.019)
Constant	-6.05*** (0.525)	-6.56*** (0.561)	-5.38*** (0.443)	-3.65*** (0.699)	-1.39 (0.899)	-2.36*** (0.531)
Observations	36,556	36,556	36,556	32,356	32,356	32,356
Pseudo R-squared	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.29	0.29	0.29

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure 1

Average marginal effect of immigrant threat perception on radical left voting at various levels of altruism




Figure 2

Average marginal effects of altruism on radical left voting at various levels of immigrant threat perception




Table 1 presents two sets of three models. Each model contains an interaction with attitudes towards immigration. Models 1 through 3 show how one-unit increases in the various independent variables change the odds of voting for a radical left party as opposed to any other party, while models 4 through 6 depict how one-unit increases in the independent variables change the odds of voting for the radical right.

Given the presence of interaction terms in each model, the most important aspect of this second analysis stage is, however, the graphical inspection of the interaction effects. Figure 1 shows the (average) marginal effects of immigrant threat perception on the probability of voting for the far left as opposed to a mainstream party at various levels of altruism. Altruism was measured using the ESS item “It is important to help and care for others’ well-being”, whose answers range from ‘not like me at all’ to ‘very much like me’. For those who are not altruistic at all (at the far left of graph in Figure 1, i.e. “not like me at all”), perceived immigrant threat has no effect, and the interaction is statistically insignificant. On the right side of the graph (high levels of altruism), the average effect of perceived immigrant threat is a reduced likelihood of voting for the radical left.

Figure 2 shows the average marginal effect of altruism on radical left voting at various levels of chauvinism. This graph shows that on average altruism leads to a higher likelihood of voting for the radical left when the perceived immigration threat is low (belief that immigrants are good, at the left side of the horizontal axis), in accordance with prior findings. Once we reach right side of the horizontal axis (the belief that immigrants are a large threat), the average effect of altruism declines, and then no longer has a statistically significant predictive power over the likelihood of voting for the radical left.

The two figures presented above showed the average effect each variable had on the other's prediction of or effect on radical left voting. However, predictive margins rather than average marginal effects provide a more accurate depiction of the interaction. With predictive margins it's possible to see the degree of impact each variable has for specific types of voters—in this case voters for whom immigration is good vs voters for whom it is a threat.

Figures 3 and 4 show us the interaction between the two variables more minutely and presents two prediction lines—one for highly chauvinistic voters and one for voters who think that immigrants are good rather than a threat. At low levels of altruism, on the left end of the graph, the probability of voting for a radical left party is rather small and there is no statistically significant difference between chauvinists and non-chauvinists (the confidence intervals overlap). At higher levels of altruism, the likelihood of voting for the radical left as opposed to a mainstream party goes up for non-chauvinistic voters, but it declines for chauvinistic voters, who become less likely to vote for a radical left party as they become more altruistic. In other words, altruism makes chauvinists less likely to vote for the radical left.

Figure 4 shows the difference between altruists and non-altruists at various levels of 'perceived ethnic threat'. At low levels of perceived threat, there is a big difference, as altruists are far more likely to vote for the radical left and non-altruists. As we move towards individuals with higher perceived ethnic threat levels, the likelihood of voting for the radical left declines until there is no longer any difference to non-altruists. The examination of egalitarianism as it interacts with one's propensity to vote for radical parties produces similar results.

Figure 5 presents the average marginal effect of egalitarianism on the likelihood of voting for a radical left party rather than a mainstream party at various levels of 'immigrant threat'. On the left end of the horizontal axis, where respondents report that 'immigrants are good', egalitarianism on average has a positive effect on the likelihood of voting for the radical left. On the other side of the chauvinistic spectrum, however, egalitarianism no longer has a statistically significant effect, with the confidence intervals crossing 0. When comparing highly egalitarian voters with non-egalitarian ones directly via predictive margins (as was done for immigrant threat perception in figure 3, see appendix), it is found that that the egalitarians' probability of voting for the radical left decreases strongly and is no longer significantly different from non-egalitarians when they are also chauvinistic, similar to the case of altruists. Moving to the third redistributive value, we explore

Figure 3

Probability of voting for a radical left party against the probability of voting for a mainstream party, across all ranges of ‘altruism’ for pro- and anti-immigration individuals





Figure 4

Probability of voting for a radical left party against the probability of voting for a mainstream party, across all ranges of immigrant threat perception for non-altruistic and altruistic voters



what happens when we plot the interaction of perceived immigrant threat and support for government redistribution. At high levels of ‘immigrant threat’, we see that the average effect of support for government redistribution on radical left voting declines.

The evidence so far shows us that when looking into the determinants of voting for a radical left party as opposed to a mainstream party, altruism, egalitarianism, and support for government redistribution only tell a part of the story. These redistributive values cease to explain support for the radical left when taking into account chauvinistic attitudes and high levels of immigrant threat perception.

What happens when we consider the effect of such interactions on the probability of voting for the radical right? What we find is a somewhat confusing picture. The average marginal effects of ‘immigrant threat’ on the likelihood of choosing the radical right as opposed to a mainstream party at various levels of altruism, egalitarianism, and preference for government redistribution is such that the average effects are either insignificant (for the interaction with preference for redistribution), or lead to a diminishing likelihood of casting a radical right vote for higher scores

Figure 5

Average marginal effect of egalitarianism and attitude towards migration on radical left voting





Figure 6

Average marginal effect of support for government redistribution and attitude towards immigration on radical left voting



on these values, which paints a picture that contradicts the argument presented above⁴. This outcome could be a result of the fact that the estimation of the marginal effects ‘averages away’ the effects of the interaction. For this reason, it may make more sense to look again at individual predictive margins at empirically and theoretically representative values, instead of average effects. This allows us to examine the predictions for individuals at precise, discrete values on the indicators of interest. Each of the figures below shows the relationship between immigrant threat perception and the likelihood of voting for the radical right. In each case, two types of individual voter is plotted: in the first graph altruistic (“very much like me”) and non-altruistic (“not like me at all”) voters; in the second graph, voters strongly in favour of government redistribution (“strongly agree”) and against redistribution (“strongly disagree”).

What we see is that there is no pronounced difference between those espousing altruistic, redistributive values, and those not characterised by them: both types of individuals will have a stronger likelihood of voting for the radical right as opposed to a mainstream party if they consider immigrants to be a very large threat—the difference between them is mostly insignificant.

⁴ See plots with average marginal effects in the appendix.

A similar analysis is performed wherein the dependent variable in the logistic regression is now the likelihood of voting for a radical left party (1) as opposed to a radical right party (0), rather than comparing each radical party to mainstream parties. This set of logistic regressions thus contain fewer observations, the reference category is radical right voting rather than the larger base of mainstream voting. Nevertheless, the results remain in tune with those observed in the previous section (see appendix for graphs with average marginal effects and individual predictive margins). Upon detailed inspection of the predictive margins (figures 8 and 9), we find that for all categories of voters, the odds of voting for a far right party as opposed to a far left party go up as we move higher on the scale of immigrant threat perception, both when comparing highly altruistic and non-altruistic respondents, and when comparing redistribution-favouring and redistribution-opposing respondents).

Attitudes towards immigration have a significant moderating effect on voters' values and ideological orientations.

Overall, there is strong evidence for sub-hypotheses h1a and h1b. Positive views of immigration will lead highly altruistic (and egalitarian, redistributive) individuals to vote for the radical left, while negative views of immigration will decrease the chance of voting for the far left for the same type of individuals. In other words, we can conclude that attitudes towards immigration have a significant moderating effect on voters' values and ideological orientations. We find some evidence for hypothesis h1c. Altruistic voters are more likely to vote for the radical right if they oppose immigration.

However, the fact that there is less difference between altruistic and non-altruistic individuals in the likelihood of radical right vote suggests a weaker effect of redistributive values than immigration-related ones.

Egalitarian and redistributive values don't always translate into voting for the radical left: they can lead individuals away from voting for the radical left, and can under some circumstances even incentivise the radical right vote. The welfare chauvinism hypothesis is therefore partially confirmed, and paints a picture of voters who are egalitarian and who favour government efforts to spread wealth via redistribution, but who think that only certain groups of people should benefit from such equality and redistribution, for instance native ethnic nationals but not immigrants. A question that merits being asked, then, is how are these in-group/out-group distinctions made?

4.2 Relative attachment: inclusive and exclusive identity

One strand of research, which has remained somewhat underexplored in recent years, suggests that the difference between individuals with exclusive and inclusive identity traits could explain the difference in radical ballot choice (McLaren, 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2004). The European Social Survey's 8th round (2016) included two indicators of individuals' feelings of attachment to their countries and to Europe. The two indicators run on scales from 0 to 10. By subtracting one from the other, it is possible to create a scale/indicator that shows how much more national attachment than European attachment an individual has, or, inversely, how much more European than national

attachment. That is to say, if a respondent gave the same value to both questions, then the difference in attachment is 0. An individual who reports 0 on European attachment and 10 on national attachment scores as ‘-10’ and in the opposite case, the respondent is assigned a ‘10’.

Regression Table 2 below presents the difference in attachment between Europe and home country. The variable is significant when explaining the odds of voting for a radical right party as opposed to another type of party (albeit at reduced coefficient strength). The variable is neither a significant predictor of the likelihood of voting for the radical left, nor for distinguishing between radical right and radical left voters when including only these in the analysis (model 3; see appendix for complete regression table and operationalisation details).

This part of the analysis only contains data from the eighth ESS wave, eliminating tens of thousands of observations that are analysed in the other models in this paper from the equation, thus reducing the number of cases from around fifty thousand to around ten thousand. Leaving aside discussions about data and sample size, it is also wholly possible for the ‘attachment’ indicators to be a bad proxy for measuring inclusive and exclusive identity traits. We cannot exclude the possibility that an individual could be somewhat attached to Europe, yet have exclusive identity traits which result in them seeking to restrict the benefits of altruism, equality, and redistribution solely to the in-group. In the model distinguishing among radical right and radical left voters (3) one finds no significant correlation. Thus the questions regarding identity may be better addressed with data or a survey that asks more precise questions about identity and sense of belonging. For the time being, the evidence on the exclusive identity hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) with its two sub-hypotheses (h2a and h2b) is mixed.

4.3 Green/alternative/libertarian–traditional/authoritarian/nationalist

In a seminal article titled “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?” Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002) addressed the growing tide of Euroscepticism on the party and voter political landscape by comparing how party positions on the EU plot against the left–right axis and then against a cultural/new politics axis they developed as part of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey: GAL–TAN. They refer to the GAL–TAN scale as the “new politics” dimension, conceived as ranging from green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN).

The final stage of this analysis explores the effect of the cultural/new politics dimension on radical party voting. Table 3 shows a new set of logistic regressions, with the addition of the variable that describes the new politics/cultural dimension: GAL–TAN. For each observation in the dataset there is an average of respondent preferences on immigration, the need for a strong government, environmental protection, same-sex marriage, and the importance of abiding by traditions, following rules, and understanding others. All variables were normalised (and if necessary reversed) to allow the generation of a mean. The average value of these indicators thus gives each ESS respondent a value on the new politics dimension. The variable describing attitude towards immigration is not included here, as it contributes to the GAL–TAN score.

**Table 2: Adding difference in level of attachment to the analysis—
country and social class dummies are not reported here**

VARIABLES	(1) Radical right v. mainstream	(2) Radical left v. mainstream	(3) Radical right v. radical left
Attachment difference	-0.09*** (0.027)	0.00 (0.023)	-0.04 (0.037)
Immigrant threat perception	0.37*** (0.041)	-0.16*** (0.022)	0.58*** (0.049)
Education	-0.10** (0.037)	0.06 (0.092)	-0.23 (0.129)
Egalitarianism	-0.14*** (0.034)	0.19*** (0.047)	-0.40*** (0.102)
Altruism	-0.05* (0.025)	0.04 (0.040)	-0.16 (0.088)
Government redistribution	0.02 (0.023)	0.47*** (0.086)	-0.41*** (0.030)
Religion	-0.04 (0.043)	-0.13*** (0.020)	0.16*** (0.025)
Age	-0.01*** (0.002)	0.00 (0.004)	-0.00 (0.009)
Rural v. urban	0.04 (0.073)	0.32* (0.136)	-0.22 (0.189)
Gender	-0.36** (0.116)	-0.27*** (0.075)	-0.17 (0.162)
Subjective income	-0.05 (0.075)	-0.27** (0.093)	0.05 (0.053)
Unemployment	0.48 (0.603)	0.39* (0.189)	-0.94 (0.684)
Economic satisfaction	0.03 (0.027)	0.08*** (0.016)	0.00 (0.028)
Political trust	0.21*** (0.038)	0.21** (0.064)	0.05 (0.060)
Constant	-2.83*** (0.248)	-7.98*** (1.023)	3.63** (1.259)
Observations	10,023	10,380	1,349
Pseudo R-squared	0.25	0.13	0.43

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 3: Exploring the effect of the new politics/cultural dimension on radical party vote—country and social class dummies not reported here

VARIABLES	(M 1) Radical Right	(M 2) Radical Left	(M 3) Right v. Left	(M 4) Radical Right	(M 5) Radical Left	(M 6) Right v. Left
GAL–TAN	3.22*** (0.354)	-4.46*** (0.795)	5.34*** (0.622)	-0.72 (0.592)	-7.32*** (1.795)	2.02 (2.297)
Education	-0.13*** (0.030)	0.05 (0.031)	-0.12** (0.045)	-0.13*** (0.030)	0.05 (0.030)	-0.13** (0.044)
Egalitarianism	-0.22*** (0.034)	0.12*** (0.034)	-0.31*** (0.071)	-0.22*** (0.034)	0.12*** (0.036)	-0.31*** (0.072)
Altruism	0.01 (0.025)	-0.06* (0.028)	0.07 (0.049)	0.01 (0.024)	-0.06* (0.029)	0.07 (0.048)
Government redistribution	-0.08 (0.040)	0.22*** (0.035)	-0.27*** (0.048)	-0.08 (0.040)	0.22*** (0.036)	-0.27*** (0.047)
Religion	-0.06*** (0.014)	0.01 (0.023)	-0.03 (0.023)	-0.06*** (0.014)	0.00 (0.023)	-0.03 (0.023)
Age	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.01 (0.004)	-0.01* (0.005)	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.01 (0.004)	-0.01* (0.005)
Rural v. urban	-0.07 (0.063)	0.07 (0.055)	-0.15 (0.100)	-0.07 (0.064)	0.07 (0.055)	-0.16 (0.100)
Gender	-0.28*** (0.046)	0.05 (0.077)	-0.28*** (0.073)	-0.28*** (0.048)	0.05 (0.077)	-0.28*** (0.074)
Subjective income	-0.11* (0.047)	-0.08 (0.041)	-0.09 (0.056)	-0.11* (0.046)	-0.08 (0.040)	-0.08 (0.057)
Unemployment	0.20 (0.179)	-0.23* (0.104)	0.31 (0.234)	0.21 (0.177)	-0.22* (0.108)	0.32 (0.235)
Economic satisfaction	0.02 (0.020)	0.02 (0.020)	0.01 (0.024)	0.02 (0.019)	0.02 (0.020)	0.01 (0.025)
Political trust	0.28*** (0.025)	0.08** (0.026)	0.16*** (0.037)	0.27*** (0.025)	0.07** (0.026)	0.16*** (0.038)
Year	0.08 (0.041)	-0.02 (0.028)	0.03 (0.057)	-0.25*** (0.059)	-0.23* (0.119)	-0.24 (0.170)
GAL–TAN *year				0.72*** (0.097)	0.59 (0.306)	0.64 (0.369)
Constant	-2.03*** (0.578)	-4.18*** (0.594)	3.30*** (0.712)	-0.32 (0.517)	-3.22*** (0.716)	4.68*** (1.190)
Observations	56,195	56,754	8,500	56,195	56,754	8,500
Pseudo R-squared	0.17	0.08	0.29	0.17	0.08	0.30

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure 7

Probability of voting for a radical right party against the odds of voting for a mainstream party, across all ranges of immigrant threat perception for altruistic and non-altruistic voters





Figure 8

Probability of voting for a radical right party against the probability of voting for a mainstream party, across all ranges of immigrant threat perception for voters who are strongly opposed to and strongly in favour of redistribution



It quickly becomes evident that the cultural variable has by far the largest influence over propensity to vote for the radical right or the radical left, being an order of magnitude stronger than the other factors. The effect is in the expected direction: culturally regressive (high TAN) individuals are more likely to vote for radical right parties than mainstream parties; high GAL scores correlate positively with the probability of voting for a radical left party instead of a mainstream party.

The sign of the coefficient is negative with respect to the likelihood of voting for a radical left party because the GAL–TAN scale runs from 0 (extreme GAL) to 1 (extreme TAN). Model 3 in Table 3 takes only radical voters into account, measuring the likelihood of casting a vote for the radical right as opposed to the radical left as the main dependent variable in its logistic regression. Here we see that the effect of the cultural factors becomes even stronger than in the first two models: once a voter has decided to vote for a fringe or radical party, whether she decides to vote for a radical left or a radical right party is heavily influenced by the cultural dimension. Altruism becomes statistically insignificant across all models, while egalitarianism and preference for government redistribution remain significant, albeit at small coefficients (the latter only in the case of radical left voting).

Figure 9

Probability of voting for a radical right party against the odds of voting for a ‘radical left’ party, across all ranges of immigrant threat perception for altruistic and non-altruistic voters





Figure 10

Probability of voting for a radical right party against the odds of voting for radical left party, across all ranges of immigrant threat perception for individuals who are for and against government redistribution



Unlike in the analysis of Rooduijn et al. (2017), we see that political trust (or distrust) becomes a significant predictor across all models (albeit at a much smaller coefficient compared to GAL–TAN). Moreover, there is no difference in the sign of the coefficient between radical right and radical left voters. In other words, the decision to opt for a radical right or radical left party instead of a mainstream party is associated with lower levels of trust in politicians and political parties. The effect on the radical right is, however, stronger than on the radical left (radical right voters display even less trust than far left ones) and this is seen when the logistic regression is performed solely on the subsample of radical voters—radical left voters are more trusting of the political establishment than radical right voters. Subjective income and economic satisfaction are only significant when looking at the radical left, as is the income decile of respondents. What this tells us is that socio-economic circumstances likely play a role in the decision to vote for the radical left, but inform right wing voting to a lesser degree.

The possibility is considered here that since opposition to immigration is one of the constituents of the new politics variable, it may drive the correlation between GAL–TAN and the radical party vote dependent variables. In order to control for this possibility, a similar analysis is performed in

which opposition to immigration was taken out of the GAL–TAN indicator, and included in the same analysis as a separate variable. The effect of the new GAL–TAN on radical party voting remains highly significant. It remains the strongest predictor, with a coefficient twice as strong as opposition to immigration, and an order of magnitude larger than the coefficients of other variables (the regression table with this amended analysis can be found in the Appendix). This shows that attitudes towards immigration are not the main driver of the progressive–conservative divide (even though they are a significant part of it), that the ‘new politics’ dimension drives party choice over and above discussions about immigration. We can confirm the cultural hypothesis.

The evidence here supports the insights offered by some earlier work. A panel study by Lubbers and Jaspers (2011) found that ideational factors were replacing economic considerations as determinants of attitudes such as those towards EU integration. Such arguments send a similar

As the ‘vertical’ issues grow in importance for voters, they will pay more attention to how parties position themselves on non-economic issues and vote accordingly.

message to Hooghe and Marks’ postfunctionalist thesis (2009) and Kriesi et al.’s new cleavage hypothesis (2008, 2012), in that there is an ever growing importance of non-economic factors that determine the political battlegrounds. Whether such a shift in paradigm takes place can be easily tested: by adding an interaction term between ‘time’ and the ‘GAL–TAN’ variables to the equation. The margins plots below show the interaction effects in question: the effect of the new politics dimension over the probability of radical party voting has grown steadily over time.

In the first ‘time* GAL–TAN’ interaction graph (figure 10) we learn that the effect of the new politics/cultural dimension on the likelihood of voting for radical right as opposed to mainstream parties has grown steadily since the beginning of the 21st century, when the first ESS wave was taken. On the radical left (figure 11), the prediction has remained consistently significant, hovering just below 0 as expected, because of how the GAL–TAN score is measured. Time has, however, not had such an accelerating effect at the radical left side of the spectrum: on the contrary, its effect has diminished with time. The cultural dimension seemed to always have some effect on this ideological pole, and there has been less change than in the case of the radical right, where there was no interaction at all at the beginning, but has picked up as we approach the present day. One could argue that the new politics dimension affects each ideological pole differently: The radical right is ever more influenced by cultural/ideational considerations, while economic arguments are more resilient among the radical left.

Finally, when considering the likelihood of voting for the radical right against the reference category of radical left voting, the total effect seems to be that over time, the new politics dimension has an ever-bigger influence over the odds of voting for the radical right as opposed to the radical left. This tells us that at least to a certain degree, the cultural/new politics dimension was less significant in the past in determining radical party choice than it is today. Undoubtedly, the cleavage between the progressive pole and the conservative one is growing and will impact European politics ever more as the sides dig in for the struggle over globalisation and social change.

Figure 11

Effect of the new politics dimension on radical right voting over time




Figure 12

Effect of the new politics dimension on radical left voting over time





Figure 13

Effect of the new politics dimension on the likelihood of voting for the radical right (1 on the dependent variable) and the radical left (0 on the dv) over time



5. Conclusion and Discussion

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the determinants of the rise of radical and fringe parties over the past two decades by addressing and elaborating upon past empirical endeavours. Thus, the paper contributes both to current academic debates in the field of electoral populism as well as to a better understanding among policy insiders and experts.

Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012) showed the importance of a new political cleavage, which they titled “integration-demarcation” to describe the cleavage between those supportive of immigration and those opposed to it, wishing to restrict economic, cultural, and political exchanges between countries. The crux of their hypothesis is that opposition and support for globalisation has become the main dimension of political competition, to the point of dislodging the traditional redistributive cleavage (left versus right) as the main one in western European polities.

This paper contributes to the academic dialogue in several ways. First, it provides evidence that it is more than mere globalisation that is driving the new cleavage. While factors such as attitudes towards immigration do factor into the cultural divide, it is about more than just that. It is more sensible to speak of a ‘new politics’ dimension that pits progressive views on immigration, gay rights, environmental policies, and socially liberal attitudes on one end against nationalism, traditionalism, cultural conservatism (apprehension about the erosion of rules and traditions), and support of the strong state at the other end. This is more in line with Hooghe and Marks’s postfunctionalist research agenda, which discussed such a potential change in European politics, arguing that politics in Europe, especially pertaining to regional integration, is entering a new ideational phase, wherein ‘hard’ factors such as economic concerns matter ever less.

Second, it aims to show a more nuanced picture of radical voterships. One earlier strand of work attempted to show how attitudes towards immigration or nationalism can influence radical and fringe party support (Rydgren, 2007). More recently, a wave of research has sought to explore more fundamental, underlying, or individual-level factors in their influence over ballot box behaviour (Bakker et al., 2016; Rooduijn, 2017; Rooduijn et al., 2017). While it has been proposed that radical right and radical left voters deep down reflect the underlying philosophies of their parties’ ideological poles (altruism v. egoism), this paper seeks to elaborate upon existing models by combining the insights of the various past approaches. It is shown here that while individual level egoistic and altruistic values level do impact radical voters choices of fringe parties, attitudes towards immigration can strongly mediate that effect.

What this study seeks to do is to provide further nuance to the votership picture that the academic state of the art is describing (Rooduijn, 2017; Van Elsas, 2017) by showing that traditional economic (distributive) and soft ideational (cultural) factors can and do interact and mediate each other’s effects on radical vote propensity. Using data from the ESS gathered over the past two decades, this paper explores what distinguishes mainstream voters from radical voters, and radical left voters from radical right voters. It is showed here that while the ‘baseline’ effect of altruistic,

redistributive values is one of increasing support for the radical left and diminishing support for the radical right, these can have the opposite effect when we account for anti-immigrant attitudes. The paper speaks to studies that address the distinction and variation among what many may refer to as ‘radical’ voters, or voters of populist parties. Radical right and radical left voters are indeed influenced by the underlying philosophies of their ideologies (Rooduijn et al., 2017), but the relationship is not absolute. Ideational and personal factors mediate their effect as was shown here.

There is scant evidence that relative attachment to the one’s home country and the EU influences the likelihood of voting for the far right. It is nonetheless possible for the national and EU attachment indicators to be bad proxies for exclusive and inclusive identity traits, since they do not ask individuals to what degree they identify themselves as members of their home nations or as Europeans, but just how attached they are to these entities. Moreover, there small sample, given that only the latest wave of the European Social Survey included that question.

Most important, the cultural/new politics dimension (GAL–TAN) was found to be the strongest predictor of radical right and radical left voting, above and beyond the traditional ‘redistributive’ and ‘egalitarian’ factors traditionally ascribed to ideological voting. The fact that the progressive–conservative indicator was so strong could be a hint of a bigger shift in Western European politics. Ever since Hooghe, Marks and Wilson’s seminal work (2002) that brought a new level of attention to the non-economic aspects of opposition to European integration, the academic discussion on the evolution of western Europe’s political landscape has sought to address the importance of the ‘vertical’ dimension. The evidence presented by this paper speaks directly to that debate by showing how the non-economic cleavage affects the electoral struggle. As the ‘vertical’ issues grow in importance for voters, they will pay ever more attention to how parties position themselves on these non-economic dimensions and issues and vote accordingly.

Having discussed the scholarly ramifications of the findings, it may be worthwhile to present a few implications that this evidence can have for decision makers and policy experts in western Europe. These are interrelated, and revolve around three points: the need to distinguish between different—even competing—‘flavors’ of populism; the potential ‘paradigm shift’ of political cleavages as we move from the ‘distributional’ (left versus right) classical cleavage to a more ideational/cultural one (pitting progressives against more traditional conservative outlooks); and the electoral strength of welfare chauvinism and latent political potential that lies in countering it with renewed attention towards social policy.

5.1 Moving beyond left versus right

Policymakers and political leaders in liberal democracies must take note of the paradigm shift that is taking place around them. Political competitions are increasingly determined not only by economic, but also non-economic questions pertaining to globalisation, immigration, attitudes towards minorities, and so on. Cas Mudde’s ‘populist zeitgeist’ and Mark Franklin and Cees van der Eijk’s ‘sleeping giant’ theses—used as a metaphor for the growing importance of Euroscepticism as a

political force at the turn of the millennium—have postulated the idea of a ‘reset’ and ‘shift’ in Western politics going forward in the new century. Hooghe and Marks’ postfunctionalist theory on European integration is another move in the same line of thinking: that ideational arguments and factors are beginning to replace ‘hard’, economic, and functionalist factors as determinants of the political contest.

In the past few years, one often gained the impression that political activity in Europe and the West were imbued with a light neo-Huntingonian feel of inter-Western civilisational clash, wherein political figures denounce liberal democracy and take up the standard of ‘conservative’ democracy while emphasising the Christian and conservative values on which Europe was founded. Time and again, far right political actors in Europe emphasise such ‘Christian’ traditional and conservative values and appeal to these in political discourse as arguments against issues such as immigration and gay rights. The conflicts between those supporting immigration and welcoming refugees in train stations throughout Europe and those opposing such actions and the rise of groups like PEGIDA and ANTIFA speak to this shift in political paradigm.

This ‘cultural’ dimension is used as a political battleground whenever conservatives rejoice at ‘liberal tears’. It is played out on when the ever more numerous ‘Red-Pillers’, right-wing outlets, or members of PEGIDA decry ‘cultural Marxism’ in Europe. On the left, words such as ‘fascist’ and ‘Nazi’ are overused as critique of the right’s advocacy for traditions, exclusion, quasi-authoritarianism, and preference of personalised strong-man populism.

It is not only the rise of radical left and radical right parties that describe the above mentioned paradigm change, but also the rise of more moderate progressive parties that contribute to this new political landscape. ‘Radical centrist’ political actors (such as Emmanuel Macron’s En Marche in France and Ciudadanos in Spain) contribute to the diminishing political capital of the traditional political centre. In France’s most recent presidential elections, after a close four-way first round race (wherein only one of the top four contenders represented one of the traditional centre parties), the second round came down to a bout between Front National’s Marine Le Pen and En Marche’s Emmanuel Macron. While such parties are essentially centrist from an economic point of view, they contribute to the revolution of the political landscape by sapping the strength of traditional catch-all (Kirchheimer, 1966) parties.

Parties such as En Marche in France, Ciudadanos in Spain, and the Feminist Initiative in Sweden represent, together with environmental and left-wing parties, the ‘progressive’ pole of the political spectrum. A large part of their pitch is the pro-European orientation and transnational outlook. In Germany, the Greens recently scored their second-best electoral result ever, and, in a recent vote-intention poll conducted in Germany on 11 August 2018, overtook the right wing AfD as the party with the third most support (German Vote Intention Poll, 2019).

It is hard to believe that all of these new (even if potentially temporary) supporters are motivated by environmental concerns or anti-systemic voting. It is very plausible that such support is also as a result of a more centrist, social-liberal, pro-European constituency that feels alienated by the power-sharing cartel of the major parties, but is uneasy with the more radical economic positions of far left parties such as Linke.

These trends indicate that there may be a shift taking place in European politics, whereby we are moving past the left versus right division into an era characterised by political contest between progressive and communitarian politics. Such changes can spill over into other aspects of electoral politics such as relative party positions and strengths. Not only can such changes affect what motivates voters in opting for far right or left parties, but also they can lead to a re-arrangement of the balance of power of the political party scene. While recent years have seen a surge in support for radical right parties, and in some countries for the radical left, this has often been accompanied by an electoral improvement of new centrist parties, or established ones such as the green parties, at the cost of centre left and centre right parties. This too points to the prospect of politics no longer being about ‘who gets what’, but about the more fundamental questions facing western Europe’s politics. Mainstream actors and parties must adapt to this shift in the salience of policy dimensions and cleavages by addressing it in their outreach to the public. They must avoid being overtaken by radical right, radical left, and radical centrist movements, as these compete over the ‘new-politics’/cultural cleavage.

Political parties must not generalise about populist actors and their voters as if they were all some monolithic part of the electorate with common traits or interests.

5.2 The varying and competing flavours of populism

Cas Mudde, one of the foremost academic authorities on populist politics, has drawn attention to the perils of treating populism as a pathology or outlier which can be merely ‘waited out’ until rosier times (Mudde, 2016). The same author draws attention to the fact that populism can be thought of as a ‘hollow’ ideology. It can be adapted to suit either the left or the right and progressive as well as regressive discourse. Populism has become an abused, catch-all term to talk about anti-system or radical parties as ready-made explanations for political developments near and far. It is important to be aware of the differences between parties to which we attribute designations such as radical or populist. It is equally erroneous to talk about such a thing as the generic ‘populist voter’ as it is to talk about the ‘generic populist’ or ‘generic fringe’ party.

It is important to distinguish and identify the different orientations of populist and radical movements currently inhabiting the Western political space. Political parties must not generalise about populist actors and their voters as if they were all some monolithic part of the electorate with common traits or interests. On the contrary, different populist and radical parties (and their

voters) can have opposing policy preferences and orientations, especially in light of the opposition between progressive and culturally conservative policy entrepreneurs (as is shown by the strength of the GAL–TAN predictor in the analytical sections above).

Thus, policymakers must pick their battles, since the defecting voters from the political centre have deemed the centrist establishment both too progressive and not progressive enough. Both the hard-line progressives and the radical right have become ever more vocal over the past decade. The major parties that still dominate the political scene must choose which populist constituency (i.e. would-be defectors) they would be willing to forgo in the formulation of new policy meant to win back some defecting voters. Such problems were exemplified in the struggle to find a proper balance regarding the intake of refugees: Set up too open a regime and it risks alienating the conservative and nationalist elements of the electorate who are then attracted to the radical right; Set up too rigid a policy framework (or one that bends too much towards deportation) and it risks raising the ire of those bent on supporting refugees and immigrants. The implication is that there may not be a ‘one size fits all’ approach that can tackle this question, of winning back voters that have defected to fringe parties. The political centre may face some tough choices in the formulation of future policy positions in terms of how to please certain defectors while maintaining its loyal voters.

5.3 Roll back welfare-state erosion... and the arsenal of populist parties

Last but not least, policy- and decision-makers in Western liberal democracies must try to address the growing inequalities and stresses that have come hand in hand with globalisation.

To do this, they need to halt the erosion of the welfare state. While nurturing the welfare state can be seen as an intrinsic good, it also carries enormous instrumental value given the multi-directional political assault on the major centrist parties.

The ‘losers of globalisation’ is a phrase used to depict those individuals (blue collar workers, the working class and lower classes, unskilled persons) in the West who have been most exposed to the negative consequences of globalisation. They face competition from cheap labour (either as a result of outsourced production or direct, wage-depressing labour competition through immigration), and are less able to take advantage of its upsides than their more-skilled and mobile peers (Kriesi et al., 2008; Teney et al., 2014). While the ‘culture war’ has a stronger impact on radical right voting, debates about the distribution of resources (i.e. the old left versus right question) have been more pronounced on the left. The left still appeals to the lower and working classes despite the growing proletarianization of the radical right, precisely because many voters have been alienated from the political centre by the failure of neoliberal policies to deliver the hoped-for outputs in terms of economic security and prosperity. The radical left has rallied against globalisation partly because they see it as a driver of the roll-back of the welfare state, and such policy positions appeal to those hardest hit by globalisation. If mainstream parties could re-formulate their policy in such a way as to appeal to those most apprehensive about the economic future—those most in danger of

economic precarity—they would greatly undercut the arsenal of populist parties of various shades. The importance of welfare chauvinism for the growing support of populist discourse, and the readiness of voters to support parties that promise radical social and economic reforms merits emphasis. The implication is that since welfare desires form one half of welfare chauvinism, mainstream parties could fight not only the radical left, but to a degree perhaps also the radical right.

It has lately been argued that right wing populists are “winning the losers, but losing the winners” of globalisation (Harteveld, 2016). By moving left on the economic scale and pursuing a discourse of welfare chauvinism, the radical and populist right enjoys ever more support among the working and lower classes. At the same time, its support among the more affluent segments of society, as well as the better educated constituencies (the so-called ‘elites’), has been declining.

Unlike the 1980s and 90s, when many radical right parties promoted communitarianism and nationalist policy positions in combination with low-tax, pro-capitalist positions, the past two decades have seen such parties move to the left on economic questions, positioning themselves as the protectors of social policy. Up until the turn of the millennium, the left and right faced globalisation challenges in opposite ways. “Socialist and communist parties have historically pursued policies of economic protectionism while adopting more inclusive social and cultural policies, whereas right wing parties have traditionally promoted market liberalisation, welfare state-retrenchment, and cultural protectionism” (Marks and Wilson, 2000). This leftward move was made to take advantage of a so called ‘empty policy space’—the quadrant of protectionist economic and social policy and communitarian and chauvinistic cultural stance. That strategic move placed at their disposal significant political capital, which has been put to effective use in Western polities (Spies, 2013). Such tactical moves have contributed, however, to the abandonment of such parties by the more well off voters (highly skilled, internationally mobile individuals) and coincided with a growing preference for progressive policies among the better educated part of the radical votership.

*Policymakers and political leaders
must take note of the paradigm shift
taking place around them.*

The strategic move by radical (right) parties to capture part of the proletarian vote has given them a set of electoral advantages which has already materialised. This has, however, also left them vulnerable to a potential re-emphasis of social policy by social-democratic and socialist parties. If social democrats can halt the invasion of the welfare state and existing social policy structures aimed at helping the ‘losers of globalisation’, it could provide a strong blow to the political policy space available to populist actors.

That is, of course, no easy task—especially in this day and age of tight fiscal landscapes and golden straightjackets of policy. Nevertheless, elites, decision makers, and policymakers must attempt to reverse the trend by stepping outside the dominant paradigm of austerity and dedicating some time and thought to the welfare state and social protection systems that for so long underpinned

prosperity and social cohesion in western Europe. This need not only mean throwing money at the more vulnerable and precarious of individuals and families in the form of wealth transfers, but also better attempts at increasing the 'employability' of said individuals. This can be done through enhanced re-training and skill updating along with a reformulation (and implementation) of credible social policies. If successful, this approach could bring Europe and the West back from the brink of democracy erosion and growing polarisation. In our era of unfettered globalisation that is perhaps, to quote the late Lord Dahrendorf, one of the great quandaries of modern politics.

5.4 Stay ahead of the game

Mainstream and moderate parties must avoid a do-nothing approach to the trend of rising populism. Mainstream parties may wish to avoid further alienating constituencies by taking clear positions on the vertical dimension of political competition that banks on the belief that once the populist wave recedes, things will go back to the classic situation of economic and distributive–redistributive politics. This is unlikely, especially in light of the growing salience of cultural cleavages in which populist parties of various shades and new radical centrist parties put post-materialist, communitarian, and chauvinistic values at the top of the agenda. In order to avoid being overtaken by the growing competition along the new political dimension, the major traditional parties must campaign and reach out to their voters along the cultural and post-materialist dimension as well, lest they add fuel to the perception of their being out of touch and fossilised.

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Appendix

Table 1 Complete

VARIABLES	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model
Egalitarianism	0.19*** (0.023)	0.39*** (0.056)	0.19*** (0.023)	-0.25*** (0.036)	-0.32 (0.191)	-0.25*** (0.035)
Altruism	0.20*** (0.055)	0.09* (0.036)	0.09** (0.036)	0.38*** (0.095)	-0.04 (0.035)	-0.04 (0.035)
Gov. Redistrib.	0.54*** (0.044)	0.54*** (0.044)	0.52*** (0.080)	0.04 (0.031)	0.04 (0.032)	0.21 (0.113)
Education	0.08*** (0.022)	0.08*** (0.022)	0.08*** (0.022)	-0.14*** (0.031)	-0.14*** (0.031)	-0.14*** (0.030)
Subjective income	-0.24*** (0.039)	-0.24*** (0.039)	-0.24*** (0.039)	-0.13* (0.063)	-0.13* (0.063)	-0.13* (0.062)
Unemployment	0.09 (0.110)	0.09 (0.111)	0.09 (0.109)	0.37 (0.254)	0.38 (0.249)	0.38 (0.249)
Immigrant threat perception	0.04 (0.046)	0.14** (0.054)	-0.11 (0.065)	0.76*** (0.078)	0.42*** (0.108)	0.57*** (0.076)
Religion	-0.20*** (0.021)	-0.20*** (0.021)	-0.20*** (0.021)	-0.06*** (0.012)	-0.06*** (0.012)	-0.06*** (0.012)
Age	-0.00 (0.003)	-0.00 (0.003)	-0.00 (0.003)	-0.03*** (0.003)	-0.03*** (0.003)	-0.03*** (0.003)
Rural v. urban	0.17*** (0.051)	0.17*** (0.051)	0.17*** (0.051)	-0.16 (0.083)	-0.16 (0.083)	-0.15 (0.082)
Gender	-0.08 (0.060)	-0.09 (0.060)	-0.09 (0.061)	-0.44*** (0.091)	-0.43*** (0.090)	-0.43*** (0.090)
Economic satisfaction	0.12*** (0.013)	0.12*** (0.013)	0.12*** (0.013)	0.05** (0.018)	0.05** (0.017)	0.05** (0.018)
Political trust	0.01 (0.013)	0.01 (0.013)	0.01 (0.013)	0.02 (0.016)	0.02 (0.016)	0.02 (0.016)
Preference for strong government.	-0.14*** (0.028)	-0.14*** (0.028)	-0.14*** (0.028)	0.13*** (0.036)	0.13*** (0.035)	0.13*** (0.035)
2. Class2	-0.08 (0.080)	-0.08 (0.081)	-0.08 (0.081)	-0.03 (0.121)	-0.04 (0.121)	-0.04 (0.120)
3. Class2	-0.44*** (0.093)	-0.44*** (0.092)	-0.44*** (0.094)	-0.38** (0.132)	-0.38** (0.131)	-0.38** (0.131)
4. Class2	-0.23* (0.102)	-0.23* (0.103)	-0.23* (0.103)	-0.13 (0.097)	-0.13 (0.096)	-0.13 (0.096)
5. Class2	-0.20* (0.088)	-0.20* (0.090)	-0.20* (0.090)	-0.31*** (0.076)	-0.32*** (0.075)	-0.32*** (0.075)

6. Class2	-0.30* (0.131)	-0.30* (0.133)	-0.30* (0.132)	-0.64*** (0.104)	-0.64*** (0.106)	-0.65*** (0.104)
2. Year	0.24 (0.158)	0.24 (0.156)	0.24 (0.158)	-0.44 (0.468)	-0.42 (0.469)	-0.43 (0.469)
3. Year	0.46** (0.156)	0.46** (0.154)	0.46** (0.155)	-0.05 (0.350)	-0.04 (0.350)	-0.04 (0.350)
4. Year	0.41** (0.142)	0.42** (0.140)	0.41** (0.141)	-0.51 (0.409)	-0.49 (0.407)	-0.50 (0.409)
5. Year	0.51** (0.196)	0.51** (0.195)	0.51** (0.196)	-0.00 (0.432)	0.01 (0.432)	0.01 (0.434)
6. Year	0.32* (0.144)	0.32* (0.143)	0.31* (0.145)	0.46 (0.361)	0.48 (0.361)	0.47 (0.361)
7. Year	0.64*** (0.149)	0.63*** (0.147)	0.64*** (0.149)	0.62 (0.394)	0.63 (0.397)	0.63 (0.396)
7. Country	0.47*** (0.096)	0.47*** (0.097)	0.47*** (0.096)	-2.14*** (0.284)	-2.12*** (0.283)	-2.12*** (0.285)
8. Country	1.83*** (0.107)	1.83*** (0.108)	1.83*** (0.107)	0.58 (0.312)	0.59 (0.311)	0.61 (0.316)
10. Country	-0.01 (0.148)	-0.00 (0.149)	-0.01 (0.148)			
11. Country	0.91*** (0.147)	0.92*** (0.150)	0.91*** (0.148)	1.37*** (0.320)	1.37*** (0.324)	1.36*** (0.324)
12. Country	0.03 (0.083)	0.04 (0.083)	0.03 (0.082)	-0.18 (0.290)	-0.17 (0.291)	-0.17 (0.291)
13o. Country	-	-	-			
14. Country	1.02*** (0.183)	1.04*** (0.187)	1.00*** (0.187)	-1.77*** (0.331)	-1.79*** (0.328)	-1.76*** (0.329)
17. Country	0.82** (0.299)	0.82** (0.300)	0.82** (0.298)			
21. Country	1.42*** (0.120)	1.43*** (0.121)	1.42*** (0.120)	0.62 (0.359)	0.62 (0.361)	0.63 (0.361)
24. Country	0.22 (0.292)	0.23 (0.293)	0.22 (0.292)			
26o. Country	-	-	-			
Immigrant threat perception # Altruism	-0.02** (0.009)			-0.06*** (0.014)		
Immigrant threat perception # Egalitarianism		-0.04*** (0.010)			0.01 (0.025)	

Immigrant threat perception # Government Redistribution			0.01 (0.016)			-0.03 (0.019)
10o. Country				-	-	-
13. Country				-0.84* (0.359)	-0.84* (0.358)	-0.85* (0.361)
17o. Country				-	-	-
24o. Country				-	-	-
26. Country				-0.29 (0.296)	-0.27 (0.296)	-0.27 (0.297)
Constant	-6.05*** (0.525)	-6.56*** (0.561)	-5.38*** (0.443)	-3.65*** (0.699)	-1.39 (0.899)	-2.36*** (0.531)
Observations	36,556	36,556	36,556	32,356	32,356	32,356
Pseudo R-squared	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.29	0.29	0.29

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 1B (Left v Right)

VARIABLES	(1) Rad Right Vs Rad Left	(2) Rad Right Vs Rad Left	(3) Rad Right Vs Rad Left
Egalitarianism	-0.45*** (0.053)	-0.55** (0.194)	-0.44*** (0.055)
Altruism	0.23 (0.175)	-0.01 (0.059)	-0.00 (0.058)
Government redistribution	-0.38*** (0.063)	-0.38*** (0.064)	-0.10 (0.191)
Education	-0.24*** (0.045)	-0.24*** (0.045)	-0.24*** (0.044)
Subjective income	0.11 (0.119)	0.11 (0.121)	0.11 (0.120)
Unemployment	0.58** (0.211)	0.58** (0.210)	0.60** (0.206)
Immigrant threat perception	0.74*** (0.134)	0.47*** (0.132)	0.78*** (0.144)
Religion	0.06** (0.019)	0.06** (0.019)	0.06** (0.020)
Age	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.004)

Rural v. urban	-0.38* (0.162)	-0.38* (0.160)	-0.38* (0.157)
Gender	-0.53*** (0.128)	-0.53*** (0.126)	-0.53*** (0.126)
Economic satisfaction	-0.03 (0.030)	-0.03 (0.030)	-0.03 (0.030)
Political trust	0.01 (0.030)	0.01 (0.031)	0.01 (0.031)
Preference for strong government.	0.27*** (0.054)	0.27*** (0.053)	0.27*** (0.054)
2. Class2	0.15 (0.247)	0.15 (0.240)	0.14 (0.245)
3. Class2	0.38 (0.285)	0.38 (0.287)	0.35 (0.293)
4. Class2	0.42* (0.185)	0.42* (0.184)	0.40* (0.185)
5. Class2	0.06 (0.176)	0.07 (0.170)	0.05 (0.174)
6. Class2	-0.07 (0.219)	-0.07 (0.219)	-0.07 (0.224)
2. Year	-0.89* (0.377)	-0.88* (0.382)	-0.91* (0.376)
3. Year	-0.67* (0.321)	-0.67* (0.325)	-0.67* (0.326)
4. Year	-1.20** (0.428)	-1.20** (0.432)	-1.20** (0.431)
5. Year	-0.89* (0.399)	-0.89* (0.402)	-0.89* (0.401)
6. Year	0.08 (0.498)	0.09 (0.500)	0.07 (0.502)
7. Year	-0.15 (0.362)	-0.16 (0.366)	-0.16 (0.365)
7. Country	-2.72*** (0.371)	-2.73*** (0.372)	-2.71*** (0.362)
8. Country	-0.71 (0.368)	-0.72 (0.372)	-0.69 (0.362)
10o. Country	-	-	-
11. Country	0.53 (0.301)	0.51 (0.299)	0.51 (0.289)
12. Country	-0.58 (0.347)	-0.61 (0.359)	-0.57 (0.346)
13o. Country	-	-	-

14. Country	-2.47*** (0.337)	-2.53*** (0.339)	-2.48*** (0.327)
17o. Country	-	-	-
21. Country	-0.73 (0.380)	-0.76 (0.386)	-0.72 (0.369)
24o. Country	-	-	-
26o. Country	-	-	-
Immigrant threat perception # altruism	-0.04 (0.026)		
Immigrant threat perception # egalitarianism		0.02 (0.030)	
Immigrant threat perception # Government Redistribution			-0.05 (0.038)
Constant	1.57 (1.280)	3.25** (1.185)	1.51 (0.801)
Observations	5,128	5,128	5,128
Pseudo R-squared	0.43	0.43	0.43

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 2 Complete

VARIABLES	(1) Radical Right v. mainstream	(2) Radical Left v. mainstream	(3) Radical Right v. Radical left
Attachement difference	-0.09*** (0.027)	0.00 (0.023)	-0.04 (0.037)
Immigrant threat perception	0.37*** (0.041)	-0.16*** (0.022)	0.58*** (0.049)
Education	-0.10** (0.037)	0.06 (0.092)	-0.23 (0.129)
Egalitarianism	-0.14*** (0.034)	0.19*** (0.047)	-0.40*** (0.102)
Altruism	-0.05* (0.025)	0.04 (0.040)	-0.16 (0.088)
Government redistribution	0.02 (0.023)	0.47*** (0.086)	-0.41*** (0.030)
Religion	-0.04 (0.043)	-0.13*** (0.020)	0.16*** (0.025)

Age	-0.01*** (0.002)	0.00 (0.004)	-0.00 (0.009)
Urban v. rural	0.04 (0.073)	0.32* (0.136)	-0.22 (0.189)
Gender	-0.36** (0.116)	-0.27*** (0.075)	-0.17 (0.162)
2.Work relation/status	-0.09 (0.332)	0.71* (0.278)	-0.11 (1.005)
3.Work relation/status	0.10 (0.586)	-2.01 (1.205)	
4.Work relation/status	-0.32*** (0.090)	0.56* (0.249)	0.32 (0.613)
5.Work relation/status	-0.23 (0.252)	-0.62 (1.245)	1.92 (1.048)
6.Work relation/status	-0.18* (0.092)	0.71*** (0.185)	-0.40 (0.411)
Subjective income	-0.05 (0.075)	-0.27** (0.093)	0.05 (0.053)
Unemployment	0.48 (0.603)	0.39* (0.189)	-0.94 (0.684)
o.Immigrant threat perception		-	-
Economic satisfaction	0.03 (0.027)	0.08*** (0.016)	0.00 (0.028)
Political trust	0.21*** (0.038)	0.21** (0.064)	0.05 (0.060)
2. Country	-1.94*** (0.029)	1.49*** (0.115)	-3.45*** (0.130)
3. Country	-1.60*** (0.050)	2.25*** (0.043)	-3.34*** (0.211)
4. Country	0.65*** (0.121)	1.98*** (0.048)	-0.66*** (0.096)
5. Country	-0.32*** (0.068)	1.72*** (0.160)	-2.26*** (0.130)
6o. Country		-	-
7. Country		0.09 (0.086)	
8. Country	-0.08 (0.081)	3.09*** (0.074)	-2.84*** (0.106)
9. Country	-0.20 (0.108)	2.27*** (0.052)	-1.67*** (0.134)
8o. Year	-	-	-

6. Country	-0.66*** (0.105)		
7o. Country	-		-
3o.Work relation/ status			-
Constant	-2.83*** (0.248)	-7.98*** (1.023)	3.63** (1.259)
Observations	10,023	10,380	1,349
Pseudo R-squared	0.25	0.13	0.43

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 3 Complete

VARIABLES	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6) Model
GAL-TAN	3.22*** (0.354)	-4.46*** (0.795)	5.34*** (0.622)	-0.72 (0.592)	-7.32*** (1.795)	2.02 (2.297)
Education	-0.13*** (0.030)	0.05 (0.031)	-0.12** (0.045)	-0.13*** (0.030)	0.05 (0.030)	-0.13** (0.044)
Egalitarianism	-0.22*** (0.034)	0.12*** (0.034)	-0.31*** (0.071)	-0.22*** (0.034)	0.12*** (0.036)	-0.31*** (0.072)
Altruism	0.01 (0.025)	-0.06* (0.028)	0.07 (0.049)	0.01 (0.024)	-0.06* (0.029)	0.07 (0.048)
Government redistribution	-0.08 (0.040)	0.22*** (0.035)	-0.27*** (0.048)	-0.08 (0.040)	0.22*** (0.036)	-0.27*** (0.047)
Religion	-0.06*** (0.014)	0.01 (0.023)	-0.03 (0.023)	-0.06*** (0.014)	0.00 (0.023)	-0.03 (0.023)
Age	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.01 (0.004)	-0.01* (0.005)	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.01 (0.004)	-0.01* (0.005)
Urban	-0.07 (0.063)	0.07 (0.055)	-0.15 (0.100)	-0.07 (0.064)	0.07 (0.055)	-0.16 (0.100)
Gender	-0.28*** (0.046)	0.05 (0.077)	-0.28*** (0.073)	-0.28*** (0.048)	0.05 (0.077)	-0.28*** (0.074)
2.Work relation/ status	-0.19 (0.152)	0.36*** (0.109)	-0.67** (0.240)	-0.19 (0.151)	0.36*** (0.108)	-0.66** (0.240)
3.Work relation/ status	-0.51 (0.296)	-0.50 (0.443)	0.71 (0.709)	-0.54 (0.300)	-0.54 (0.441)	0.69 (0.698)
4.Work relation/ status	-0.16* (0.076)	0.08 (0.149)	-0.50* (0.200)	-0.17* (0.076)	0.08 (0.149)	-0.48* (0.196)
5.Work relation/ status	-0.15 (0.220)	0.07 (0.194)	-0.14 (0.394)	-0.16 (0.219)	0.06 (0.195)	-0.12 (0.399)

6.Work relation/ status	-0.19* (0.095)	0.27* (0.110)	-0.75*** (0.182)	-0.19* (0.094)	0.27* (0.111)	-0.73*** (0.180)
Subjective income	-0.11* (0.047)	-0.08 (0.041)	-0.09 (0.056)	-0.11* (0.046)	-0.08 (0.040)	-0.08 (0.057)
Unemployment	0.20 (0.179)	-0.23* (0.104)	0.31 (0.234)	0.21 (0.177)	-0.22* (0.108)	0.32 (0.235)
Economic satisfaction	0.02 (0.020)	0.02 (0.020)	0.01 (0.024)	0.02 (0.019)	0.02 (0.020)	0.01 (0.025)
Political trust	0.28*** (0.025)	0.08** (0.026)	0.16*** (0.037)	0.27*** (0.025)	0.07** (0.026)	0.16*** (0.038)
2. Country	-0.88** (0.288)	0.79* (0.309)	-1.59*** (0.463)	-0.81** (0.291)	0.85** (0.320)	-1.53*** (0.460)
3. Country	-2.14*** (0.227)	2.23*** (0.215)	-3.92*** (0.312)	-2.06*** (0.214)	2.30*** (0.226)	-3.92*** (0.300)
4. Country	0.58** (0.185)	3.53*** (0.457)	-2.59*** (0.394)	0.65*** (0.184)	3.57*** (0.462)	-2.55*** (0.389)
5. Country	-0.30** (0.114)	1.54*** (0.224)	-1.98*** (0.238)	-0.24* (0.108)	1.60*** (0.248)	-1.92*** (0.234)
6. Country	-1.24*** (0.249)			-1.18*** (0.246)		
7o. Country	-		-	-		-
8. Country	0.30 (0.235)	2.45*** (0.254)	-2.27*** (0.341)	0.39 (0.234)	2.54*** (0.260)	-2.20*** (0.334)
9. Country	-0.71*** (0.159)	1.67*** (0.191)	-2.25*** (0.229)	-0.62*** (0.162)	1.76*** (0.214)	-2.19*** (0.212)
10o. Country	-	-		-	-	
11o. Country	-	-		-	-	
12o. Country	-	-		-	-	
13o. Country	-	-		-	-	
14o. Country	-	-		-	-	
Year	0.08 (0.041)	-0.02 (0.028)	0.03 (0.057)	-0.25*** (0.059)	-0.23* (0.119)	-0.24 (0.170)
6o. Country		-	-		-	-
7. Country		2.83*** (0.392)			2.85*** (0.401)	
GAL-TAN#. Year				0.72*** (0.097)	0.59 (0.306)	0.64 (0.369)
Constant	-2.03*** (0.578)	-4.18*** (0.594)	3.30*** (0.712)	-0.32 (0.517)	-3.22*** (0.716)	4.68*** (1.190)
Observations	56,195	56,754	8,500	56,195	56,754	8,500
Pseudo R-squared	0.17	0.08	0.29	0.17	0.08	0.30

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 3b—includes opposition to immigration as a separate variable from GAL–TAN

VARIABLES	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model
GAL–TAN6	0.71** (0.249)	-3.63*** (0.710)	2.85*** (0.515)
Immigrant threat perception	-0.27*** (0.023)	0.10*** (0.019)	-0.28*** (0.035)
Education	-0.11*** (0.028)	0.05 (0.031)	-0.11* (0.044)
Egalitarianism	0.19*** (0.034)	-0.10** (0.032)	0.30*** (0.068)
Altruism	-0.01 (0.025)	0.06* (0.029)	-0.11* (0.051)
Government redistribution	0.07 (0.041)	-0.21*** (0.035)	0.27*** (0.044)
Religion	-0.04*** (0.014)	0.00 (0.024)	-0.02 (0.023)
Age	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.01 (0.004)	-0.01* (0.005)
Urban v rural	-0.04 (0.059)	0.09 (0.058)	-0.17 (0.100)
Gender	-0.33*** (0.045)	0.05 (0.076)	-0.30*** (0.070)
2.Work relation/status	-0.21 (0.155)	0.35*** (0.107)	-0.62** (0.240)
3.Work relation/status	-0.48 (0.310)	-0.54 (0.439)	0.65 (0.615)
4.Work relation/status	-0.18* (0.076)	0.08 (0.153)	-0.42* (0.197)
5.Work relation/status	-0.23 (0.237)	0.08 (0.195)	-0.13 (0.395)
6.Work relation/status	-0.22* (0.094)	0.27* (0.108)	-0.72*** (0.177)
Subjective income	-0.10* (0.045)	-0.07 (0.041)	-0.08 (0.055)
Unemployment	0.20 (0.182)	-0.21* (0.100)	0.24 (0.269)
Economic satisfaction	-0.01 (0.016)	0.03 (0.018)	-0.03 (0.019)
Political trust	0.22*** (0.023)	0.08** (0.028)	0.12** (0.037)

2. Country	-0.83** (0.281)	0.64* (0.323)	-1.49*** (0.424)
3. Country	-2.01*** (0.218)	2.05*** (0.140)	-3.77*** (0.287)
4. Country	0.86*** (0.255)	3.27*** (0.373)	-2.14*** (0.398)
5. Country	-0.22 (0.121)	1.37*** (0.160)	-1.88*** (0.179)
6. Country	-1.04*** (0.197)		
7o. Country	-		-
8. Country	0.45* (0.230)	2.29*** (0.199)	-1.98*** (0.272)
9. Country	-0.41*** (0.110)	1.34*** (0.235)	-1.85*** (0.166)
10o. Country	-	-	
11o. Country	-	-	
12o. Country	-	-	
13o. Country	-	-	
14o. Country	-	-	
2. Year	0.65 (0.425)	-0.26 (0.287)	1.40** (0.472)
3. Year	0.57 (0.422)	-0.24 (0.224)	1.25*** (0.246)
4. Year	0.49 (0.433)	-0.45 (0.337)	1.78*** (0.290)
5. Year	0.34 (0.424)	0.19 (0.222)	0.60* (0.245)
6. Year	0.41 (0.425)	0.20 (0.215)	0.72** (0.265)
7. Year	0.77 (0.432)	-0.20 (0.255)	1.07** (0.355)
8. Year	0.94* (0.416)	-0.44 (0.237)	1.25*** (0.266)
6o. Country		-	-
7. Country		2.50*** (0.339)	
Constant	-1.16* (0.557)	-3.53*** (0.429)	2.37*** (0.699)
Observations	55,634	56,171	8,418
Pseudo R-squared	0.20	0.09	0.33

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Variable Operationalisation

The first part of the analysis uses precisely the same data as Rooduijn et al. (2017), downloaded as a replication file available with the journal article. It is data from the European Social Survey waves 1–7.

The variables probing socio-demographic indicators (age, gender, urban v. rural residence, employment status) as well as those probing issues such as subjective income and level of personal religiosity, are taken from corresponding ESS data (variables *agea*, *gndr*, *domicil*, *rlgdgr*, *uempla*). Political trust is an aggregation of two variables (trust in country’s politicians and country’s parliament: *trustparl*, *trustpol*) The social class dummies are calculated by Rooduijn et al. on the basis of respondents’ employment categories. One difference from the study of Rooduijn et al. is that this present paper only uses data from western European countries (and Greece).

Indicator in Paper	ESS Variable
Age	<i>agea</i>
Gender	<i>gndr</i>
Urban v.rural residence	<i>domicil</i> (1-3 urban, 4-5 is rural)
Unemployment status	<i>uempla</i> (1 if unemployed, 0 else)
Religion	<i>rlgdgr</i>
Political trust	arithmetic mean of <i>trustparl</i> and <i>trustpol</i>
Subjective income level	<i>hincfel</i>
Immigrant threat perception	<i>Imbgeco</i> , <i>imueclt</i> , <i>imwbcnt</i> , normalized 0-10 so that 10 = anti migrant attitudes
Economic satisfaction	<i>stfecoc</i>
Egalitarianism	<i>ipeqopt</i>
Altruism	<i>iphlppl</i>
Government redistribution	<i>gincdif</i>
Work relation/status	6 Dummy variables on the basis of the 2 categories of <i>jbspv</i> and 3 categories of <i>emprrel</i>
GAL–TAN	Arithmetic mean with equal weighting of <i>impenv</i> <i>freehms</i> <i>ipstrgv</i> <i>imprtrad</i> <i>ipfrule</i> <i>ipudrs</i> <i>imwbcnt</i>
Preference for strong government (not included in Table 3 Models, since the variable is used to calculate GAL–TAN)	<i>ipstrgv</i>
Education	<i>eiscsed</i>

Variables gauging the normative-ideological stances of voters pertaining to altruism, egalitarianism, and support for government redistribution derive the data from ESS variables *iphlppl*, *ipeqopt*, and *gincdif* (“It is very important to her/him to help the people around her/him. S/he wants to care for their well-being”; “S/he thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated

equally. S/he believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life”; “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”). These variables are coded on 1-6 Likert scales (1-5 in the case of the latter).

The second analysis in this paper uses the eighth wave of the ESS. Thus, it is the first of two analyses (the other being the GAL–TAN based analysis in table 3) which use not the data replicated from Rooduijn et al., but the raw ESS Data coded to resemble Rooduijn et al.’s. Only one wave (ESS 8) is used as it is the only one that asks respondents about attachment to Europe and to their home country. The attachment difference variable is obtained by subtracting the value of national attachment (atctr) from European attachment (atcherp)


The other variables in this analysis derive their data from the same ESS variables as the first analysis. The only exceptions are the following: instead of Rooduijn et al.’s social class dummies, a similar variable is calculated which is based on the employment status and categories from the ESS (is the person self-employed, work for family business, does the person supervise other workers—emplrel and jbspv).

For the third set of analyses in the paper (oriented around the GAL–TAN dimension) the same points apply on operationalisation as above in the second analysis, with the addition of the GAL–TAN variable. It is generated as the arithmetic aggregation with equal weighting of seven variables (impenv, freehms, ipstrgv, imprad, ipfrule, ipudrs, and imwbcent), which were normalised on a 0–10 scale. The seven variables correspond to statements respondents agreed to: that it is important to care for the environment; that they support homosexual freedoms; that it is important to understand others; that it is important to follow traditions; that it is important to do what one is told and to follow rules; that it is important to have a strong government; and that immigrants make the country a worse place to live. High values on the first three variables contribute in an opposite (progressive) direction to the aggregation, so their scales were inverted.


For the analysis in table 3B (appendix) in which the immigration variable was taken as a separate variable, GAL–TAN was aggregated only using the first six variables, while the belief that immigrants make the country a worse place to live was introduced in the analysis separately. Instead of the aggregated anti-immigration variable from the first analyses, the models from table 3b (the third, GAL–TAN oriented analysis) control for immigration by including the ESS variable imwbcent, according to which immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live. This is done because the aggregation of the GAL–TAN includes imwbcent, so in the model that seeks to test for the effects of GAL–TAN when controlling for immigration attitudes, it makes sense to use that variable. For the analysis, the anti-immigration variable is pulled out of GAL–TAN and used as a separate predictor.

When comparing highly egalitarian voters with non-egalitarian ones directly via predictive margins, it is found that that the egalitarians’ probability of voting for the radical left decreases strongly and is no longer significantly different from non-egalitarians when they are also chauvinistic, similar to the case of altruists.

A similar analysis is performed wherein the dependent variable in the logistic regression is now the likelihood of voting for a radical left party (1) as opposed to a radical right party (0), rather than comparing each radical party to mainstream parties. This set of logistic regressions thus contain



fewer observations, since radical left voting is no longer compared to the larger base of mainstream voting, the reference category is radical right voting. Nevertheless, the results remain in tune with those observed in the previous section .



What happens when we consider the effect of such interactions on the probability of voting for the radical right? What we find is a somewhat confusing picture. The average marginal effects of ‘immigrant threat’ on the likelihood of choosing the radical right as opposed to a mainstream party at various levels of altruism, egalitarianism, and preference for government redistribution is such that the average effects are either insignificant (for the interaction with preferences for redistribution), or lead to a diminishing likelihood of casting a radical right vote for higher scores on these altruistic values, which paints a picture that is somewhat contradictory to the one presented above.

