ABSTRACT. This paper proposes to outline various theoretical approaches used to conceptualize peacekeeping operations (PKO) in International Relations Theory, and compare these general approaches with Indian and Chinese participation and practices. The analysis follows two main trajectories: 1) How is peacekeeping understood in Chinese and Indian conceptions of international relations? 2) How are peacekeeping operations operationalized and carried out? The article carries out a literature analysis additionally informed by a hundred interviews carried out by the authors with policy-makers, academics and military in China and India in 2012. There are several core findings of the comparative analysis: While China and India tend to differ at the level of their contributions, there is a commonality of the broad theoretical underpinnings of their participation. Westphalian principles of sovereignty and non-interference remain at the core of engagement for both these actors. At the same time, as demonstrated by Indian support for the UNAMA missions and Chinese voting behavior on Libyan and Syrian missions at the UNSC, both countries have become more pragmatic in their foreign policy approach to peacekeeping as future “responsible powers”. Chinese and Indian involvement in different types of missions which go beyond traditional peacekeeping thus point to a change in the international outlook and evolving foreign policy of both these countries, possibly in tandem with their rising global status and the need to utilize peacekeeping as a means of greater participation in the global governance system.

Keywords:
1. Introduction

India and China are among the largest countries contributing troops for United Nations peacekeeping in the world. In May 2013, India ranked third and China ranked sixteenth in terms of their current deployment of peacekeepers to United Nations missions (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2013c). While India has a much longer history, participating in the first UN Peacekeeping Mission (UNEF) in Egypt in 1965, China has increased its involvement, starting with the election monitoring UNTAG mission to Namibia in 1989. As traditional peacekeeping (such as ceasefire monitoring) has slowly evolved into more comprehensive peacebuilding even at the United Nations, the global community as well as these two emerging powers are facing the challenge of legitimizing their participation and redefining the role peacekeeping plays in their respective foreign policies. China and India are thus fast becoming “active contributors of public goods in international security” (Medcalf, 2012), meriting a more in-depth analysis and comparison of their individual approaches. This paper attempts to look at the theoretical frameworks that have been employed in order to analyze the relationship between peacekeeping and international relations in general, and in the Chinese and Indian discourses in particular.

Academic analysis of peacekeeping strategies has tended to focus either on problem solving and dealing with the challenges of operationalization, or on the evolution of peacekeeping as a concept from the 1990s onwards. The more specific works deal largely with how peacekeeping missions are structured and carried out in individual cases of conflict. However, relatively little academic attention has been focused on how peacekeeping is conceptualized within troop-contributing countries like India and China, and how these have evolved over time with their changing positions in world politics and stances of foreign policy. This paper is filling this gap by linking the various academic debates together. Theorizing peacekeeping is a relatively nascent field of international relations; the past decade has seen a proliferation of terms such as “first generation peacekeeping”, “peacemaking” or “multidimensional peacekeeping” which describe the various degrees of intervention and mandates of peace operations. In the following section we will therefore reduce some of the complexity by defining two key terms, namely peacekeeping and peacebuilding, for the purpose of this paper.

The term peacekeeping implies a multinational force, sometimes with a civilian component, mandated to administer, monitor or patrol areas of conflict in a neutral and impartial manner.¹ Most peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era are associated with and carried out under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, which allows “[t]he Security Council […] at
any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 [...] [to] recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment” (United Nations, 1945). Pugh (2004) argues that old-style peacekeeping tended to be represented by UN officials as part of an idealist or liberal internationalist framework where peacekeepers represent impartial or neutral parties in the conflict. As Fabian (1971) notes, they were often characterized by the phrase “Soldiers without enemies”. Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) have tended to become more comprehensive and have moved beyond cease-fire monitoring. Redefined under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN charter, these are now labeled as “multi-dimensional peacekeeping”, including missions such as “peace enforcement”, “second generation peacekeeping”, etc. The end of the Cold War and the humanitarian crises of the mid-1990s have also necessitated a new conceptual backing, coined “peacebuilding”.

Peacebuilding is a highly debated concept. There seem to be two points, however, on which scholars agree, namely that “peacebuilding addresses instate, rather than interstate conflicts and foreigners have a substantial role to play in the process” (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2006, p. 11). These outside interventions are to create a “sustainable peace”, which by definition implies a broader role for peacekeeping forces including addressing the root cause of the conflict and creating political and socio-economic stability. According to the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee, “peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels of conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives”. In practice it often takes the form of post-conflict interventions, and includes actions to “identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Thus, while peacekeeping prevents the resumption of conflict by monitoring ceasefires, etc., it does not address underlying causes of conflict in a comprehensive manner as peacebuilding does. This distinction will be valid for the rest of the paper, while in general the term ‘peace operations’ shall be used.

To identify what kind of theoretical frameworks have been relied on to analyze Indian and Chinese involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, we will first revisit the various schools and approaches used to understand peacekeeping in general. Sections 2 and 3 will look at domestic discourses in the case countries in the form of official documents and media debates as well as academic writings. Providing a background and status quo of the
analytical landscape in these two countries, it will help us situate the respective discourses within the broader attempts at formulating a theory for conceptualizing UN peacekeeping.

2. Peacekeeping Theory

Pugh (2004) traces the antecedents of peacekeeping and peace interventions to crisis management mechanisms developed in 19th century Europe, consolidated in the inter-war period as a means of dealing with conflicts emerging from self-determination struggles and decolonization. Citing the example of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the resulting local conflicts, he argues that “nineteenth century European capitalism provided the modern antecedents of peace support operations” (Pugh, 2004:42). For instance, the international plebiscite in Schleswig-Holstein (1920) and the military observation mission in Greece (1947-51) were sites of inter-governmental cooperation, multinational humanitarian missions that foreshadowed present day peace enforcement. Subsequent operations were a result of European imperial rule, and in fact the first occasion where UN peacekeepers were deployed was to supervise the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli troops from Egypt in 1956 – a conflict of imperial derivation as well.

UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld first institutionalized peacekeeping as an extension of UN diplomacy, in the first UNEF mission to Sinai in 1956. Together with former Canadian prime minister Lester Pearson, he articulated the key principles of peacekeeping at the time, namely “monitoring, consent, neutrality, nonuse of force, and unarmed peacekeeping” (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, p. 12; United Nations, 1990, pp. 5-7; Urquhart, 1987, p. 133). Also, while there are stark differences in these cases, the missions in Congo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor established the form of protectorate government associated with peacekeeping. Missions like those in Cyprus froze the legacies of empire and colonial rule. The Cold War, however, marked a decline in Western political and military interest in peacekeeping, and few states took peacekeeping seriously till the prospect of war between the different blocs and alliances was extinguished. Tracing history back to the antecedents in the European concert diplomacy and inter-state security, several theoretical frameworks can be applied to conceptualizing and analyzing peacekeeping operations, emphasizing the links between state and inter-governmental bodies like the UN that manage and organize the peacekeeping missions.

In research, however, little theoretical analysis of peacekeeping operations exist, with most writings post-WWII focusing on increasing mission efficiency and developing strategy, treating each peacekeeping
mission as a unique case, and focusing largely on the practice of peacekeeping rather than the theory. The key turning point for the practice of peacekeeping was the end of the Cold War and with it the end of bipolarity and clear alliances. The dramatic experiences in Rwanda and the increase in mandate for ordinary peacekeepers towards peacebuilding intensified academic attention. Towards the end of the 1990s, a shift took place in the analysis of international peacekeeping operations in the dominant Western academic circles. While before this most authors conceptualized peacekeeping as a form of conflict resolution, new approaches tried to embed the study into international relations and many argued that there was something inherently normative about peacekeeping missions. These will be discussed in the section below.

Conceptualizing theories of international peacekeeping

The systematic study of international peacekeeping has received a significant boost after the end of the Cold War. The following paragraphs will introduce the main theoretical approaches taken, starting from realist perspectives to the English school and finally critical theories that have dominated much of the new scholarship in the 21st Century.

"In the realist framework, peacekeeping enables governments of contributing states to increase their international clout or to subsidize the maintenance of armed forces" (Pugh, 2004, p. 50). As Pugh (2004: 51) argues, since peacekeeping emerged historically with the diplomatic intent to check dispute escalation caused by imperial powers within the realist/neorealist framework, the focus of interest in peacekeeping missions is not on crisis and operational performance (Pouligny, 2001). The crisis is often made subservient to domestic considerations, foreign policy agendas, and power distribution among elites. According to the neo-realist view, states use international institutions such as the UN framework as arenas for competition (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995, p. 10) and establish norms to reflect power and interest, and thus justify participation in peacekeeping missions under the UN framework (Yanacopulos & Hanlon, 2008, p. 53).

Elaborating on the kind of interests pursued by countries involved in peacekeeping operations, Wheeler (2002) argues under the assumptions of the English school theorists that states form an international society with rules and norms to constrain and legitimize action (Bull, 1977; Buzan, 2004; Dunne, 1998). Since the Cold War, the legitimacy of peacekeeping operations has shifted towards humanitarian claims (Orford, 2003, p. 2). Humanitarian outcomes of action are thus "as important as the motives, which may include economic and strategic goals" (Pugh, 2004, p. 51). One strand of English school theory used to explain peace operations is the solidarist case (Wheeler, 2002). In contrast to the pluralist interpretation
solidarists argue that it is the moral duty of states to express solidarity by acting against states which are perpetrators of massive rights violations, regardless of the legal criterion determining legitimate humanitarian intervention (Woodhouse & Ramsbotham, 2008). This strand has been reiterated by the UN Secretary General (Annan, 1999; Pugh, 2004, p. 51; Wheeler, 2002, pp. 12-13).

While after the end of the Cold War most analyses were “predicated on (neo-) liberal assumptions about the importance of norms, values, rules and institutions in international politics” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Bures, 2007, p. 422; Johansen, 1993; Langille, 2002), several authors have tried to apply rational choice theory and public good theory to peacekeeping (Bobrow & Boyer, 1997; Khanna, Sandler, & Shimizu, 1998; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002). Using rational choice theory, a peacekeeping contingent that positions itself between the warring parties creates something like a natural boundary, making it harder for one of the parties to win (Smith & Stam, 2003). While the idea has some theoretical appeal, in practice this perspective can only explain certain missions, such as UNEF II which initially monitored the ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli Forces (1973-1979), not, however, most of the contemporary missions, where peacekeeping entails much more than mere “physical interposition” (Bures, 2007, p. 423). Using public goods theory, in contrast, the focus lies on the nature of peacekeeping and its provision of public good benefits, which are “non-excludable” and “non-rival” (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002). However, while this theory does have a general appeal, benefits from peacekeeping operations are not solely public. Contributing countries also pursue their own agendas, as the ensuing spillover benefits and positive externalities cannot be measured (Bures, 2007, p. 423).

Laure Neack in 1995 looked at Cold War peacekeeping and found no traits supporting a liberal explanation for participation, where states engage in missions to protect international peace, norms and values. Instead, she found that states “participate in peacekeeping to serve their own interests” (Neack, 1995, p. 194). These are preservation of the status quo for Western states and claims to prestige for non-Western states. Bures rightly points out that a similar analysis would have to be applied to peacekeeping operations after the end of the Cold War to see if it still holds – for peacekeeping is no longer mainly undertaken by Western powers, there is a regional concentration of missions in Africa, and finally peacekeeping has moved more and more towards peacebuilding (Bures, 2007, p. 424). Her neo-realist critique is surprisingly compatible with later analyses by critical theorists (Debrix, 1999; Mendelson, 2005; Pugh, 2005; Whitworth, 2004).
The aforementioned approaches broadly belong to what Bellamy calls “problem-solving theories” that focus on the practice of peacekeeping and see peacekeeping as an objective answer to conflict. However, these theories – in contrast to critical theories – have three main shortcomings: i) instrumentalism, which overlooks the role politics play in the construction of peacekeeping operations, ii) objectivism, which ignores the framing of a peace agenda by the interveners, and iii) a non-reflexive approach to theory and practice, which leads theories to be unaware of their own biases and normative assumptions (A. J. Bellamy, 2004, p. 34). Picking up on the larger “interventionist vs. non-interventionist debate” in international relations circles, critical theories in contrast try to render normative foundations of operations and liberal ideologies explicit (A. Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010; Bures, 2007, p. 425; Chandler, 2004, 2002; Orford, 2003; Wheeler, 2002).

Francois Debrix was one of the first authors to conceptualize peacekeeping as a hegemonic enterprise; he writes: “Peacekeeping does not represent (disciplinary) liberal ideology. [...] It simulates it. Peacekeeping depicts a fantasy space or dream land of international relations (where peacekeeping operations are successful, governance is realized, etc.) inside which claims to neoliberalism on a global scale can be made” (Debrix, 1999, p. 216; Heathershaw, 2009, pp. 4-5). Richmond expands on this point, calling the results of many interventions a “virtual peace” which continues to be allowed as long as it is in neo-liberal democratic form, even “if it requires direct and indirect forms of governance to be taken over by outside actors like the UN or EU, agencies and NGOs” (Richmond, 2004, p. 96), citing conflict areas like Kosovo, Afghanistan and Bosnia as cases.

In the first decade of the 21st Century other western authors took up the criticism of implicit ideologies informing peacekeeping and, more controversially, peacebuilding. Michael Pugh called it the “New York Orthodoxy”, where peacebuilding operations are part of diffusing a neorealist framework that centers around arguments of liberal peace and a US dominated world order (A. J. Bellamy & Williams, 2004, p. 9; Pugh, 2004, 2005). Pugh sees peacebuilding to be a continuation of “dictating the pattern of economic transformation in societies emerging from conflict” (Pugh, 2005, p. 23) to achieve “liberal peace”, in line with the Washington Consensus (Mac Ginty, 2008; Paris, 1997, 2010). Richmond summarizes that “… the creation of the liberal peace requires an agreement on method, which can be found in a peacebuilding consensus framed by the notion of peace-as-governance”(Richmond, 2004, p. 92). One could link the shift towards a more critical approach towards UN Peacekeeping operations to the increased employment of peacebuilding rather than the traditional peacekeeping operations characteristic of the Cold War.
To extend contemporary analysis, therefore, Oldrich Bures makes a plea for developing a mid-range theory of international peacekeeping – linking the practice of peacekeeping with larger phenomena, such as the role of norms in international politics (Bures, 2007, p. 427). According to Bures, peacekeeping research has so far only focused on strategy and policy operationalisation, rather than linking the issue back to International Relations and International Politics. Instead, he suggests applying the theoretical framework around the “capabilities-expectations gap”, a term coined by Christopher Hill in his analysis of the EU’s international role (Hill, 1993), to the issue of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Bures, 2007, p. 432).

Normative Aspect of International Peacekeeping

Accepting the notion that peacekeeping operations do not take place in a norm vacuum, but rather all missions during and after the Cold War were informed by underlying assumptions about the nature of conflicts and peace, this paper will now turn to a more in-depth look at what kinds of norms are crucial to the academic discourse of international peacekeeping.

Bellamy et al. (2010) in their book Understanding Peacekeeping draw a distinction between two ideal types of engagement by global actors: the Westphalian and the post-Westphalian approaches. Norms embedded in a country’s attitude are generally characterized as leaning more to one or the other extreme along this spectrum. In traditional peacekeeping and the landmark document An Agenda for Peace, peacekeeping can only take place “with the consent of all parties”, clarifying the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. §20). This demonstrates a turning away from peace enforcement in the aftermath of the events in Srebrenica and Mogadishu in the early 1990s. Former Secretary-General of the UN Kofi Annan defined the concept of sovereignty to entail sovereign responsibility, that is, a government’s responsibility towards its people (the world’s “peoples” being the main signatories to the UN Charter), while at the same time cautioning against an unprincipled system of intervening (A. Bellamy et al., 2010, p. 38). Depending on where a country stands on the questions of sovereign responsibility and non-interference – both being part of the older concept of sovereignty – it would get involved in peacekeeping missions to differing degrees. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin developed a categorization plotting countries’ attitudes towards sovereign responsibility, non-interference, and inter-state and intra-state peace operations on two ends of a spectrum (2010, p. 36). The resulting two main ideal types labeled “Westphalian” and “Post-Westphalian” can be seen in the table below.
According to this matrix, countries with a stronger focus on non-interference would be less likely to get involved in missions that involve tasks exceeding traditional peacekeeping, in particular when they go against the host state’s consent. One might be able to observe such a situation in the case of Syria, where Russia and China opposed an intervention addressing the Assad regime in 2012. At the other end of the spectrum, the US seems to be following a post-Westphalian approach, although, for instance, the European Union’s main aims in peacekeeping operations of “Promotion of Security, Stability and Democratic Values” (Delegation of the European Commission to the USA, 2008) make it less of an extreme case, but still place it on the “Post-Westphalian” end of the spectrum. In general, however, EU missions do not violate the principle of non-interference, as some of the Union’s member states like Germany do not participate in missions that have not been sanctioned by the United Nations. The EU sees peacekeeping as part of a preventive defense policy. This change in attitude is a result of the experience of the Balkan wars – there was a realization that it is not enough to react, but that defense policy can also act preventively (while not necessarily pre-emptive). In addition, the EU policy can be seen in parallel to globally rising concerns about the humanitarian situation in some of the countries concerned, which has been pursued by the interventionist side of the spectrum also involving middle powers such as Canada, Australia and the Scandinavian countries.

Table 1 Westphalian and post-Westphalian approaches (A. Bellamy et al., 2010, p. 36)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Westphalian</th>
<th>Post-Westphalian</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sovereign responsibility</strong></td>
<td>Limited to relations with other states</td>
<td>Relations with other states and for treatment of citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-interference</strong></td>
<td>Absolute (more or less) right of sovereigns</td>
<td>Dependent on fulfilment of responsibilities to citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace operations (inter-state)</strong></td>
<td>Most frequent. Consensual activity designed to facilitate peaceful settlement of disputes between states</td>
<td>Less frequent. Usually designed to facilitate peaceful settlement of disputes between states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace operations (intra-state)</strong></td>
<td>Less frequent. Limited engagement to assist states deployed only at request of host state</td>
<td>Most frequent. Extensive engagement to facilitate or sometimes impose liberal democratic polities and economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key advocates</strong></td>
<td>China, India, Cuba, NAM</td>
<td>Western Europe, UN Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As pointed out before, the end of the Cold War led to an increase in mandate of peace operations which can be classified as peacebuilding. With the emergence of peacebuilding activities by the international community, another set of norms have come to the fore. Although most countries do participate in UN peacekeeping operations in one way or another, there is no convergence of political systems by these countries. Peacebuilding activities are also likely to reflect such domestic practices, which at the same time has been one of the main criticisms by critical approaches to peacebuilding (Pugh, 2004). Some global actors are very open about the kinds of goals and norms that they want to pursue through peacekeeping missions. For instance, from a European perspective “peacekeeping has evolved from its traditional role of maintaining a safe and secure environment to include elements like election observation missions, support for police and the judiciary in states recovering from the ravages of conflict, promotion of the rule of law and respect for human rights” (Delegation of the European Commission to the USA, 2008, p. 2). While there is a consensus around peacebuilding that includes state-building activities, India and China both prefer on principle traditional peacekeeping within a Westphalian framework. For instance, countries such as China have been placing their troops’ emphasis on the creation of stability in government and reconstruction of infrastructure amongst others (Zhao, 2010). However, both China and India have participated in several multi-dimensional (non-traditional) PKOs, which indicates their flexibility.

On a macro level, therefore, there are two sets of norms affecting the study and framing of UNPKO missions. One is international in nature and depends on whether a government follows more of a Westphalian or Post-Westphalian approach. The other is domestic in nature and reflects states’ desires to see peacekeeping missions mirror political and economic developments at home. This refers to the extent and the way in which they are willing to engage in state-building activities on the one hand, but also affects the regions to which peacekeepers would be sent.

**Peacekeeping Operations**

With the end of the Cold War, as mentioned above, the size, functions, and strategies of peacekeeping missions have altered significantly. Peacekeeping has moved beyond interposition and ceasefire monitoring to include expanded functions like election supervision, nation building, etc. Traditional missions are thus contrasted with what scholars refer to as “new peacekeeping” (Ratner, 1996), or “second generation” missions (Mackinlay & Chopra, 1992). One of the drivers towards a change in approach to peacekeeping is the emergence of “new wars”, which more often are intra-state but internationalised, target civilians, involve scenarios of state failure
and are motivated by economic incentives (A. Bellamy et al., 2010, p. 35; Berdal, 2003; Kaldor, 1999; Newman, 2004). Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998) have made a systematic attempt to classify peacekeeping missions according to their function using a theoretical framework derived from literature on peacekeeping, conflict management and resolution. This classification moves beyond the descriptive case-by-case analyses used before. They argue that treating each mission as unique does not add to building a theory of peacekeeping, and their classification provides an interesting approach to understanding the underlying assumptions of states participating in peacekeeping operations which, in the case of this paper, are China and India.

The most basic distinction has been made between observation and traditional peacekeeping missions (Diehl, 1994; UN 1991). Mackinlay and Chopra (1992) added seven additional mission types beyond this category, varying according to the degree of risk to the peacekeepers (intensity of the mission) and the scope of military assets required for the mission. Another method has been the timing of intervention vis-à-vis the stage of armed conflict (Thurman, 1992). These are often ideal types that are not manifested in the field. Moreover, the same peacekeeping operation may perform multiple functions (for example, nation building and humanitarian assistance). In their more comprehensive typology, Diehl et al (1998) construct a taxonomy of peacekeeping operation types based largely on function. They identify 12 relevant characteristics and code each mission type according to those characteristics. These categories are not mutually exclusive and can exist either simultaneously or sequentially. These categories include traditional peacekeeping, observation, collective enforcement, election supervision, humanitarian assistance, state/nation building, pacification, preventive deployment, arms control verification, protective services, intervention in support for democracy, and sanctions enforcement.

An application of this typology and different theoretical approaches discussed above would provide a framework to systematically analyze Chinese and Indian approaches to peacekeeping. In the following sections, we will follow a two-fold approach. First, the paper will look at how Chinese and Indian engagement fit conceptually into the theoretical frameworks reviewed above. Analyzing policy documents, government declarations and academic literature on peacekeeping emerging from these two case countries will expose the theoretical frameworks used for understanding international peacekeeping. Second, looking at overall participation in peacekeeping missions and strategies used, the paper will review how their model of peacekeeping fits into a traditional or rather a multidimensional approach, such as peacebuilding.
3. China and UN Peacekeeping Operations

Since the 1990s, China has transformed from a staunch opponent of peacekeeping operations to one of the main troop-contributing countries. In January 2013, China deployed over 1,868 personnel under the flag of the United Nations (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2013a). In terms of its budget contributions, China currently contributes 2.93% of the total UN Peacekeeping budget, compared to 27.14% by the US (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2013b). "According to the Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, China’s contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget will increase from just over 3 percent of the total budget today, to more than 6 percent by 2015" (Wong, 2013) This has resulted in a sharp increase in its assessment rate in recent years. China has not been carrying out missions outside of the UN framework (unlike several European countries, the US and NATO), instead emphasizing the core principles of the UN mandate, host country consent, minimal use of force and involvement of regional partners (International Crisis Group, 2009a, p. 18).

The increase in Chinese participation in UNPKO has been attributed to political, economic and military reasons. Politically, it is a core interest of the Chinese government to create its image as a responsible stakeholder on the global stage, and participation in peacekeeping missions is one of the key ways to achieve this goal. As Chen Bingde, chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), said, “China regards participation in international peacekeeping missions as an important way to perform its duty as a responsible country and safeguard world peace” (Jie 2011). Secondly, the vast majority of peacekeeping missions are based in African countries, many of which entertain close economic and trade relations with Chinese companies and investors (Bi 2011). This is not unusual, since around three quarters of UN peacekeepers are in Africa. Stability in countries such as Congo or Sudan therefore represents a core interest for successful economic cooperation. Thus most of the latest literature on Chinese peacekeeping investigates its involvement and intentions in UN missions to African countries (Ayenagbo, Njobvu, Sossou, & Tozoun, 2012; Mathews, 2013). Lastly, Chinese military and naval forces have traditionally not acquired much experience in overseas and foreign missions. Peacekeeping missions as well as special antipiracy cooperation provide peaceful opportunities to expose the PLA and the navy to foreign missions and other militaries (Gippner, 2011).

Peacekeeping operations form part of Chinese defense policy and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). However, as pointed out above, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also plays a role in the decision-making. In a way, they could therefore be seen as a hybrid. The main
motivation – projection of the image as a responsible power – stems from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than the military, for example, whose main priority is the maintenance of national security and for which peacekeeping in its present form is not considered a priority. Further, Ling points out, “The personal accounts of former Chinese peacekeepers currently available have all been issued through official media outlets that seek to reinforce the image of China as a responsible power that supports international peace and security, rather than exploring how serving in international missions has changed Chinese peacekeepers’ attitudes toward procedural protections, human rights and political inclusiveness” (2007, p. 49).

**Academic Debates on Chinese Participation in Peacekeeping**

From an academic perspective, Krister Karlsson has made an attempt to analyze how Chinese behavior in UN Peacekeeping missions from 2000-2010 was framed based on the theory of ‘offensive realism’, according to which multilateral peace operations are a tool that can facilitate self-interested, power-seeking behavior by major military powers (Karlsson, 2011). However, instead of undertaking “muscular peace-making”, which one would expect following Karlsson’s argument, China projects its image as a responsible power by repairing roads, rebuilding bridges and schools, and providing medical services to the local communities (Bi, 2011). Furthermore, combat troop training and readiness is significantly limited because the PLA has no actual combat experience since the China-Vietnam border conflict came to an end in 1989. According to Karlsson, this helps explain the practical reasons behind Beijing’s resistance to committing combat troops to UN peace operations. However, Karlsson’s perspective does not cover the crucial importance of the principle of non-interference for Chinese decision-making, which causes a general resistance to infringing on other states’ sovereignty and has been claimed to characterize the Chinese way of engagement in peacekeeping.

There have been several attempts by Chinese scholars to understand and contrast the Chinese approach to peacekeeping to that of other countries (Ayenagbo et al., 2012; Gill & Huang, 2009; Hirono & Lanteigne, 2011; Huang, 2011; Pang, 2007; Suzuki, 2011; H.-H. Wang, 2011; Zhang, 2011; Zhao, 2010). A researcher at the Central Party School (of the Communist Party) in Beijing has chosen to juxtapose the Chinese perspective to the “Western” perspective. In line with Pugh’s criticism (2004) of underlying agendas affecting UN Peacekeeping missions, he identifies a certain set of priorities for Chinese decision makers when they engage in UN peacekeeping (see Table 2). Most importantly, Zhao accepts that both perspectives are inherently normative and relate to the legitimacy of the
state, which is “liberal democracy” in the Western understanding and “development” in the Chinese view. This suggests that attitudes towards peacebuilding are inherently influenced by and mirror domestic norms and principles. The criteria focus, principles, strategic culture and methods of peacebuilding approaches then follow from these. For instance, Zhao underlines that Western peacebuilding focuses on creating liberal democratic institutions that would lead to good governance, while Chinese peacebuilding is aimed at creating stability as a precondition for economic development by supporting governments regardless of the political system in place. As emphasized above, this in turn relates to the Chinese emphasis on sovereignty embodied in the crucial principle of non-intervention or non-interference. The distinction of the two approaches is indeed useful to systematically analyse approaches followed by different countries. A key drawback to this simplistic contrasting is the generalization of “the West”, as some of the distinctions are clearly oriented to U.S. behavior. For instance, in the category of principles, actors such as the EU also firmly subscribe to non-intervention, which means missions can only take place with the host country’s consent.

Table 2 Different Perspectives on Peacebuilding (Zhao, 2010, p. 92)

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<th>Western perspective</th>
<th>China’s perspective</th>
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<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Liberal democracy priority</td>
<td>Development priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Good governance</td>
<td>Good government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principle</td>
<td>Democracy promotion</td>
<td>Assistance orientation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Necessary intervention</td>
<td>Non-intervention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Culture</td>
<td>Pre-emptive</td>
<td>Reactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Top-down &amp; bottom-up management:</td>
<td>Top-down management:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set for new constitution; hold</td>
<td>Strengthen state capacity;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>national election; build multi-</td>
<td>enhance national identifica-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>party system; strengthen civil</td>
<td>tion and national reconcili-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>society, etc.</td>
<td>ation; promote economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>recovery etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>Challenge local ownership</td>
<td>Lack of public participation</td>
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In contrast to the neoliberal agenda ascribed to Western attitudes towards peacekeeping, more recently there have been claims that China might be pursuing an economic agenda in its missions. Although academically it is hard to draw a clear connection, as China has not been acting pre-emptively, Karlsson highlights the case of Sudan, which provides evidence linking
economic and foreign policy interests within the context of peace operations. Sudan was the most significant trade partner of any recipient of significant deployment of Chinese peacekeepers during the 2000s. At the beginning of the decade, China received fewer than 20 percent of all Sudanese exports and by 2007 this share increased to almost 80 percent and currently hovers around 50 percent (Financial Times, 2004). This increasing Chinese share could also be explained, however, by the consequences of Western countries’ sanctions on Sudan, which effectively brought down their relative share. During the 2000s, attempts by the international community to intervene were vetoed by China, while negotiating a consensus-based peacekeeping mission to Sudan and South Sudan at the end of the decade. While several scholars have pointed out a potential link between these economic interests and Chinese voting on peacekeeping missions, clear evidence of this connection is still missing. The case of Darfur is furthermore interesting, as it “stands out as a watershed in China’s approach to intervention” (Chan, 2013; Lee, Chan, & Chan, 2012). China became more actively involved, when compared to previous engagements in Kosovo and Rwanda. Notably, China pushed for the integration of the African Union as a regional institution as an important to the process of conflict resolution.

**Humanitarian Intervention and Non-UN Missions**

Most official reports and academic as well as media analysis point to the key factors and motivators for peacekeeping in creating a responsible image abroad. European arguments along the lines of “we cannot continue watching the human rights violations in country X” have rarely been part of the officially cited Chinese rationale. Instead, human rights violations are often interpreted as a pretext used by western powers for intervention. An example might be China’s approach towards a United Nations Security Council Solution to the crisis in Syria. An often evoked image is that of the outcome of China’s abstention (and implicit approval) at the UNSC vote on a free-flight zone over Libya in 2011. The following intervention and ousting of Libya’s president Gadhafi has frequently been interpreted as excessive interventionism on the side of European countries and their allies (Tisdall, 2011). Drawing a lesson from that, until 2013 China’s veto in the “similar” case of Syria was deemed wise by media outlets such as the Global Times Chinese edition, and in turn by much of the Chinese establishment (Editorial 2012; France24 2012). However, in the light of increasing international pressure and willingness by China to take a stand, such as on the Crimean crisis in Spring 2014, “Chinese policy makers will find it increasingly difficult to balance the need to safeguard its interests with the desire to assure the international community of its commitment to peace and security (Geoxavier, 2012).
Evolution of Chinese Attitudes to Peacekeeping

The main issue that remains to be analysed is the impact of these peacekeeping missions back home in China on public and academic discourses. In contrast to UNSC debates, national Chinese views on peacekeeping have been increasingly positive, due to “growing confidence in the country’s foreign policy-making skills, concerns about [...] American unipolarity and the need to bolster ‘traditional’ peacekeeping practices based on consent and respect for sovereignty” and increasing enthusiasm about multilateralism (Hirono 2011; Pang 2005). Officially, even combat force contributions have been under discussion since December 2008. Among the Chinese public, the issue reached the headlines when eight “martyrs” – four civilian police and four visiting officials – were killed in the peacekeeping mission in Haiti in January 2010. The Haiti mission furthermore demonstrated a less punitive approach on the Chinese side, since Haiti had never recognized the PRC and maintained ties with the Taiwanese government. The academic community in China around the study of peacekeeping has also witnessed a sharp increase over the past few years. There is a growing corpus of literature, supplemented by several “landmark conferences” such as that in Beijing in 2009 and the SIPRI-IFS conference on China in peace support operations in 2010 (Gippner 2011; Hirono 2011: 246). While a systematic approach to the study of peacekeeping in China is still lacking, another academic from the China Peacekeeping Police Training Center calls for the establishment of a “Discipline of Peacekeeping”, which allow the redefinition and conceptualization of peacekeeping (X. Wang, 2012; Zhang, 2011).

The liberal bias of most modern day peacekeeping which was pointed out by critical theorists such as Michael Pugh in the early 2000s has been part of Chinese perspectives on the issue for a long time and was the core tenet of Chinese resistance to participation before the end of the Cold War. Thus, China’s refusal to participate in UNPKO during the Cold War is largely related to its international image at the time, where peacekeeping was seen as an imperialist enterprise. Today, the strong adherence to the principle of non-interference clearly has its roots in the rejection of international responses to domestic conflicts in the first decades of the People’s Republic. Even after the change in position, however, critical approaches to Chinese attitudes to peacekeeping deserve more attention. One step in that direction was made by a Japanese researcher who looked at the influence of “paternalistic Chinese discourses” which allow China to participate in intrusive peacekeeping (Suzuki 2011). Using the quasi-official annual CASS publication *China Modernization Report*, the author identifies this paternalism as rooted in the discourse on modernization and a subsequent hierarchical worldview. Modernization theory divides a country’s
development into three stages, epitomized by the “agricultural revolution”, the “industrial revolution” and the “intelligence revolution”. Paired with other factors such as ethnocentrism and racism, Suzuki argues, China has already advanced to a superior role as a “primary developing state” as opposed to many African states which still “lack in development” (quotes from the China Modernization Report), which in turn legitimizes Chinese participation in interventionist operations. Having revisited some of the trends in conceptual underpinnings for Chinese participation in UN Peacekeeping, the following section will look at participation in peacekeeping missions and strategies used by the Chinese government.

Patterns of Participation in Peacekeeping Operations: Mission Size and Type
China has been pursuing a very specialized style of peacekeeping consisting of non-combat troops, focusing on engineering and medical duties, as well as police units and military observers. While military observers are generally part of international UN teams, engineers and medical teams are organized into all-Chinese contingents who work and live together. As of July 2012, China is involved in twelve missions: MINURSO, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNFICYP, UNIFIL, UNIMIL, UNMISS, UNMIT, UNOCI, UNSMIS, and UNTSO. Furthermore, a 140-strong police unit is trained for deployment to Liberia. Since January 2011, Major General Chao Liu is the Force Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force to Cyprus.

China has successfully participated in more than eighteen international missions to date. Reports from the field, both from official documents and interviews, indicate that Chinese peacekeepers such as engineering companies, transportation companies and medical teams have acquired an excellent reputation and have won repeated acclaim for good conduct such as the Peace Medal of Honour or the Special Contribution Award to the Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (Gill & Huang, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2009b). The Chinese government takes great pride in the fact that China is the biggest troop-contributing country of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council with a share of 57%, compared to France (28%), the UK (8%), the US (4%) and Russia (2,5%) (Lecarte, 2013, p. 2). Going beyond government statements, this statement is also frequently evoked in policy and academic writing.

Generally speaking, as part of its traditional principles of peacekeeping, China does not participate in non-UN missions. If a mission cannot be authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC), it usually violates China’s principle of multilateralism and non-interference. Other analyses have also pointed to the fact that the UNSC is the organ in which China internationally
holds the most power (Olson & Prestowitz, 2011, p. 45). Thus, it strongly supports any peacekeeping missions under the UN while applying the non-interference principle to other missions, criticizing other actors, esp. the US, for its interventionist stance. Notwithstanding, China has established a strategic dialogue with NATO, which includes recognising NATO’s role in the operations in Afghanistan, for example (Sánchez-Cacicedo, 2010, p. 25; Zhongying, 2005, p. 101). Although the Naval Operation Atalanta was initiated through resolution 1816 by the UNSC, it is an EU mission coordinating the protection of the sea line of communication (SLOC) through the Gulf of Eden. Thus, Chinese participation in Atalanta could be indicating a retreat from its strict adherence to the principle of participating in UN-led missions only.

Chinese academic discourse is also concerned with mission operationalization, especially evaluating the present state of peacekeeping in China and the future directions it could take, as well as improving existing peacekeeping structures. In the Chinese academic discussion, several articles concern themselves with an evaluation of the present state of peacekeeping in China as well as its future direction. The two main strands of the discussion concern the re-definition and conceptualization of international peacekeeping on the one hand (Wang 2012b; Zhang 2011), and the improvement of Chinese peacekeeping structures on the other (Wang 2012a). In a publication by the China Peacekeeping Police Training Center in the Chinese People’s Armed Police Forces Academy in Langfang, Zhang argues that a dilemma arises as UN peacekeepers are tasked with far too many peacebuilding activities, such as the rebuilding of infrastructure and capacity building for institutions. Instead, the UN should redefine its tasks and strengthen the capacities and role of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which at the moment coordinates the various actors involved in post-conflict peacebuilding (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, 2013). The author even goes so far as to demand the PBC assume the leadership capacity of peacebuilding missions instead of simply using existing peacekeeping capacities for the task (Zhang, 2011, p. 1).

Finally, the country’s peacekeeping training facilities have developed since it decided to adopt a relatively active policy in UNPKO in 1999, sharp increases in personnel taking place in 2004. It can thus be concluded that using peacekeeping first and foremost to appear as an internationally responsible actor and demonstrating this to other countries is key to understanding the malleability of China’s future role in international peacekeeping. Although China is usually cited as a classic Westphalian example, recent events in Libya and South Sudan have demonstrated a softening of the country’s stance on non-interference. At the same time, peacekeeping is much more easily defined as an instrument of international
relations. Until recently, China saw peacekeeping as an instrument vis-à-vis the global community. With recent increases in trade and investment relations in the world and with several host countries of peacekeeping missions, we are likely to see a new, more pragmatic dimension to the theory and practice of peacekeeping in China. It is clear that both China and India are seeking more discursive power in this field.

4. India and UN Peacekeeping Operations

This section will analyze the main approaches India follows regarding participation in international peacekeeping missions. An overarching framework or theory is not necessarily evident as the country does not have a single, comprehensive white paper on peacekeeping missions. Rather, it is here deduced by looking at policy statements, academic writings, and actual participation in missions over the years. This is then linked to the broad theoretical approaches used to conceptualize peacekeeping outlined previously. One can thus attempt to identify and understand whether there is in fact an ‘Indian’ approach to peacekeeping.

India has had a long and consistent history of participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, starting with the deployment to Gaza as early as the 1950s. At present, it is the third largest Troop and Police Contributing Country (TPCC) in the world (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2013c), contributing around 8,000 soldiers and police at any given time. By the end of 2011, it had contributed a total of 163,000 personnel and participated in forty-three missions. India is also member of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission as one of the top five providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN Peacekeeping operations. Kumar (2010) argues that this massive participation in International Peacekeeping indicates Delhi’s inclusion of peacemaking capabilities in its foreign policy doctrine.

Peacekeeping within a Realist Paradigm?

India’s participation in peacekeeping missions is partly in line with the realist paradigm discussed above, since peacekeeping missions were first conceptualized as a tool of diplomacy, enabling the government to increase international clout and, to an extent, subsidizing the maintenance of large armed forces, as will be shown below. At the same time, the rhetoric used to justify participation in peacekeeping missions follows the ‘solidarist’ line of camaraderie with newly decolonized countries, which are often where most conflicts are located nowadays, especially within the framework of the Non-Alignment Movement. This section will look at the foreign policy
justifications used to explain Indian participation in international peacekeeping.

In fact, within the country these are the three broad historical reasons often cited to explain India’s participation in peacekeeping operations: the size of its armed forces, lack of such forces in other parts of the newly decolonized world, and influence in world affairs through its role in the Non-Aligned Movement (Thakur and Banerjee, 2003). As part of its commitment to international peace and security written in the Indian constitution under Article 51 (Part IV), along with a long-term foreign policy commitment to supporting the process of decolonization, India has increasingly participated in peacekeeping operations. However, it is important to note here that Indian participation in peacekeeping has been overwhelmingly within the UN framework, with the exception of the bilateral peacekeeping mission to Sri Lanka in 1987.

Used as a foreign policy tool, international peacekeeping missions were thus used by India to establish solidarity and better relations with newly decolonized countries and maintain an influential position and leading role within the Non-Alignment movement. The use of Non Alignment as a tool for foreign policy and for conceptualizing international relations is evident most clearly in India’s participation in peacekeeping missions. Having gained independence before many other nations in Asia and Africa, “India made it a foreign policy priority to support freedom for other colonies” (Banerjee, 2003). Many civil wars in Africa were a direct consequence of post-colonial struggles, and a commitment to UN involvement in these cases was reiterated by the Indian foreign policy establishment in which India pledged “commitment to the principles of peace and justice as enshrined in the United Nations Charter” (Saksena, 1995). Since then, participation in United Nations peacekeeping has been accorded a high priority in Indian foreign policy.

Recent debates show there is an increasing trend towards the participation in peacekeeping to fulfill international political aspirations. Competition with economically advanced countries like Germany and Japan to gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is often cited as a reason to improve India’s international credibility through participation in UNPKO (Krishnasamy & Weigold, 2003). It is also seen as a tool to improve bilateral and multilateral relations, “a blend between the larger goal of peacekeeping and narrower goal of bilateral relations” (Nambiar, 2011).

India’s self-perception as a “global peacekeeper” is reflected in the consistency and extent of its participation in UNPKO. “Reliability” as a peacekeeper is often highlighted in international and national writings within India on the subject (see Pant, 2000; Thakur, 2006; Nambiar, 2011). India has been singled out as having one of the longest and most consistent records
of participation in UNPKO, amongst other third-world peacekeepers (Bullion 1997).

All debates in India reiterate that its “pro active” commitment to UNPKO is motivated by great power ambitions to enhance its international identity and image (Pant, 2000; Ministry, 2010). The motivations behind peacekeeping are thus clearly geared towards playing a greater role in global politics. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an expansion in India’s United Nations agenda, where it has by and large shown support for global norms like environmental management, human rights and sustainable development. It is as part of this agenda that India’s UNPK commitments have increased in the post-Cold War era. As Prime Minister Gujral said in his address to the UN assembly, “as a country that places very great store on the UN’s capacity to contribute to international peace and security (and peacekeeping activities)... India has vital interests in the UN” (Krishnasamy/Weigold 2003).

To sum up, in the aftermath of the Brahimi Report on the practice of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations from 2000, there has been a critical assessment of India’s role in peacekeeping looking at negative and positive drivers behind participation in IPKO (Sidhu, 2011). While the positive drivers include aspirations for a permanent seat in the UNSC and the desire to be seen as a ‘responsible global actor’, peacekeeping is instrumentalized for sustaining India’s position as an emerging power as well as negotiating for a greater role in the UN system. The Indian Foreign Secretary, Sugata Bose, emphasized in his speech in 2010 that “India has been at the forefront of this move, seeking an enhanced global role as a permanent member of the reformed Security Council, commensurate with its size, capabilities, contribution to UN peacekeeping operations and impeccable track record in upholding the UN system” (Bose, 2010). At the same time, it is worth noting that a major critique of peacekeeping participation under the UN is gathering momentum in policy circles in India. It is increasingly viewed as a mission for underdeveloped countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, since permanent members of the Security Council make a limited contribution to troop numbers in the UN peacekeeping operations.12

Strategic national interests in securing peace in regions such as Africa and Afghanistan accompanied by renewed assertions of ‘soft power’ are particularly stressed. India’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions shows a growing flexibility in both the nature and degree of involvement in multilateral coalitions, though this does not extend to the use of force. As Kumar (2010) notes, the Indian peacekeeping approach does accept the use of force in situations of grave civilian threat, but only if authorized by an appropriate UN mandate. Negative drivers cited by the report suggest that the economic boom of the 2000s has largely nullified the financial benefits
derived from participation in UN peacekeeping. Loss of life during peacekeeping operations as well as charges of corruption and even criminality levied at peacekeeping forces abroad are a recurring concern.

**Sovereignty Norm**

As Bellamy et al (2010) point out, there is a tension between Westphalian and post-Westphalian conceptions of peace operations even within the UN, especially concerning the scope of multilateral authority vis-à-vis sovereign authority, and the legitimacy of peace operations. Within the UN structure, two aspects of India’s approach to peacekeeping can be observed. First, it still aims to steer a middle path as part of its ‘Non-Alignment’ approach and is keen not to violate sovereignty norms, i.e., it agrees to participate in peacekeeping only when the host state consents. Tension between state sovereignty and international intervention is particularly strong in India, borne out of the collective memory of colonization as well as attempts to retain an autonomous foreign policy in a bipolar world during the Cold War. Thus, in its early post-independence years, it emphasized state autonomy even as it believed in engaging internationally (Thakur and Banerjee, 2003). “The role of the UN must be based on impartiality, equity and non interference” (IANS 2011). Second, there is also a selectivity criterion applied to participation in UNPKO; for example, India declined to participate in the conflict in East Timor which broke out on the question of ethnic separatism, as it resonates closer to home and to the Kashmir conflict. “Delhi is apprehensive of internationalizing the Kashmir issue, largely due to historical resentment towards outside interference in the region and because it is critical to national security” (Sanchez-Cacicedo 2010, pg 35).

Moreover, India has traditionally stayed away from regional groupings and security structures like NATO and as a matter of policy does not get involved in regions where other states have more pressing strategic interests and hence are willing to commit troops (Nambiar, 2009). For instance, non-participation in Yugoslavia and the Balkan crisis is explained using this rationale. Interviews with the Ministry of Defense and the Army Directorate of Affairs stressed that India does not participate in non-UN missions as it seeks to retain autonomy in foreign policy and avoid undue interference which is often perceived to be a by-product of participating in regional alliances. India has also shown a propensity for bilateral relations in its foreign, security and trade policy generally.

**Humanitarian Intervention and Non-UN Missions**

The sovereignty norm extends further to India’s attitude towards humanitarian interventions and non-UN missions. According to the UN Charter, peacekeeping can be authorized under Chapter VI and VII of the
declaration. While the former describes peacekeeping mandated by the UN Security Council to investigate and mediate in disputes, the latter focuses on authorizing wide-ranging sanctions as well as the use of military force and active combat to end conflict. Experts in India are in favour of peacekeeping missions under Chapter VI and strongly argue against ‘interventions’ under Chapter VII. Though it differs from case to case when one looks at the country’s voting behavior in the UN General Assembly, interviewees overwhelmingly argued that Indian peacekeeping missions fall under Chapter VI and that ‘humanitarian intervention’ is often a ruse used by powerful nations to violate national sovereignty, are counterproductive and leave state structures weakened in their wake.

The only exception to this was the deployment of Indian Peacekeeping Forces to Sri Lanka at the request of Colombo (rather as part of an agreement with the Sri Lankan government – Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987) in 1987. However, the negative repercussions of the Sri Lankan intervention reverberated through Indian domestic politics and are often taken as a lesson against outside intervention, especially in the immediate neighborhood. Internal conflict situations in Jammu and Kashmir also complicated the situation. India is thus willing to countenance multilateral actions that enjoy host-state consent and UN authorization, but opposing intervention remains an essential principle.\textsuperscript{14}

Indian representatives to the UN have repeatedly stated that the UN Security Council should “respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states” unless the situation is “a clear threat to international peace and security”.\textsuperscript{15} Non-UN missions such as the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo in 1999 also evoked scathing and unequivocal condemnation in India, which was seen as a violation of international norms and against the provisions of the UN Charter which amounted to unprovoked aggression (for a detailed account, see Nambiar, 2000). International actors should “be more sensitive to the issue of sovereignty”.\textsuperscript{16} Emphasizing state sovereignty, many voices in India believe that military and humanitarian intervention should be replaced by ‘preventive diplomacy’.

\textbf{Patterns of Participation in Peacekeeping Operations: Mission Size and Type}

As of July 2012, India has participated in 43 UN peacekeeping missions altogether and was providing 8,109 troops at the time.\textsuperscript{17} An analysis of mission size and development demonstrates that Indian participation has been primarily in terms of combat troops and fighting contingents. Of its participation in 10 active UN missions until July 2012, ‘contingent troops’ have seen maximum presence, with the highest numbering up to 3,600 troops in MONUSCO.\textsuperscript{18} Of ‘civilian’ staff, India provides a large number of
police personnel under ‘Form Police Unit’ and what the UN classifies as ‘Experts on Mission’. Mission make-up illustrates that the kinds of duties performed include active combat and ceasefire monitoring as well as peacebuilding duties by civilian and police personnel. However, troop and contingent size show that the focus is very much on traditional peacekeeping activities, and less on second generation peacekeeping or peacebuilding efforts.

Involvement at senior/decision-making levels as Mission Commanders has been significantly less. Indian presence is ‘troop heavy’, with significantly less representation at the decision-making level at UN headquarters in New York – an issue that comes up frequently in interviews with army personnel who have participated in Peacekeeping Operations.\textsuperscript{19} Police personnel and the civilian component of the peacekeeping contingents have only recently increased.

Geographical Proximity
The focus of India’s peacebuilding operations has traditionally been outside Asia, since regional interference is seen as a threat to the balance of power (Sanchez-Cacicedo, 2010). The principle of peaceful co-existence is the keystone of its foreign policy, enshrined also in the ‘Gujral doctrine’ of the 1990s which acknowledged the value of establishing non-frictional and cordial relations with its neighbours (Ibid, p.31).\textsuperscript{20} Therefore, it is argued that India is most comfortable participating in peacekeeping operations taking place in tertiary regions such as the African continent. Its engagement in regions of proximity resulted in a bitter experience in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, and has seen only limited engagement in Afghanistan in the form of economic aid and reconstruction. Within the South Asian region, therefore, India is extremely wary of violating sovereignty norms and anything that might be construed as political interference.

5. Conclusion
In an effort to compare and contrast Chinese and Indian roles in United Nations Peacekeeping, we have identified differences in the sheer size of deployment – India has a much longer history of participation and currently deploys almost five times as many troops and police when compared to China. Furthermore, the types of contingents have been very different. While India has a long tradition of sending combat troops and police units as blue helmets, Chinese peacekeepers have mostly been medical teams, transport staff, and engineers, ruling out Chinese combat troops. Recent media reports on a United Nations Mission to Mali in July 2013, however, claim that China will send combat troops for the first time (The Economist, 2013).
While China and India tend to differ at the level of their contributions, there is an alignment of the broader theoretical underpinnings of their participation. Both countries continue to emphasize their preference for traditional peacekeeping at the rhetorical level. As part of this reasoning, there is also a fear that current UN operations could become more far reaching, which could have spillover effects on the domestic politics of these countries (Bajpai, 2008; Zhongying, 2005). Wary of what is characterized as ‘new interventionism’ in Kosovo, Iraq, and to some extent Libya, both countries highlight the need for UNPKO to be carried out under the mandate of the UN Security Council. “Several member states are all too willing to expend resources to effect regime change in the name of protecting civilians”.21 As Sanchez-Cacicedo (2010) notes, and as is demonstrated in this paper, both Chinese and Indian foreign policy, respectively, are based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence with other countries. This shows how Westphalian principles of sovereignty and non-interference remain at the core of engagement by both of these actors.

However, it can be noted that both countries have become more pragmatic in their foreign policy approach as future “responsible powers”. India provided support to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), provided bilateral aid and offered support to NATO’s ISAF mission in the country (Swaine, 2008; Radha Kumar, 2010). China demonstrated its different attitude in reaction to the consequences of the Arab Spring when abstaining in the UNSC voting regarding Libya and Syria. Chinese and Indian involvement in different types of missions which go beyond traditional peacekeeping also point to a change in the international outlook and evolving foreign policy of both these countries, possibly in tandem with their rising global status and the need to utilize peacekeeping as a means of greater participation in the global governance system. India’s use of its peacekeeping history in its bid for a permanent membership at the UN Security Council is telling in this regard. There is an observable change in both countries’ approaches to peacekeeping as they aim to strike a balance between Westphalian concerns and a greater role in international politics.

In conclusion, therefore, the respective discourses in both countries point to a particular approach to international peacekeeping borrowing heavily from both realist and solidarist understandings of peacekeeping operations. This paper has tried to apply existing theoretical frameworks for understanding peacekeeping to the approaches followed by India and China. However, the discussion above also shows that an overall theoretical
framework cannot be used to fully explain the Indian and Chinese approaches to peacekeeping; thus, there is some value to looking at indigenous discourses and mission strategies emerging from both these countries which conceptualize international relations differently.

NOTES

1. Pugh, 2004: 47
2. Fabian, 1971
5. Sandole, 2010:12
7. Pugh, 2004
8. Richmond, 1998
9. China has also participated in UNPKO in other regions, such as the missions in East Timor, Afghanistan, Haiti, Lebanon, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo and Lebanon.
10. Besides focusing on economic and security interests, some studies have also in the Chinese case investigated common discourses from similar philosophical traditions, that of Confucianism and Ubuntu, which both focus on collective achievements and aid Chinese peacekeeping presence in Africa (Herman & Szanajda, 2013).
11. Data based on Department of UN Peacekeeping, quoted in Banerjee (forthcoming)
12. See “Time to Abandon UN Peacekeeping”, Pragmatic Euphony blog, January 2008
13. Interviews conducted by author in New Delhi between May-October 2013, at various policy making bodies and think tanks dealing with peacekeeping.
14. As demonstrated in India’s advocacy for other alternatives in the cases of Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor.
19. Interviews conducted by author in New Delhi, between May-October 2013.
20. See Sengupta, 2007 for a detailed discussion on the Gujral Doctrine, relevant to this paper are the points that 1) bilateral agreements will give concessions to weaker and smaller neighbours, and 2) India must remove from its own mind threat perceptions from neighbours except in the case of Pakistan (quoted in Sánchez-Cacicedo 2010, ft.84, p.31

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21. Statement of India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Hardip Puri, at the UNSC Debate on Protection of Civilians (2009)

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